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Abstract 
Anarchism has often been marginalised and misunderstood by 
mainstream political thought and practice. I show that anarchists 
actually have a valuable and distinctive contribution to make to 
politics,, by showing that some reasons for marginalisation are 
mistakes. Anarchists are said to be: 1) terrorists; 2) nihilists; 3) 
skeptics; 4) primitivists; and 5), to demand an impossible utopia. I 
deal quickly with the first two of these reasons for marginalisation, by 
showing that they are historically inaccurate. Chapter 2 shows that 
anarchists are not in general skeptics, by analysis of the 
misrepresentation of historical anarchism and skepticism in some 
recent philosophical literature. Chapter 3 shows that anarchists are 
not in general primitivists, by analysis of two representatives of the 
tradition, William Godwin and Peter Kropotkin. Chapter 4 explains the 
mistaken accusation of primitivism, and discovers in that explanation 
a common anarchist rhetorical trope of comparison between different 
human social forms. The main body of the thesis then theorises and 
deploys a form of argument, based on this trope,. to show that the 
anarchist utopia is possible. Chapters 5 to 8 develop a conceptual 
toolkit for the comparative analysis of human sociability; chapters 9 
to 13 deploy it to analyse and compare some exemplary social forms, 
and to discover in them real fragments of anarchic sociability. I 
conclude that, because humans really have lived in these amongst 
many other ways, an anarchist utopia, which I construct from these 
fragments, is one social possibility for creatures like us. 
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1* 
Introduction 
Anarchism has often been marginalised and misunderstood by 
mainstream political thought and practice. I show in this thesis that 
anarchists actually have a valuable and distinctive contribution to 
make to politics. But first,, I consider some of the reasons for 
marginalisation. 
1.1 Five marginalisations 
I suggest that there are five important reasons for the marginalisation 
of anarchism, and that all are mistakes. The first two are culturally- 
sanctioned images of anarchists which distort our perception. First, 
there is an image immortalised and satirised by Joseph Conrad in The 
Secret Agent (1993; first published 1907). Conrad's "Professor' 
expresses his pathological hatred for everything with calculated 
violence. He carries a bomb with him at all times, so as never to be 
taken alive by the police; he hands out explosive to anyone who asks 
for it, for whatever purpose; he devotes his life to a search for "The 
perfect detonator" (Conrad 1993: 61). His only interests are bomb- 
making and the violent destruction of everything around him. There 
certainly have been anarchist terrorists: Francois-Claudius Ravachol, 
Emile Henry, perhaps Alexander Berkman. But they are in the 
minority; their activity was largely confined to the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly in 
France and the United States'; many other anarchists repudiated their 
actions; and in any case, what political position can claim that no-one 
has ever committed violence in its name? Supporters of states, in 
particular, need to recognise that far more violence, including terrorist 
1 For sensationalist contemporary accounts, see Schaack (1889) and 
Vizetelli (1911); for the era of propaganda by deed in historical 
context, see for instance Joll (1979: chapter 5). 
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violence, has been done by states, through their institutions, and in 
their names, than by anarchists. This is not a new point: 
For every bomb manufactured by an Anarchist, many millions 
are manufactured by governments, and for every man killed by 
Anarchist violence, many millions are killed by the violence of 
States. We may, therefore, dismiss from our minds the whole 
question of violence, which plays so large a part in the popular 
imagination, since it is neither essential nor peculiar to those 
who adopt the Anarchist position. (Russell 1918: 38) 
But the image of the wild-eyed, bearded anarchist with the Tom-and- 
Jerry bomb has not disappeared. Nonetheless it is not an accurate 
picture of most anarchists, nor of the claims and results of anarchist 
theory. 
Second, there is an image immortalised and satirised in 
"Anarchy in the UK": 
I am an antichrist, 
I am an anarchist, 
Don't know what I want, 
But I know how to get it, 
I wanna destroy... (The Sex Pistols 1977., my transcription) 
In this image, the anarchist is a pathetic and ineffectual nihilist, 
vehemently rejecting everything but lacking any idea of how to 
replace it. If asked what a better world would be like, she has no 
answer. Again, there have been self-described anarchists who are like 
this. But again, they are in the minority. Anarchist literature - the 
work of William Godwin, Peter Kropotkin, Colin Ward or Murray 
Bookchin, to note a few examples - shows that anarchists have not 
lacked ideas of what they want, and have not typically been much 
enamoured of destruction for its own sake (which is not to say that 
some have not argued, like many Marxists, that violent revolution is 
the only effective way to change our world). 
These false images are easily refuted, but less easily removed: 
myths have their own historical momentum, and a reasoned 
argument that they are mistaken is not always enough to lay them to 
rest. The other three reasons for marginalisation are harder to refute, 
and my responses to them will make up the bulk of this thesis. The 
third and fourth reasons are of the same type: both picture anarchists 
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as holding some theoretical position so obviously wrong, or so 
problematic in practice, as to be immediately unacceptable. The third 
reason for marginalisation is the claim that anarchists are extreme 
political skeptics who deny the possibility of legitimate authority or 
order, just as epistemological skeptics deny the possibility of 
legitimate knowledge-claims. The assumption is that, despite the 
hermeneutic utility of the figure of "the skeptic" or 'the anarchist" as an 
imagined interlocutor, no-one could reasonably endorse her position. I 
refute this reason for marginalisation in chapter 2. The fourth reason 
is that anarchists are primitivists: nostalgic for a mythical golden age, 
or over-optimistic about human nature, or both. I refute and explain it 
in chapters 3&4. 
The fifth reason for the marginalisation of anarchism is perhaps 
the most obvious and I think the most interesting, and a large part of 
this thesis is devoted to responding to it. It is the belief that anarchist 
utopianism is unacceptable, because of both the weakness of utopian 
argument-forms, and the unavailability to us of the anarchist utopia. 
Anarchists are relegated to the margins of political discourse because 
they use a marginal form of political argument, and demand and work 
for something which we cannot attain. This second is an accusation 
which some anarchists have gleefully appropriated: in Paris in 1968, 
"Street posters declared paradoxically 'Be Realistic: Demand the 
Impossible" (Marshall 1993: xii). I will argue: 1) that utopianism (of a 
specified form) is a reasonable way of carrying out political thinking 
and intervention; and 2) that the anarchist utopia is in fact possible. 
Humans are capable of organising themselves in the way that 
anarchists have typically demanded and worked for, and utopianism is 
one reasonable way of arguing and working for that possibility. 
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1.2 Anarchists and academics 
Anarchists have often been marginalised in and even excluded from 
academic conversation, for at least these five reasons; they have 
often isolated themselves by refusing to deal with thinkers 
compromised by working for states. As an anarchist in an academic 
context, I think both reasons for not talking to one another are 
mistakes. Academics can learn something from anarchists, and vice 
versa, and nobody need be called an extremist or a lackey. 
My main purpose here is to display the value of, and to extend, 
the anarchist tradition, by correcting some mistakes about anarchism, 
and most importantly by showing that the anarchist utopia is possible. 
But while carrying out that purpose, I also intend to show that 
anarchists and mainstream academics can learn from, and benefit by 
talking to, each other. 
1.3 Norms and facts 
Like most political theories and ideologies, anarchism involves both 
normative and factual elements. The two are not always easily 
distinguishable, because one claim can do both jobs. If, for instance, 
we claim that humans are all equally God's creatures, we make both 
an assertion of fact about the world, and a moral demand about how 
we should treat one another. However, to the extent that the two 
sides are distinguishable, I concentrate on the factual elements of 
anarchist thought. Anarchist moral demands are not particularly 
distinctive, and anarchists have not typically been much interested in 
doing moral philosophy: most anarchists, like many other people, 
believe that domination, violence, inequality and slavery are bad 
things, that equality, freedom, self-determination and peace are good 
things, and that there are more pressing tasks than finding a formal 
justification of these claims. The distinctiveness of anarchism, and for 
me its main interest, is in the factual claims that anarchists make 
about the possibilities of human sociability. So, my project here is to 
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elaborate and defend these factual claims about how humans can live 
together, not to defend a moral theory. I answer the critic who argues 
that the anarchist utopia is impossible, but not the critic who argues 
that it would be a morally bad way to live. 
1.4 Hope, possibility and probability 
I think that the anarchist utopia is possible, and hope that it will be 
realised. Hope can be analysed as involving the belief that its 
objective is (logically and perhaps physically) possible, or as also 
involving the further belief that it is probable (see for instance Day 
1969; 1 am indebted to Catriona McKinnon for this point). Like any 
other theorist with moral and political commitments, who hopes for a 
better world,, I am involved in a difficulty. We want to say much more 
than that our preferred state of affairs is merely possible: many 
things are possible. But judging how probable it is that some social 
form will be realised, or that some social change will happen, is very 
difficult. The conditions for either are extremely complex, and include 
tiny, contingent, unknown and perhaps unknowable elements. Many 
realisations and changes which seem on their face quite unlikely - 
including, as I suggest in chapter 9, the current ubiquity of states - 
nevertheless happened. So, I avoid the probability question about the 
anarchist utopia. I do not know how to answer it, and doubt that 
anyone else does, either. I argue that the anarchist utopia is possible, 
meaning that it is within the real social, as well as the logical and 
physical, range of possible human ways of life, but without making 
any claims about how likely it is to be realised, now or at any 
particular time. 
My point in making this distinction of the implications of hope 
is, first, to disclaim three ambitions. I do not intend to write about: 1) 
revolutionary tactics; 2) the direction or telos of current or general 
social change; nor 3) our chances of creating an anarchist utopia, 
now. Second, to distinguish my project: I am concerned here to argue 
for the availability to us of an anarchist way of life, where 'us' is 
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understood as 'humans' and 'availability' as 'being within the joint 
social experience of humanity'. Minimally, then, my hope for the 
anarchist utopia's realisation can be analysed as involving the claim 
that such a way of life is socially possible for humans, which I support 
in later chapters by showing that it is within the joint social 
experience of humans. 
1.5 The variety of anarchism 
This thesis is about anarchism. But the problem with that statement is 
that it is not immediately obvious what anarchism in general is. As 
James Joll remarks, "Anyone who has tried to write about anarchism 
sometimes comes to a point at which he wonders just what it is he is 
writing about" (Joll 1976: 1092). Noam Chomsky may be right that "It 
would be hopeless to try to encompass all of these conflicting 
tendencies [of anarchism] in some general theory or ideology" 
(Chomsky 1970: vii). Or, as Michael Freeden expresses the point, 
perhaps 'anarchism' is just an "Umbrella term that covers a cluster of 
concepts whose totality can be made to pull in entirely different 
ideological directions" (Freeden 1996: 311). 'Anarchism' may be 
nothing more than a catch-all name for a disparate collection of fringe 
theorists, extremists and cranks, with little in common. In order to 
give shape to that thought, and to provide materials for chapters 2& 
3,, 1 now display some of the generalisations which have been made 
about, and the characterisations and taxonomies which have been 
made of, anarchism. 
In the 1790s, the French Republican Directory attacked its 
political enemies as 'anarchists: 
By 'anarchists' the Directory means these men covered in 
crimes, stained with blood, and fattened by rapine, enemies of 
laws they do not make and of all governments in which they do 
not govern, who preach liberty and practice despotism, speak of 
fraternity and slaughter their brothers ... ; tyrants, slaves, servile 
adulators of the clever dominator who can subjugate them, 
capable in a word of all excesses, all basenesses, and all crimes. 
(quoted in Woodcock 1963: 8-9). 
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Most anarchists would want to dispute this definition. But what might 
they, or even an equally unfriendly commentator, offer in its place? 
Characterisations of anarchism and of anarchists have varied in the 
common character they identify, in the claims they take to be central, 
and in the thinkers and movements they include or emphasise. 
According to Isaac Kramnick, anarchists are distinguished by their 
"Common conviction of superiority": 
Above the mediocre, the petty,, the base, the dull, and the 
deceived, stands the anarchist... convinced of his superiority of 
intellect or feeling. No surprise, then,, that as political thought 
anarchism has traditionally been the expression of an intellectual 
or artistic elite. Like Abbie Hoffmann, the anarchist has always 
stood apart from the "Pig Nation, "' which he sees so mindlessly 
unaware of its misery and mediocrity. (Kramnick 1972: 114-5) 
According to Cesare Lombroso, they are distinguished by a peculiar 
physiology. In the nineteenth century: 
Professor Lombroso of Turin University was able to solve the 
problems of definition and categorisation. After having studied 
many anarchists he concluded that anarchists possessed certain 
well-defined physiological characteristics which were easily 
discernable; for example, exaggerated plagiocephaly, facial 
asymmetry, cranial abnormalities (ultrabrachycephaly), large jaw 
bone, exaggerated zygomas, enormous frontal sinus, anomalies 
of the eyes, ears, nose and teeth, anomalous coloration of the 
skin, and neuro-pathological anomalies. (Carlson 1972: 6-7) 
These are only a few examples. Anarchists have been characterised 
by their enemies in a wide variety of incompatible ways. 
However, those enemies may just be confused. In 1897, EV 
Zenker noted that ""Since the extraordinary danger of anarchist 
doctrines is firmly fixed as a dogma in the minds of the vast majority 
of mankind, it is apparently quite unnecessary to obtain any 
information about its real character in order to pronounce a decided, 
and often a decisive, judgement upon it" (Zenker 1897: v). John Clark 
made a similar point nearly a century later, regretting that "'It is not 
unusual for academic 'scholars" to gather no more evidence about the 
nature of anarchism than the derivation of the term, after which they 
can ascend to the heights of abstraction, paying attention neither to 
social history nor to the history of ideas"' (Clark 1984: 117). Perhaps, 
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then,, the conflicting negative characterisations I have quoted arise 
from ignorance or even malice. But the difficulty with this claim is that 
sympathetic commentators, and even anarchists themselves, have 
disagreed just as much as have their enemies about how to 
characterise anarchism. 
Anarchism "May be described as the doctrine that all the affairs 
of men should be managed by individuals or voluntary associations, 
and that the State should be abolished" (Tucker 1972: 16). But then 
again, a ""Mental shift into a timeless world, out of progress and freed 
from material temptations" has been seen as "The necessary leap of 
faith for the true black anarchist" (Woodcock 1963: 344). According 
to Alan Ritter, anarchists seek: 
To combine the greatest individual development with the 
greatest communal unity. Their goal is a society of strongly 
separate persons who are strongly bound together in a group. In 
a full-fledged anarchy, individual and communal tendencies, now 
often contradictory, become mutually reinforcing and coalesce. 
(Ritter 1980: 3) 
Peter Kropotkin introduces anarchism as "The no-government system 
of socialism" (Kropotkin 1993: 72); Eric Hobsbawm, as '"The 
libertarian tradition of communism" (Hobsbawm 1999a: 67). 
According to Alan Carter, anarchism centres on both "Normative 
opposition to certain substantive political inequalities and the 
empirical belief that they principally derive from, are preserved by, or 
are embedded within, certain centralized forms of power" (Carter 
2000: 232). Or, according to commentators including the influential 
Paul Eltzbacher, the only thing anarchists have in common is "That 
they negate the State for our future", and this negation "Has totally 
different meanings" (Eltzbacher 1960: 189) for different anarchists! 
Some analysts and anarchists present anarchism as a 
permanent phenomenon and human tendency. Max Nettlau, for 
instance, believes the context of anarchism to be the whole history of 
the ""Continuous struggle to shake off authoritarian chains and 
restraints": 
The history of anarchist ideas is inseparable from the history of 
all progressive developments and aspirations towards liberty. It 
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therefore starts from the earliest favourable historic moment 
when men first evolved the concept of a free life. (Nettlau 1996: 
1) 
This account allows him to include, for instance, Zeno of Citium (336- 
264 BCE), the founder of the Stoic school, as a proto-anarchist. Peter 
Marshall spreads his net as widely, tracing anarchism's "Origins and 
development from ancient civilisations to the present day" and hoping 
that "A study of anarchism will show that the drive for freedom is not 
only a central part of our collective experience but responds to a 
deeply felt human need" (Marshall 1993: xiii; xiv). He includes, for 
instance, Lao Tzu (born around 604 BCE). Nettlau and Marshall were 
perhaps influenced by Peter Kropotkin's article "Anarchism" in the 
eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (Kropotkin 1995a; 
first published 1911), in which he argues that anarchism's 
"Conception of society... and the tendency which is its dynamic 
expression, have always existed in mankind, in opposition to the 
governing hierarchic conception and tendency" (Kropotkin 1995a: 
236). Kropotkin is particularly concerned to show the anarchic 
tendency at work in Christian heresy, as is James Joll (1979), who 
begins his survey of anarchism with Gnosticism. 
This account of anarchism as a permanent tendency has been 
attacked by a number of authors. George Woodcock, for instance, 
argues that: 
Anarchist historians have confused certain attitudes which lie at 
the core of anarchism... with anarchism as a movement and a 
creed appearing at a certain time in history and having specific 
theories, aims and methods. The core attitudes can certainly be 
found echoing back through history at least to the ancient 
Greeks. But anarchism as a developed, articulate, and clearly 
identifiable trend appears only in the modern era of conscious 
social and political revolutions. (Woodcock 1963: 37) 
Andrew Vincent similarly suggests that those "Who claim that 
anarchism is... an all-pervasive universal and ahistorical libertarian 
disposition" betray "An intellectual weak-mindedness... that ignores 
historical and sociological factors" (Vincent 1992: 116). Both 
Woodcock and Vincent attribute the attempt to show anarchism as 
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permanent to a desire for a mythical ancient lineage for a modern 
phenomenon: "Even a cursory study of the writers claimed shows that 
what has so often been represented as the prehistory of anarchism is 
rather a mythology created to give authority to a movement and its 
theories" (Woodcock 1963: 36-7 )2 . These and other authors 
have 
presented anarchism as a distinctively late-eighteenth and nineteenth 
century phenomenon, which "Began to emerge as a relatively 
coherent theory at about the time of the French Revolution" (Carter 
1971: 1) and was first clearly expressed in William Godwin's Enquiry 
Conceming Political Justice (1985; first published 1793). Or, perhaps, 
not until the European Revolutions of 1848, which: 
Saw the rise of separate working-class political movements. In 
that year Utopian socialism died a more or less natural death, 
and in its place appeared the beginnings of the Communist,, 
Socialist and Anarchist movements of our own day. (Woodcock 
1948: 5-6) 
Or, for that matter, not until around 1880, by which time there was a 
self-conscious anarchist movement within the International. 
Even if we ignore supposed forerunners like Lao Tzu, Zeno, or 
the Anabaptists, there is still a difficulty about who counts as an 
anarchist. Eltzbacher, for instance, bases his characterisation on 
seven anarchist sages: William Godwin, Peter Kropotkin, Michael 
Bakunin, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Leo Tolstoy, Max Stirner and 
Benjamin Tucker. His "Assumption that anarchist theoretical wisdom 
is crystallised in his seven subjects" (Eltzbacher 1960: 182, editor's 
n ote 3) has both influenced and been challenged by later analysts. 
Fowler (1972) replaces Tucker with Alexander Herzen, but otherwise 
leaves the list unchanged. Ritter limits himself to Godwin, Proudhon, 
Bakunin and Kropotkin, "Whose contributions to anarchist theory are 
universally regarded as most seminal", and rejects Stirner on the 
grounds that "His argument lacks the cogency it needs to be included 
in this analytic study of anarchist thought" (Ritter 1980: 5; 6). 
' The phenomenon of political myth-making is not confined to 
anarchism: see for instance Tudor (1972) and 12.1. 
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Crowder (1991) follows him. Carter (1971) invokes Eltzbacher"s 
seven, but insists on the importance of Errico Malatesta, Josiah 
Warren, Henry David Thoreau, Elisee Reclus and Emma Goldman, and 
of anarchist movements in Russia with Nestor Makhno and in Spain 
with Buenaventura Durutti. Any complete account of anarchism also 
ought to take account of more recent work by, for instance, Colin 
Ward, Paul Goodman,, Murray Bookchin and Hakim Bey. 
However widely the net is cast, many taxonomies have been 
developed to categorise the different anarchisms it catches, which can 
be split along various faultlines between different movements, 
theorists and episodes. For instance, there is an often rancorous 
division between libertarian (right-wing) and socialist (left-wing) 
anarchists. For another instance, ""There has always been a conflict 
within anarchism between the two traditions of determinism and 
utopianism" (Otter 1966: 305). And having started, we can identify 
fractures between millennialist and progressivist, violent and pacifist, 
sacral and atheist, activist and philosophical, gradualist and 
revolutionary, and conspiratorial and educational anarchisms. 
Horowitz (1964) distinguishes anarchism into utilitarian, peasant, 
anarcho-syndica list, collectivist, conspiratorial, communist, 
individualist and pacifist forms. 
Another possible division is geographical. According to Gerald 
Brenan, American and non-industrial European anarchisms are 
entirely different, grounded in different economic circumstances: 
""American anarchism [is] an ultra-liberal doctrine suited to industrial 
countries with a middle-class standard of life, [but] Bakunin is the 
creator of the peasant anarchism of Southern and Eastern Europe" 
(Brenan 2000: 131-2). Similarly, according to Max Nettlau, ""There 
was very little mutual knowledge"' between the American and 
European anarchists, and "Ample room for both movements to 
function without any interference on either side, so that one was 
hardly aware of the existence of the other" (Nettlau 1996: 39). 
' To be fair to Eltzbacher, he does not assume this: he makes a 
complex attempt at a logical proof of it. 
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Specifically Spanish anarchism has sometimes been presented as 
radically different from other anarchisms, much as Spain has 
sometimes been presented as radically different from the rest of 
Europe (Brenan 2000). 
Once we have started to divide anarchism up, it is difficult to 
stop, because individual anarchists differ so much from each other. 
Godwin's utilitarian, gradualist anarchism, shaped by dissenting 
Christianity, is a world away from Bakunin's revolutionary rhetoric, 
love of conspiracy and pan-Slavic nationalism. Stirner's egoism has 
little in common with Kropotkin's evolutionary communism, and 
indeed Stirner is ""'The epitome of almost everything which 
revolutionaries of Kropotkin's tradition came to oppose" (Fleming 
1979: 20). "Stirner's consuming egoism, Herzen's elegant 
ambiguities,, and Kropotkin's breathless positivism apparently lie far 
apart" (Fowler 1972: 739 )4. Once we realise that we also have to take 
into account, for instance, the Japanese anarchist movement (Crump 
1993), or anarchist involvement in working-class activism in Brazil 
during the First World War (Wolfe 1991), we may decide that 
anarchism is not a single phenomenon at all. Perhaps there are many 
anarchisms, sharing little but the name. 
Even the name may be problematic. Godwin never used it, and 
many of Proudhon's followers have preferred to call themselves 
"mutualists'. The pacifist Tolstoy did not call himself an anarchist, on 
the grounds that 'the anarchists' preached violent revolution and 
attempted "To destroy violence by violence, by terrorism, dynamite 
bombs and daggers" (Tolstoy 1990: 69). Worse,, acceptance of the 
name has often been ironic, temporary or unwilling. As Daniel Guerin 
points out, Proudhon took "Malicious pleasure" (Guerin 1970: 12) in 
the confusion he caused by using 'anarchy' and 'anarchist' in both 
positive and pejorative senses, and he abandoned the name entirely 
in later life, instead calling himself a "federalist'. James Guillaume 
4 Ax Breathless positivism" is, incidentally, a bizarre characterisation of 
Kropotkin's character and measured, empirically grounded writing. 
See chapters 3&4. 
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spoke for many when he "Argued in 1876 that the terms 'anarchist' 
and 'anarchy" expressed only a negative idea "without indicating any 
positive theory' and led to 'distressing ambiguities'" (Fleming 1979: 
16). 
It may be argued that I am needlessly complicating the issue 
by ignoring the most obvious characterisation of anarchism: 
anarchists are anti-statists. This claim is often grounded on the 
observation that "anarchism, 'anarchy' and 'anarchist' are derived 
"From Medieval Latin anarchia, from Greek anarkhia, from anarkhos 
without a ruler, from AN- [not; without] + arkh- leader" (Collins 
English Dictionary). So, 'anarchy' must be the condition of lacking a 
ruler, 'anarchism' the position which demands and works for that 
condition, and an 'anarchist' a person who holds that position. But 
etymology does not govern meaning. That anarchism has come to be 
called 'anarchism' by some long series of borrowings, baptisms, 
extensions and creative misunderstandings does not tell us anything 
about the beliefs and activities of the people who are now called 
anarchists. Consider how much can be discovered about modern 
western liberals by noting that 'liberal' derives "From Latin liberalis of 
freedom" (ibid), or about Pope John Paul II by noting that 'Catholic' 
derives "From Latin catholicus, from Greek katholikos universal, from 
katholou in general, from kata- according to + holos whole" (ibid). 
This etymological information does not enable us to derive the Pope 
or the Catholic Church's position on the trinity, or on gay marriage, or 
on any other particular issue. Similarly, that 'anarchy, 'anarchism' 
and 'anarchist' have the etymology they do tells us next to nothing 
about anarchism and anarchists. 
That the 'obvious' answer is often derived in this faulty way 
does not show that it is false, but there are other reasons to think 
that it is, at best, not very useful. 1) Anarchists very often are 
opposed to states, but they are not the only people who are. Many 
Marxists look forward to states' obsolescence and destruction (Engels 
1969; Lenin 1992; Marx 1977). Recent anti-capitalist and anti- 
globalisation protesters attack states amongst other institutions: "'The 
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co re institutions of global capitalism are the multinational 
corporations, the leading capitalist states and the international 
institutions that reflect their interests" (Callinicos 2001: 111). So, 
being against states is not a distinguishing characteristic of 
anarchism. 2) Anarchists are often opposed to states as (large and 
important) examples of some more general category, such as 
oppressive institutions, which also includes other features of our 
current arrangements, such as capitalism and organised religion. So, 
being against states is not a complete characterisation of anarchism. 
3) Although anarchists do perform the negative act of opposing 
states, they also spend a great deal of time and effort on the positive 
acts of discovery, analysis and celebration of alternative social forms 
(a practice which I take up in later chapters), and of working for 
anarchic organisation and justice. So, even if all and only anarchists 
could be characterised as anti-statists, that would again not be a 
complete characterisation of anarchism. It would be no more useful 
than a characterisation of humans as featherless bipeds: as it 
happens true, but uninteresting. 
Finally, 4) the 'obvious" answer may be suspect because it has 
not always seemed so obvious. Until comparatively recently, the 
'intuitively obvious' characterisation of anarchists was that they are 
nihilistic terrorists (that is, the Secret Agent characterisation I gave as 
the first reason for the marginalisation of anarchism, in 1.1). Zenker 
(1897), Eltzbacher (1960) and Russell (1918; quoted in 1.1) all warn 
against this simplistic characterisation. That the supposedly obvious 
answer to the problem of characterising anarchism has such a short 
history should, at least, make us wonder how firmly grounded it is. 
The characterisation of anarchism as anti-statism is at best unhelpful. 
I do not intend to make the peculiar claim that anti-statism has 
nothing at all to do with anarchism, but only to argue that "anti- 
statism' is not a particularly useful answer to the complex historical 
question, What is anarchism? It does not catch enough of anarchists' 
concerns or claims. 
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In this section I have sketched the variety of anarchism by 
noting some of the various and contradictory characterisations and 
taxonomies of anarchism which have been given, and then argued 
that one common solution to the problem of variety fails. I do not 
offer an alternative solution. Anarchism is various, and there are no 
clear central claims that one must accept, or activities in which one 
must take part, in order to be an anarchist (see further 3.3). So, this 
thesis cannot be "about anarchism' in the same way that it could, 
perhaps, be 'about being a member of the Church of England ; for a 
partial account of the claims and activities involved in that, see for 
instance The Book of Common Prayer. But this is not a problem 
unique to anarchism: being a liberal or a socialist, for instance, 
involves similar ambiguities. There is no Book of Common Liberalism, 
either. 
This negative claim - that it is not obvious what anarchism in 
general is - is intended as a starting point. I have not argued that 
there is no unity to the anarchist tradition, but only that we should 
not be confident that we know in what that unity consists. I will have 
more to say in later chapters about what we can and cannot say 
about anarchism in general. 
Despite the variation of anarchism, we can make some 
taxonomic genera I isations, and it is helpful to do so here in order to 
distinguish my mode of argument from others. Arguments for 
anarchism (the position) or for the possibility of anarchy (the way of 
life) have often fallen into four broad types. 
First, and perhaps most familiarly, they have taken the form of 
a radical polemic which appeals to hazy concepts of freedom and 
human solidarity, which is often more passionate than coherent, and 
which can be found in pamphlets available at meetings, gigs and 
protests. It is one form of a much wider political phenomenon, also 
involved in many other radical causes and traditions, and not to be 
despised, but not considered further here. 
Second, and perhaps most familiarly to academic political 
philosophers, there is the "philosophical anarchism" discussed by 
1.1m WON 
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Robert Paul Wolff and otherS5. which takes anarchism to be skepticism 
about the justification of the state or about political obligation. I 
consider it, and the way in which it has distorted perception of the 
broader anarchist tradition, in chapter 2. 
Third, there is a strand of argument exemplified by William 
Godwin (1985), which supports both anarchism and the possibility of 
anarchy with a progressivist account of human history as tending 
towards an anarchist utopia, and with a picture of human nature 
which emphasises our potential for transformation. I discuss Godwin 
in chapter 3, progressivist and other monolineal accounts of history in 
chapters 8 and 9, and concepts of human nature in chapters 3 and 5. 
Fourth, and finally, there is strand of argument which I unearth 
from the work of Godwin and of Peter Kropotkin in chapter 4, and 
which I extend and theorise in much of the rest of the thesis. It uses 
accounts of, and comparisons between, a variety of human social 
forms to display the possibility of anarchy and to criticise our own 
arrangements by comparison with these alternatives. The form of 
argument I deploy to prove the possibility of the anarchist utopia is 
grounded on and extends this strand of the tradition, but is distinctive 
in two ways: 1) 1 use and refine resources from other traditions., 
especially academic political philosophy, to theorise the comparative 
strategy and to defend it against possible criticisms; and 2) 1 do not 
adopt the occasional tendency to romanticise some of the social 
forms, and especially the non-state social forms, used for comparative 
purposes. 
5RP Wolff (1998), De George (1978), Frankfurt (1973), Ladenson 
(1972),, Martin (1978), Pennock & Chapman (1978), Reiman (1972). 
Simmons (1996), 3 Wolff (1996). 
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1.6 Philosophical minimalism 
My general argumentative strategy, throughout this thesis, is to claim 
as little as possible, and to involve myself in debates only where there 
is a clear benefit in doing so. In line with this minimalist strategy, I 
will in many cases indicate and avoid a debate or claim which lies 
close to my discussion, but which is not relevant to it, or not a helpful 
resource for my stated purposes. I do not intend,, for instance, to 
resolve all the worries we might have about the concept of equality. 
My chapter on that concept (chapter 7) is a necessary piece of 
conceptual apparatus, tailored to my particular purposes and goals, 
and not a general intervention in the analysis of equality (see further 
chapter 5). So,. for instance, a criticism on the grounds that I do not 
consider the ongoing debate about the relationship between equality, 
luck and responsibility would only be telling if the critic could show 
that not considering it damages my conceptual toolkit for analysing 
human sociability, of which chapter 7 forms a part, such that I cannot 
use it for my stated purposes. 
This parsimonious strategy has two major advantages: first, a 
theory of everything is probably impossible, and so theories which 
tend towards them are probably snark-hunts. Rather than taking that 
risk, I specify the claims I prove and the issues I consider, and use 
only those arguments and data which are relevant to them. Second, 
and as already noted, a large part of this thesis (chapters 5-8) is 
devoted to developing a conceptual toolkit for analysing human 
sociability. As I argue by analogy with mapmaking in chapter 5, any 
such toolkit distorts its object in some way. But this is not a problem 
so long as we are aware of the distortion, and have chosen the right 
mapping for our purposes. My general strategy requires me to 
stipulate my purposes clearly, and so allows me to pick the right map 
projection for my task. 
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1.7 Using traditions 
This thesis is a work of political philosophy, which uses philosophical 
methods and draws on selected academic literature to correct 
misapprehensions of and to support (one version of) anarchism. I also 
draw on selected anarchist literature for the same purposes. In 
particular, I draw on the work of William Godwin and Peter Kropotkin, 
to correct misreadings of anarchism, to suggest forms of argument, 
and to characterise an anarchist utopia. Sometimes, the academic and 
the anarchist literatures overlap: the mutual exile I described in 1.2 is 
not complete. 
I also make use of literature from disciplines and traditions in 
which I am not involved, whose methods I do not for the most part 
use, and to whose canons I do not intend to contribute. In particular., 
I use empirical and theoretical material from history, sociology and 
anthropology to justify my claim that the anarchist utopia is within the 
range of human social possibility. This use may seem opportunistic: 
but there are precedents in both the anarchist and the academic 
traditions. Kropotkin, for instance, made considerable use of biology 
and (early) anthropology (see 3.1.2 & 3.2.2). GA Cohen (1978) made 
use of evolutionary theory as part of his reconstruction of Marx's 
theory of history. Barrington Moore's Inequality (1978) and Social 
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1991) are simultaneously 
moral philosophy and historical sociology, written by a sociologist (on 
the moral character of Moore"s work, see Skocpol 1994). 
In general, the boundaries between traditions,, disciplines and 
literatures are not sharp, and we can have good reasons to cross 
them. Certainly, people with different educations and expertises will 
often have different concerns, methods and vocabularies, and we may 
have to guard against misunderstanding and gullibility outside our 
own fields. But that does not entail that we should always stay inside 
them. Where we have reason to believe that the best test of some 
claim is evidence of a kind generated by another discourse, we have 
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reason to use that evidence; wherever we come across a relevant 
argument, we have reason to discuss it. 
One likely criticism of this boundary-crossing strategy is that 
the claims generated by particular disciplines are so bound to their 
particular practices and idioms that they cannot simply be cherry- 
picked in this way. The thought is that the claims of, for instance, 
history, can only be understood and used from within the practices of 
the discipline; history is or has a culture, and as Peter Winch has 
argued, a culture can only be understood from inside (Winch 1988). 
But this thought is inappropriate here, for three reasons. 1) It might 
be the case that four arbitrarily chosen disciplines were so distinct in 
their practices that their practitioners found each other 
incomprehensible, but I deny that this is so for philosophy, history, 
anthropology and sociology. I suggest that as a matter of empirical 
fact these disciplines already overlap considerably, such that 
'boundary-crossing' is actually an overstated description of the 
activity of using one another's results and conceptual tools. 2) 1 
further suggest that, also as a matter of empirical fact, these 
disciplines are embedded in a larger practice, which we might label 
'humanistic scholarship, the concepts and operating procedures of 
which are available to and used by all of them. So, 'boundary- 
crossing' is an even less appropriate description of my activity. 3) 
There is an alternative Winchean thought available, which better 
describes that activity: "Seriously to study another way of life is 
necessarily to seek to extend our own" (Winch 1970: 99). Above, I 
noted precedents for my practice. I now want to add a final one: 
Clifford Geertz suggests that the transformation of anthropology in 
which he was involved, from the 1950s onwards, was partly made by 
the adoption and use of "Tools made elsewhere, in philosophy, 
linguistics, serniotics, history, psychology, sociology, and the cognitive 
sciences" (Geertz 2000a: 13). Geertz and other anthropologists did 
not merely cherry-pick ideas and results from other disciplines, but 
changed their own discipline by crossing its boundaries. Less 
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ambitiously but relatedly, my practice here is changed by the 
practices and results of disciplines other than my own. 
1.8 Neglected riches 
In Liberty Before Liberalism, Quentin Skinner suggests that one task 
for intellectual historians is ""To uncover the often neglected riches of 
our intellectual heritage and display them once more to view" 
(Skinner 1998: 118-9). His archaeological activity has a double 
purpose, somewhat analogous to my purposes here. First, and 
explicitly, the recovery of more or less alien thought can help us "To 
stand back from, and perhaps even to reappraise, some of our current 
assumptions and beliefs" (ibid: 112). For Skinner, the recovery of a 
"Neo-roman theory of free citizens and free states" (ibid and passim) 
might challenge or force us to reflect on the ""Hegemony in political 
philosophy" (ibid: 113) of liberalism. For me, the recovery of some 
anarchist thought from marginalisation is similarly useful. That 
thought may at least challenge, or force us to reflect on, some current 
assumptions and beliefs about human sociability and about political 
philosophy. Skinner's second, implicit purpose is political. Although he 
stops short of actually recommending the neo-roman theory of liberty 
he exhumes, he is in other contexts openly a republican, and the 
strong implication of the last chapter of Liberty Before Liberalism is 
that he thinks the neo-roman theory superior to its hegemonic liberal 
competitor. I am more explicit: I openly argue that the version of 
anarchism which I develop partly out of the uncovered past anarchist 
thought I consider, is correct. 
I am a political philosopher, not an intellectual historian. My 
interest in anarchist texts is, first, to correct some misreadings and 
false images, but second, and more importantly, to make use of some 
of the ideas and arguments those texts express. I pick up and use 
part of their riches for current philosophical and political purposes. I 
do not intend to produce, for instance, a Skinnerite account of what 
Kropotkin understood himself to be doing by writing and publishing 
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texts in his cultural context (on this methodological stance, see 
Skinner 1988; on Kropotkin, Kinna 1995). My interest is in uncovering 
and using some buried ideas, not in recovering the past for its own 
sake. I do not claim that my readings of the texts I consider are the 
final or only possible ones. They are within the range of reasonable 
readings, while the misreadings I correct are not. 
I emphasise that I do not intend to weave the threads of the 
anarchist tradition I uncover into some claimed 'real' or 'core' 
anarchism, opposed to other pretenders to that crown. The threads I 
do not pick up have as good a claim to be real anarchism as the ones 
I do. I intend to come to a negotiated settlement with, and thereby 
sympathetically to extend, the tradition, not to present myself as its 
one true heir. 
1.9 A sketch utopia 
In chapter 13 1 use some anarchist thought, and the material 
gathered in previous chapters, to describe an anarchist utopia and 
prove it possible. But in order to give some idea of where we are 
heading, I now anticipate that chapter and briefly sketch my utopia. 
In his article ""Anarchism", in the eleventh edition of the 
Enclopaedia Britannica, Kropotkin defines the term. I have given 
reasons in 1.5 to be suspicious of his confidence, but his account is a 
good beginning description of my anarchist utopia: 
[Anarchism is] the name given to a principle or theory of life and 
conduct under which society is conceived without government - 
harmony in such a society being obtained, not by submission to 
law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements 
concluded between the various groups,, territorial and 
professional, freely constituted for the sake of production and 
consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of 
needs and aspirations of a civilized being. In a society developed 
along these lines, the voluntary associations which already now 
begin to cover all the fields of human activity would take a still 
greater extension so as to substitute themselves for the state in 
all its functions. They would represent an interwoven network, 
composed of an infinite variety of groups and federations of all 
sizes and degrees, local, regional, national and international - 
temporary or more or less permanent - for all possible purposes: 
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production, consumption and exchange, communications, 
sanitary arrangements, education, mutual protection, defence of 
the territory, and so on; and, on the other side, for the 
satisfaction of an ever-increasing number of scientific, artistic, 
literary and sociable needs. (Kropotkin 1995a: 233-4). 
My anarchist utopia consists of multiple interwoven networks of social 
humans pursuing their huge variety of interests, from the most basic 
in making a living, to the most subtle in art, science and 
communication. Power is equally distributed in and between these 
networks. Coordination between networks is achieved, not by an 
attempt to unify them into a single territorial hierarchy, but by 
federalisation and agreement. Conflict is not absent, but is limited and 
resolved by mediation and negotiation. Individuals' activity is various 
and varying, not limited to particular tasks by the division of labour. 
Much of this sketch is at present unclear: its individual features 
will be examined and further characterised in later chapters. All I 
intend, by giving it here, is to indicate where we are going. I now 
indicate how we are going to get there. 
1.10 A roadmap 
The chapters of this thesis, and their purposes, are as follows. In 
chapter 21 correct one common misreading of anarchism, which takes 
it to be extreme political skepticism. In chapter 31 correct another, 
which presents anarchists as primitivists. In chapter 4,1 explain this 
second mistake, and discover in the explanation a common anarchist 
rhetorical trope of critical and exemplary comparison between social 
forms. This trope suggests a form of argument, which I go on to use 
to prove my main thesis. However, there is a serious problem with 
that form, and its solution requires some theoretical apparatus. 
Chapters 5-8 provide that apparatus: chapter 5 characterises it in 
general; chapter 6 develops a concept of power; chapter 7, a concept 
of equality; and chapter 8, a model of human sociability. Chapters 9- 
13 then carry out the main argument for the possibility of the 
anarchist utopia by deploying the tools developed in chapters 6-8 to 
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describe some selected examples of human social forms. Chapter 9 
describes states, in their pristine and modern forms; chapter 10, the 
Atlantic slave system; chapter 11, the social form of the Nuer people 
of the Southern Sudan; chapter 12, the anarchic social experiments in 
Spain during its civil war; and chapter 13 describes and proves 
possible the anarchist utopia, and defends utopianism as a form of 
politics. Finally, chapter 14 recapitulates my project and considers its 
results. 
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*Anarchism and Skepticism 
There is a common analogy between anarchism and skepticism, made 
by Robert Ladenson (1972), Jeffrey Reiman (1972), Rex Martin 
(1978) and Jonathan Wolff (1996), amongst others. It is often used to 
ground criticism: anarchists are marginalised on the grounds that 
extreme political skepticism is so peculiar, or so unacceptable in 
practice, that like extreme epistemological skepticism it can 
immediately be rejected. Skepticism and anarchism can be useful 
hermeneutic devices, and 'the skeptic" and 'the anarchist' useful 
imaginary interlocutors, but their positions cannot reasonably be 
endorsed. 
In this chapter I pursue an alternative analogy: even if there 
are forms of anarchism and of skepticism which are structurally 
analogous, each is only one form of a much wider and more various 
tradition, which is misrepresented in particular philosophical 
discourses. To the (considerable) extent that anarchism and 
skepticism in general are understood by reference to these specific 
forms, a fundamental mistake is being made about both. So, first, the 
analogy between anarchism and skepticism in general is that 
philosophical discourses create and use false images of them. Second, 
and more importantly for my overall project: even if skepticism in 
general or in this particular form are unacceptable, this tells us 
nothing about anarchism in general. 
The targets of the double attack on anarchism and skepticism 
are, in fact, philosophical anarchism, particularly as represented by 
Robert Paul Wolff, and what we can call philosophical skepticism. 
According to Ladenson: 
An analogy more appropriate than the [Kantian] one drawn by 
Wolff would be between his doubts about the existence of morally 
legitimate political authority and the radical doubts about the 
existence of an external world which Kant was also concerned to 
refute. The parallel with radical scepticism in the realm of 
epistemology is almost exact. According to this kind of scepticism, 
even after we have checked all the considerations which, even in 
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the widest sense, count as evidence for empirical knowledge, it 
still does not follow that the existence claims one makes about 
physical objects, presumably on the basis of this evidence, are well 
founded. If one asks the sceptic what would be needed in order to 
have good grounds for such claims, over and above the normal 
evidence of sight, touch and so forth, he tells us that nothing 
would or even could do the job. Likewise with Wolff, if asked what 
would be needed to establish the moral legitimacy of a given 
state's authority, over and above showing that it does a tolerably 
good job of serving purposes such as those enumerated in the 
Preamble to the United States Constitution (i. e., the sorts of things 
one would naturally think of as relevant for deciding the issue) he 
would say that nothing could do this. On his view,, no state, in 
principle has had or could have the right to rule. Now the beliefs 
which the radical sceptic about the external world seeks to 
undermine are so basic that they cannot be rejected. Accordingly, 
the fact that a given epistemological theory leads to radical 
scepticism about the external world is a sufficient reason for 
rejecting it. The same is true of Wolff's account of legitimate 
political authority. The fact that it leads to the kind of scepticism 
that it does shows his account to be unacceptable. (Ladenson 
1972: 337) 
This argument relies on at least two dubious claims: first, that we 
have a good idea of what "one" (who? ) would "'naturally" think 
relevant to the question of legitimacy; second, that difficulties in 
putting a conclusion into practice refute the argument that led to it. 
But the interest of Ladenson's claims here is the understanding of 
anarchism and of skepticism which they express, not their cogency. 
Ladenson supposes that (Wolff's) anarchism and (philosophical) 
skepticism are so analogous, and so unacceptable, that both can be 
refuted in a paragraph. 
In 2.1,1 display specifically philosophical anarchism (2.1.1) and 
skepticism (2.1.2) as distinctive projects. In 2.2,1 show that in each 
case, a particular form of anarchism or skepticism is often taken to be 
representative of the whole tradition. In 2.3, that this understanding 
is a mistake, because both anarchism (2.3.1) and skepticism (2.3.2) 
are considerably more various than it allows. I conclude in 2.4 that 
the marginalisation of anarchists on the ground that they are extreme 
skeptics is a mistake, regardless of whether or not skepticism is 
acceptable, because that ground is in general false. 
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2.1 Contexts 
Philosophical anarchism and philosophical skepticism are minority 
positions, stalking horses and subjects of debate in particular 
academic contexts and discourses. In this section I characterise them 
in those contexts. 
Philosophical anarchism and Rawlsianism 
Philosophical anarchism appeared in political philosophy with the 
publication of Robert Paul Wolff's In Defence of Anarchism in 1970 (R 
P Wolff 19981). There are few other self-declared philosophical 
anarchists. James Buchanan and A John Simmons can be claimed. 
Simmons lists "Others... who are frequently identified as defenders of 
some form of philosophical anarchism" (Simmons 1996: 34 note 2) as 
including MBE Smith, Leslie Green, Donald Regan, AD Woozley, 
David Lyons and Joel Feinberg. We might add ]an Narveson. William A 
Edmundson, Chaim Gans, John Horton, Robert Ladenson, David Miller, 
Jeffrey Reiman and Jonathan Wolff have also been involved in the 
debate, but as critics rather than supporters. 
Philosophical anarchism is not the only species of recent 
academic anarchist writing, or of academic writing about anarchism. 
It is distinct, for instance, from Michael Taylor's work on social order 
without states (Taylor 1976,1982 & 1987); from Alan Carter's 
attempt to found an "analytical anarchism' to match analytical 
Marxism (Carter 2000); and from the work of Anthony cle Jesay 
(1985). 1 discuss it here because it has produced a distorted image of 
anarchism in general in the thought of many political philosophers. 
Philosophical anarchism centres on an issue often thought 
fundamental to political philosophy, the justification or legitimacy of 
the state: 
' In order to avoid confusion, I reference Robert Paul Wolff as RP 
Wolff and Jonathan Wolff as J Wolff, throughout this chapter. 
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Why is there a state at all? Or rather, why should there be a 
state at all? What is the justification of the state? The sense that 
these are real questions has come and gone and come again at 
various times; when that sense is present, the questions step in 
as the basic or first questions of political philosophy. (Williams 
1982: 27) 
So, Wolff formulates "The fundamental problem of political 
philosophy" as "How the moral autonomy of the individual can be 
made compatible with the legitimate authority of the state" (R P Wolff 
1998: xxvii). Wolff's work is an extremely negative contribution to 
this wider debate. 
The context in which philosophical anarchism is performed is 
not just political philosophy, but specifically the modern tradition of 
contract theory instigated and exemplified by John Rawls. Rawls is 
widely credited with initiating "A renaissance in social philosophy 
unparalleled in this century" (Blocker & Smith 1980: vii), and many 
pieces of work in the field since are "Best understood in terms of their 
relationship to Rawls" (Kymlicka 2002: 10). 
The post-Rawlsian consensus has three distinctive themes. 1) 
The legitimate form of 'the state 2 is universal: that is, right for all 
people at all times, regardless of culture, history, faith or 
circumstance. 2) The normative ground of this universal state is 
individuals abstracted from most features which might individuate 
them. For the Rawls of A Theory of Justice, the individual is an 
idealised decision-maker behind a veil of ignorance. She is a rational 
deliberator who knows nothing about her capacities and tastes, her 
society, or her place in it. She does "Understand political affairs and 
the principles of economic theory... the basis of social organization and 
the laws of human psychology" (Rawls 1972: 137). That is, she does 
not know a great deal that we do, and does know a great deal that we 
do not. She has no particular allegiances, tastes or history, and is 
unformed by any particular life or social form. Rawls does not suppose 
that real individuals are actually like this: characterising his decision- 
I By which is meant some major social institutions; I give a different 
account of states and 'the state' in chapter 9. 
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makers in this way is a heuristic device for working out the demands 
of justice. But he does suppose that what is relevant about people in 
working out those demands is these characteristics, not the 
characteristics of more familiar individuals. Most importantly, 3) the 
task of political philosophy is to justify some universally legitimate 
state. Rawls' justificatory project uses the device of imagining 
negotiations between his 'individuals' over a state-creating contract, 
as a way of achieving "Reflective equilibrium"' (Rawls 1972: 20) 
between our most firmly-held moral intuitions and theoretical principle 
(see also 5.3). The justificatory argument is that this device gives 
content to, and morally justifies, a notion of "Justice as fairness" 
(ibid: 11 and passim). 
This consensus holds even across what are often regarded as 
deep oppositions: Robert Nozick, for instance, is often thought of as 
Rawls' antithesis, but the central disagreement between them is far 
shallower than is often claimed. Rawls is for, and Nozick against, 
redistribution of wealth. But Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
shares the three themes I identified above. 1) He also regards the 
legitimate form of the state as being right for all people at all times. 
2) He grounds its legitimacy on abstract individuals. For Nozick, the 
individual is essentially a rights-holder: "Individuals have rights, and 
there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating 
their rights)" (Nozick 1974: ix). 3) Nozick's justificatory project 
involves him in constructing a hypothetical history explaining how 
self- interested, rational 'individuals' in a ""State of nature" (Nozick 
1974: 10 and passim) might come to construct a minimal state 
"'Limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, 
theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts"' (ibid: 26). The 
justificatory argument is that if each move towards that state could be 
expected of such "individuals' - because it can be shown to be in their 
interests - and would not violate anyone's rights, then the state is 
justified. Equally, any state for which such a hypothetical history 
cannot be constructed is unjustified. The implied critical conclusion is 
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that no state which does more than Nozick's minimal state, and in 
particular no redistributive state, is justified. 
In general, then, the business of this tradition of political 
philosophy is to investigate the justification of a universal state by 
using theoretical devices involving abstract individuals., even though 
particular theorists differ strongly in the conclusions they reach 
through these shared practices I now show that philosophical 
anarchism is a part of this tradition. 
Wolff explicitly describes his conception of political philosophy 
in the first edition preface to In Defence of Anarchism. He presents 
himself as a seeker after a justification for the state who has both 
failed and shown the failure of other attempts at justification: 
During my first year as a member of the Columbia University 
Philosophy Department,, I taught a course on political philosophy in 
which I boldly announced that I would formulate and then solve 
the fundamental problem of political philosophy. I had no trouble 
formulating the problem - roughly speaking, how the moral 
autonomy of the individual can be made compatible with the 
legitimate authority of the state. I also had no trouble refuting a 
number of supposed solutions which had been put forward by 
various theorists of the democratic state. But midway through the 
semester, I was forced to go before my class, crestfallen and 
embarrassed, to announce that I had failed to discover the grand 
solution. At first, as I struggled with this dilemma, I clung to the 
conviction that a solution lay just around the next conceptual 
corner. When I read papers on the subject to meetings at various 
universities, I was forced again and again to represent myself as 
searching for a theory which I simply could not find. Little by little, 
I began to shift the emphasis of my exposition. Finally - whether 
from philosophical reflection, or simply from chagrin -I came to 
the realization that I was really defending the negative rather than 
looking for the positive. My failure to find any theoretical 
justification for the authority of the state had convinced me that 
there was no justification. In short, I had become a philosophical 
anarchist. (R P Wolff 1998: xxvii-xxviii) 
Wolff's project, which he understands as the "Fundamental problem of 
political philosophy", is to justify the authority of the state. The state in 
question is not a particular, historical institution, but the state in 
general. Wolff's project is the Rawlsian project of justifying a universal 
state, the "Distinctive characteristic"' of which, for him, is its "Supreme 
authority" (ibid: 4). 
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Wolff's negative position in this justificatory project is the double 
claim that, first, all extant attempts to justify the state fail; second, and 
more radically, that no such attempt could succeed. His argument for 
these claims is grounded, as is the Rawlsian project., on abstract 
individuals. Again, these 'individuals' have no particular tastes, 
allegiences or history. Their vital characteristic is their moral autonomy: 
"'The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled"' 
(ibid: 18). 
Wolff"s anti-justificatory argument works as follows: what is 
required in a justification of universal state authority is a way of making 
the autonomy of the 'individual' consistent with the right to command 
and to be obeyed. That is, a demonstration that an 'individual' can obey 
a command, because it is a command and not for any prudential or 
separate moral reasons, and still be autonomous. Wolff denies that 
there can be any such demonstration, and therefore claims that 
'legitimate authority' is analogous to 'round square' or "married 
bachelor': "A morally legitimate state is a logical impossibility" (ibid: 
Vii). 3 
Writers in the Rawlsian tradition, including Wolff, are concerned 
to contribute, by innovation and by criticism, to their shared project of 
justifying a universal state by appeal to abstract individuals. Wolff's 
contribution to this project is extremely negative, but in using the 
tactics and idiom of the debate, he identifies himself as a member of 
the tradition. Wolff's philosophical anarchism is performed as part of the 
Rawlsian tradition, in that Wolff is engaged in its project,, uses its 
tactics, and regards its concerns as central to the whole enterprise of 
political philosophy. 
Of course, there are disanalogies between Wolff and Rawls' 
activities. While both are involved in the project of justifying a universal 
3 Writers including Harry Frankfurt (1973) and Rex Martin (1974) 
have pointed out that Wolff vacillates about this conclusion. 
Sometimes he makes the strong self-contradiction claim; sometimes 
he seems to be claiming only that legitimate authority is so unlikely to 
occur in practice that the possibility can be disregarded. Nonetheless, 
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state, they conceive states somewhat differently. Different Rawlsians, 
including philosophical anarchists, focus on concepts of varying 
inclusiveness, and using varying terminology, within their justificatory 
project. Rawls regards the subject of justice and therefore of 
justification as "The basic structure of society", by which he means: 
The way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation. By major institutions I 
understand the political constitution and the principle economic 
and social arrangements. (Rawls 1972: 7) 
Wolff defines the state in Weberian terms as ""A group of persons who 
have and exercise supreme authority within a given territory" (R P Wolff 
1998: 3) and regards the legitimacy of that authority as the central 
concern of political philosophy. But all I need, in order to show that 
philosophical anarchism appears within the Rawlsian tradition, is to 
show that Wolff and others concerned with philosophical anarchism are 
involved in the same general project of justifying some universal state 
by using theoretical devices involving abstract individuals. No more 
specific claim of similarity, for instance the dubious claim that Wolff's 
concern with political obligation is a special case of Rawls' concern with 
basic structure, is needed. I am identifying a shared project and shared 
tactics, not claiming that Wolff and Rawls' arguments are the same. 
Others debating philosophical anarchism can be shown to be 
involved in the Rawlsian tradition in the same way. They too are 
involved in its justificatory project. Richard De George, for example, 
claims that "The anarchist argues first that no satisfactory external 
justification of the state, law, and government has ever been given 
(hence they have not been justified), and secondly that they cannot be 
justified and so are unjustifiable" (De George 1978: 93). For him too, 
anarchism is a negative position in the justificatory project which 
intends to ground the legitimacy of the state. 
On the grounds of shared project and tactics, I have shown that 
philosophical anarchism appears within the Rawlsian tradition. I now go 
Wolff himself still endorses the strong version (R P Wolff 1998: 2 nd 
edition preface). 
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on to show that philosophical skepticism similarly appears within 
modern epistemology. 
2.1.2 Philosophical skepticism and epistemology 
I show the location of philosophical skepticism in the modern 
epistemological project by considering a representative textbook, 
Jonathan Dancy's Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Dancy 
1985 )4 . Dancy describes his approach to epistemology as being one of 
two available in his ""Anglo-American tradition" (ibid: 1). This approach, 
"Associated with Descartes, starts by considering the challenge of 
scepticism, the claim that knowledge is impossible; and hopes in 
answering this challenge to be driven to expose the nature of what it is 
to know, from which the possibility of knowledge will follow" (ibid: 1-2). 
Descartes was not a skeptic, and neither are Dancy or other modern 
epistemologists who consider skepticism. But skepticism performs a 
vital role as a foil to their arguments, in the person of 'the skeptic. 
Descartes's project, which he carried out in the context of the 
theological debate sparked by Luther's "'*New criterion of religious 
knowledge" (Popkin 1979: 3), was to set knowledge on firm 
foundations, once and for all. His metaphor for this process is 
architectural. When rebuilding one's house, one needs to pull the old 
building down, "Plan carefully", and provide "'Materials and architects" 
and "Some other accomodation in which to be lodged conveniently 
while the work is going on" (Descartes 1968: 45). When rebuilding 
one's knowledge, one pulls down the old work with skeptical arguments, 
and provides a method for building the new, certain science and "A 
provisional moral code" (ibid) to guide action until one can use the 
rebuilt science to do so. Descartes used a wide variety of skeptical 
arguments, both his own and borrowings from classical and 
contemporary writers, to tear down the old, rickety knowledge. His aim 
4 Thomas Kuhn analogously considers science textbooks which 
"'Implicitly... define the legitimate problems and methods of a research 
field"' (Kuhn 1996: 10). 
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was to win the argument against 'the skeptic' in the most crushing way 
possible, and he therefore used the most corrosive skeptical arguments 
he could find, in an "Extreme dramatization of uncertainty" (Williams 
1983: 338). 
Descartes's plan was: 1) to pull down the old, uncertain 
"knowledge' with the strongest skeptical arguments available; 2) to 
rebuild in such a way that the new, certain structure of knowledge 
would be resistant to such attacks; and 3) to ground his life and actions 
on this certain knowledge. Dancy's plan, and the plan of the modern 
epistemologists whom he represents here, is: 1) to attack common 
claims of knowledge with skeptical arguments mostly derived from 
Descartes; and 2) to rebuild in such a way that some or all common- 
sense and scientific claims of knowledge are reinstated. The absence of 
3, the practical results of the exercise, is interesting. Descartes's project 
was an intervention in the reformation debate by a radical Catholic, with 
personal and political consequences. By contrast, modern 
epistemologists are rarely interested in skeptical results for their or our 
ordinary lives. The possibility that, given skeptical arguments, we 
should in reason put less trust in common-sense beliefs and scientific 
proofs, is hardly considered: "If moderns discuss the thought that our 
present life is a dream it is as a problem in epistemology, to be 
neutralized" (Clark 1990: 173). 
There are even fewer self-declared philosophical skeptics than 
there are philosophical anarchists (Unger 1975 is one of the few 
examples). Dancy is far from confident that he has completed his 
Cartesian project: he ends his book with the thought that "Scepticism 
may continue more durable, more seductive and more secure than any 
reply we have found so far" (Dancy 1985: 241). But he does not 
therefore conclude that he actually ought to doubt common sense, 
science, or the existence of the external world. The role of "the skeptic' 
is to be a character in the project of rebuilding knowledge, but the 
skeptic's position is not seriously entertained. It is part of the modern 
epistemologist's project. 
43 
Philosophical skepticism is part of the modern epistemological 
project in the same way that philosophical anarchism is part of the 
Rawlsian project. It is used in the Cartesian project of setting 
knowledge on firm foundations, once and for all. This project, as is 
implied by its central role in Dancy's influential and widely-used 
textbook, is regarded as the defining activity of modern epistemology: 
its central justificatory business. The philosophical skeptic, like the 
philosophical anarchist,, appears in a project for which each is a foil and 
character. 
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I have so far shown that philosophical anarchism is a minority 
position,, stalking horse and subject of debate in Rawlsian political 
philosophy, and that philosophical skepticism is similarly located in 
modern epistemology. This is not a criticism of either of these 
positions, or of the theorists who consider them. The problem is that, 
all too often, writers confidently discuss or criticise philosophical 
anarchism and skepticism as if their understandings and attacks 
applied to anarchism and skepticism in general. I now show this, 
before going on to consider the variation of anarchism and skepticism 
which makes their confidence misplaced. 
2.2 Homogenisation 
As Myles Burnyeat points out, ""The modern philosopher feels free to 
construct skeptical arguments of his own and to describe them as 
'what the skeptic says', without worrying whether any historical 
skeptic did make himself vulnerable to the crushing refutation which 
then follows" (Burnyeat 1983: 1). 1 have already quoted John Clark's 
remark that "It is not unusual for academic 'scholars' to gather no 
more evidence about the nature of anarchism than the derivation of 
the term, after which they can ascend to the heights of abstraction, 
paying attention neither to social history nor to the history of ideas" 
(Clark 1984: 117; see 1.5). In both cases, a lack of historical sense, 
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knowledge or interest leads to a confident but mistaken 
homogenisation of complex, various traditions. 
In the case of anarchism, this homogenisation sometimes 
occurs quite subtly, by a slide from talking about "philosophical 
anarchism" to talking about just 'anarchism '. For example: A John 
Simmons begins with a potentially useful distinction between the 
positive and the negative sides of anarchism. The former involves "A 
vision of autonomous, noncoercive, productive interaction among 
equals, liberated from and without need for distinctively political 
institutions, such as formal legal systems or governments or the 
state" (Simmons 1996: 19). The latter, either "A general critique of 
the state" or a "More limited critique of the specific kinds of political 
arrangements within which most residents of modern political 
societies live" (ibid). Philosophical anarchism, in Simmons' initial 
formulation, is a specific version of the negative side of anarchism. 
But he then moves from presenting philosophical anarchism as a 
particular and limited kind of anarchism, to writing as though all 
anarchisms shared its central characteristics: 
Commitment to one central claim unites all forms of anarchist 
political philosophy: all existing states are illegitimate. I take this 
thesis to be an essential, if not the defining, element of 
anarchism. (ibid: 19-20, my emphasis) 
Although he is aware that philosophical anarchism is a particular, 
limited form of anarchism, Simmons still takes its main characteristic, 
the concern with the justification or legitimacy of the state, to be 
characteristic of all anarchism. 
Simmons' account of the "Essential... element" of anarchism 
assimilates anarchism in general to philosophical anarchism. It allows 
him rapidly to move from his stated intention of discussing the 
second, to talking about the first. So, for example, "The minimal 
moral content of anarchist judgements of state illegitimacy" is that 
"The subjects of illegitimate states have no political obligations" (ibid: 
22, my emphasis); or, for another example, "Like other anarchists, 
philosophical anarchists can defend their central judgements about 
state illegitimacy on either a priori or a posteriori grounds and, like 
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others, they take this judgement to entail the nonexistence of general 
political obligations" (ibid: 23, my emphasis). The difference between 
philosophical and other anarchists is thus smoothed down to a 
difference in practical results (a difference which may remind us of 
the difference between Descartes and Dancy): 
What is distinctive about philosophical anarchism is that its 
judgement of state illegitimacy... does not translate into any 
immediate requirement of opposition to illegitimate states. This 
is what leads many to contrast philosophical anarchism to 
political anarchism. (ibid: 23) 
This admission of difference disguises a large and implausible claim of 
similarity. For Simmons, the only contrast between philosophical and 
other anarchisms is between their consequences for anti-state action. 
Anarchism in general is thus homogenised with philosophical 
anarchism. The philosophical anarchist concern, which is the Rawlsian 
concern, with justifying a universal state, is extended to cover the 
activity and thought of anarchists in general. The only difference, 
apparently, is that philosophical anarchists are quietists. 
Simmons is more subtle, and more sensitive to variation within 
anarchism, than many writers in the debate about philosophical 
anarchism. But even he slides from consideration of specifically 
philosophical anarchism to claims about anarchism in general which 
have little to do with the practices or concerns of most anarchists. 
Modern epistemologists typically talk of 'the skeptic, and Rawlsian 
practitioners of the 'the anarchist, without reference to the historical 
variation and complexity of skepticism and anarchism. I now go on to 
show that this talk misrepresents both. 
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2.3 Variation 
In this section I use the material already gathered in 1.5 on the 
variation of anarchism, and a parallel sketch of the variation of 
skepticism, to show that philosophical anarchism and skepticism are 
distinctive and unrepresentative forms of these wider traditions. 
2.3.1 Anarchisms and philosophical anarchism 
Anarchism is various: anarchism has been characterised in various 
incompatible ways; divided by many taxonomical schemes; and is not 
easily characterisable in general. Philosophical anarchism is distinctive 
as a particular form of this various tradition in at least three ways. 
First, philosophical anarchism is performed in the institutional 
context of universities. By contrast, most other anarchists have been 
writers and activists outside academia. This is not a criticism of 
philosophical anarchists: I am an anarchist in an academic context,, 
think that is a reasonable thing to be, and want to foster 
communication across this boundary (see 1.2). But the institutional 
context of philosophical anarchism does make it distinct from many 
other anarchisms, and means at least that we should be wary of 
supposing that what interests some anarchists in this context also 
interests others outside it. 
Second, philosophical anarchists are involved in the Rawlsian 
project of justifying a universal state by appeal to abstract individuals, 
but this is not typical of anarchists in general. None of the various 
anarchisms and characterisations of anarchism I described in 1.5 were 
concerned with this issue or this tactic. Neither the word "justification' 
nor the word "legitimacy' even appears in the index to George 
Woodcock's classic Anarchism, or to Peter Marshall's more recent 
Demanding the Impossible. Anarchists, as can be seen from such 
histories and compendia, have been involved in a wide range of 
projects. Legitimacy has occasionally been an issue for anarchists, as 
for instance in arguments over the propriety of anarchist involvement 
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in the Republican government in Spain, before and during its civil war 
(see further chapter 12). But this is not the central, only, or even a 
particularly common anarchist concern. 
Third, and as noted in 2.2., philosophical anarchists have 
typically been quietists (there does not seem to be any entailment 
from philosophical anarchism to political inaction, but the two have 
historically gone together). Robert Paul Wolff attempts to show that 
the state is unjustified, not to justify or even to suggest any 
possibility of stateless or otherwise anarchist society. Even though he 
attacks the legitimacy of states, he regards them as useful, and has 
no account of what might carry out their functions in their absence: 
Men's almost universal belief in the legitimacy of the states 
which rule them serves the largely positive social function of 
coordinating the economic and social behaviour of large numbers 
of people in complex, functionally differentiated and integrated 
societies. The fact that their belief is false does not diminish the 
social usefulness of the belief. It is perfectly appropriate to ask: if 
men cease to believe in the authority of the state, what besides 
force and threats will maintain an adequate level of social 
coordination?... I have no pat answer, and I am not even 
possessed of the optimistic faith that an adequate answer can be 
found. But it should be clear that this issue has no direct bearing 
on the correctness of the argument in my book. (R P Wolff 1973: 
304) 
Anarchism, as Wolff understands the term, can be defended without 
any account of anarchic sociability. It is purely a conceptual attack on 
the justification of the state, without any immediate implications for 
social life or action. In contrast, many other anarchists have taken the 
positive side of their anarchism - developing descriptions, and 
working towards the realisation, of an anarchic utopia - to be central 
to their projects, and have spent much of their time and effort on 
activities - pamphleteering and speech-making, founding schools and 
reading groups, conspiracy and fomenting revolution - directed 
towards these aims. 
In these three ways, philosophical anarchism is not 
representative of anarchism in general. My point is not that other 
anarchists disagree with philosophical anarchists in, for instance, 
believing that some universal state can be justified; it is that other 
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anarchists have not taken part in this project at all. They have not 
used its terminology or tactics, have not considered its questions, and 
have not been concerned with its results. I emphasise that I am not 
arguing that Robert Paul Wolff, for instance, is "not really an 
anarchist". I have no monopoly on the use of words: if Wolff chooses 
to call himself a (philosophical) anarchist, he is welcome. My point is 
only that too many thinkers take philosophical anarchism to be 
representative,, or its project and concerns to be typical, of anarchism 
in general, and therefore suppose that a refutation of Wolff is a 
refutation of anarchism in general. This is a mistake. 
2.3.2 Skepticisms and philosophical skepticism 
As discussed in 2.1.2, Descartes used recently rediscovered classical 
skeptical arguments, tactically, as part of his intervention in the 
Reformation debate about knowledge. He intended to rebuild 
knowledge, and his tactical use of skepticism for that purpose has 
been adopted by modern epistemology. But these two appearances of 
skeptical arguments do not exhaust the range of skeptical projects, 
nor of projects making use of skepticism. This section, analogously 
with 1.5, displays the variation of skepticism, and then, analogously 
with 2.3.1, shows that the generalisation assumed in the use of 'the 
skeptic' as a foil for the Cartesian project fails. 
Descartes's use of skepticism is a watershed in its treatment, 
and we might, initially, divide the history of skepticism into two 
periods: before and after Descartes. That is, we might claim that 
there are two skeptical projects. First, classical skepticism, which was 
a therapeutic project intended to show that there was equal rational 
support for particular opposing truth claims, so leading both 
practitioner and interlocutor to suspension of judgement on their 
contest, and from there to tranquillity. Second, the Cartesian project 
already discussed, which uses skeptical arguments to knock down all 
but some privileged source of legitimation for belief, so leaving the 
ground clear for a reconstruction of knowledge on certain foundations, 
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once and for all. Where the classical project attempted to revalue 
knowledge, Descartes and his followers attempted to renovate it. 
However the proposed classical project is itself various. It can 
be divided into Academic and Pyrrhonian projects, distinguished in 
particular by their different institutional contexts. The Academic 
project,, as represented by Arcesilaus, operated in a pedagogical 
context where: 
A pupil would be asked to argue some positive current thesis, 
usually one emanating from the Stoa, and Arcesilaus would 
produce counter-arguments, while allowing the pupil to maintain 
a defence. The intended result was a stalemate, and the 
withholding of assent both from the thesis itself and from its 
denial. (Sedley 1983: 10) 
On the other hand the Pyrrhonian project., as represented by Sextus 
Empiricus, was a personal discipline to be carried on while living: 
In accordance with everyday observances, without holding 
opinions - for we are not able to be utterly inactive. These 
everyday observances seem to be fourfold, and to consist in 
guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of 
laws and customs, and teaching of kinds of expertise. (Sextus 
Empiricus 1994: 9) 
Sextus' interlocutor was not a pupil but himself. How can these two be 
the same project when the locations, activities and stated intentions 
of their practitioners are so different? 
We can go on to note that Descartes is only the best 
remembered of a number of users of the rediscovered skepticism of 
his time: 
Figures such as GF Pico, Omer Talon, Fransisco Sanches, Pedro 
de Valencia, Gentian Hervet, and Michel de Montaigne put 
skepticism to exceedingly different uses. In common with many 
other philosophical doctrines... those of skepticism were 
interpreted, used, modified, and indeed perverted in many 
different ways. (Schmitt 1983: 241) 
There is a wide range of historical and possible skeptical projects, and 
the confident association of skepticism and 'the skeptic' with the 
character in Descartes"s project is an unwarranted generalisation. 
The association of 'the skeptic' with Cartesianism is not even 
appropriate to the modern, common-speech use of 'skepticism'. In 
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ordinary use, that notion is subject to as many changes of sense and 
emphasis as is the related notion of 'realism. 'Skeptic" can have the 
pejorative implication of cynicism, but also the approving implication 
of tough-minded refusal to accept a claim on authority. A "skeptic 
about religion' has 'seen through all the rubbish . 1. Sometimes this 
means not that she has suspended judgement, but that she 
dogmatically rejects religious claims as obvious lies. More positively, a 
skeptic maintains a cautious open-mindedness, guarding herself 
against dangerous enthusiasm. Or, skepticism is a conscious 
technique of scholarship, intended as a guard against wish-fulfilment 
and propaganda, without which "We are apt to slip into complacent 
self-deception and dogmatism" (Kurtz 1992: 9). 'Skeptical' can be 
used both of the claim that X does not exist or is not so - there is no 
God, there is no solution to the problem of political obligation,, 
freemasonry has no historical link with the Templars - and of the 
claim that we do not, or cannot, know whether or not X exists or is 
SO. 
Skepticism has been too varied in its history to support the 
simple generalisation assumed in the confident use of 'the skeptic' in 
modern epistemology. What alternative generalisation it might 
support is an open question. But the Cartesian tactical use of 'the 
skeptic' as a foil is only one, distinctive form of skepticism, and 
cannot represent the whole. 
2.4 Conclusion 
Philosophical anarchism and philosophical skepticism are distinctive 
forms and not representative of anarchism and skepticism in general, 
and are somewhat analogous, as minority negative positions and 
stalking horses in the context of particular, academic justificatory 
projects. Justification is both a moral and an epistemic notion: we 
may expect institutions including states to be morally justified, and 
claims of knowledge to be rationally justified. So, we should not be 
surprised that a position understood as attacking the moral 
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justification of the state is thought analogous to a position understood 
as attacking the rational justification of knowledge. Where the 
analogy is between specifically philosophical anarchism and 
skepticism, it is harmless and may be helpful. But no such limitation is 
made. The analogy is extended, quickly and frequently unnoticed, to 
cover anarchism and skepticism in general, and this is not only 
unwarranted, but serves to maintain the misrepresentation of both in 
modern philosophy. 
I have not attacked Wolff, Dancy, philosophical anarchism or 
philosophical skepticism for adopting their particular projects and 
tactics. I have argued only that those projects and tactics distinguish 
them from anarchism and skepticism in general, in such a way that 
refutations cannot touch these wider traditions. 
I have not intended to argue that the Rawlsian tradition is 
monolithic or unchanging. My purpose has been to discover the 
source of an image of anarchism in a particular historical moment: the 
transformation of political philosophy in the 1970s. Many more recent 
contributions to political philosophy, including contributions by Rawls 
himself (e. g. 1996),, have criticised or modified the emphasis and 
tactics of the project I have described. The thought of Robert Paul 
Wolff is not currently a central concern in political philosophy. 
However, the image of anarchism which was one of the minor 
products of this distinct moment has survived, and was in need of 
criticism. 
I have taken no position on the cogency of specifically 
philosophical anarchism, nor on whether extreme skepticism really is 
unacceptable. My tactic against the marginalisation of anarchists, on 
the grounds that they are skeptics (or that their position is 
significantly analogous to skepticism), has been to show that 
anarchists are not in general (philosophical) skeptics. So, even if 
skepticism is unacceptable, anarchism escapes the diagnosis. 
There is an analogy between anarchism and skepticism: both 
are various traditions which have been mistakenly homogenised by 
particular projects and debates. Within the Rawlsian project, 
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anarchism is homogenised as philosophical anarchismf and thought 
analogous to philosophical skepticism. But this has little to do with 
anarchism in general: the accusation falls at the first hurdle of 
associating it with extreme skepticism. 
53 
Primitivism 
Anarchists are commonly supposed to hold deeply optimistic views 
about human nature, and to be nostalgic for 'primitive, as opposed to 
"civilised'. societies. ""Traditionally, anarchists are seen to possess an 
optimistic conception of human nature, an optimism essential to the 
success of their vision of a stateless society" (Morland 1997: vii). 
According to James Joll, "The fundamental idea that man is by nature 
good and that it is institutions that corrupt him remains the basis of 
all anarchist thought" (Joll 1979: 16), and anarchism shares the 
mental pathology of Christian heretical movements which demand and 
expect "A return to the Golden Age of the Garden of Eden before the 
Fall"' (ibid: 6). Roger Scruton claims that "Typical anarchist beliefs"' 
include that ""Men are benign by nature and corrupted by government" 
(Scruton 1983: 15). Irving Horowitz, that ""Anarchism has as its 
theoretical underpinning an idealization of natural man in contrast and 
in opposition to civilized man... What is offered is a belief in "natural 
man' as more fundamental and historically prior to 'political man'" 
(Horowitz 1974: 16). Norman Barry, that "Communitarian [as 
opposed to libertarian or propertarian] anarchism depends upon an 
optimistic view of human nature as essentially benign and 
cooperative" (Barry 1991: 5). 1 argue here that these are false 
genera lisations. 
Claims that anarchists think like this have often been used to 
ground criticism. Robert Dahl, for instance, offers as "A critique of 
anarchism" (Dahl 1989: 43) the thought that ""While some romantic 
anarchists may imagine our returning to the tiny autonomous groups 
of some preliterate societies, short of a cataclysm that no sane person 
wants, a return to the infancy of the species looks to be impossible or, 
if not impossible, highly undesirable" (ibid: 46). Benjamin Barber, for 
another instance, attacks anarchists because: 
Their view of actual men is wildly romanticized. Hunger, greed, 
ambition, avarice, the will to power, to glory, to honour,, and to 
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security which have played some role in all traditional 
ethnologies find no place in the anarchist portrait of man. 
(Barber 1972: 18) 
Barber directs this attack specifically against American hippy 
anarchists like Abbie Hoffman, but is explicit that he believes the 
tradition from William Godwin onwards to be implicated in this wild 
romanticism. His evidence in fact consists of unsupported claims 
about the elitist psychology of individual anarchists, and a few out-of- 
context quotations. As another example, the only support Horowitz 
can give for his characterisation of anarchism comes from Denis 
Diderot, who, in Horowitz's own words, "Advocated a parliamentary 
monarchism in which representation would be elected by propertied 
classes" (Horowitz 1964: 65-6), and was therefore clearly not an 
anarchist. It is therefore tempting to dismiss the whole line of attack 
as a self-sustaining polemic. 
However, there are two forms of criticism of this type which 
require a more detailed response. I call them accusations of 
'primitivism', for convenience and because each can be related to one 
of the various meanings of "primitive". This chapter will display, 
analyse and refute two important forms of the assertion of anarchist 
primitivism. 
"Primitive' is a complex term. It can mean unsophisticated, 
savage, stupid or childish; pure; original or primary; low or simple; an 
early stage of evolution; a relic or survival in a world that has moved 
on. It can refer to people or societies without sophisticated technology 
or state-like institutions. 'Primitive' stands in some complex relation 
to a cluster of terms including 'savage', "native, 'aboriginal', 
'undeveloped' and 'prehistoric', and also to opposing terms like 
'civilised', 'developed', 'complex, 'sophisticated' and 'modern. We 
should note the term's ideological weight. Calling societies or people 
%primitive' has often been involved in, or even stood for,, justifications 
of marginalisation, oppression, and extermination. The term can also 
be used in a less extreme but still polemical way, to indicate a 
comfortable value judgement: 'we are civilised, they are primitivel. 
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The two meanings of the term which relate to the two criticisms 
of anarchism I discuss here are, 1) primitive as pure, and 2) primitive 
as original or primary. The criticisms which involve these meanings 
are: 1) the claim that anarchism depends on an unrealistic notion of 
uncorrupted human nature; and 2) the claim that anarchists are 
nostalgic for a mythical golden age. I call these the accusations of 
'human nature primitivism' and 'golden age primitivism, respectively, 
and define and respond to each in turn. 
3.1 Anarchism and human nature primitivism 
Ideas of human nature are various, important and contested. The 
range of such ideas includes, for instance,, Christian, liberal, 
conservative individualist, Rousseauian, Darwinian, Freudian, 
existentialist and feminist human natures (for accounts of these and 
more examples, see Chaney 1990 & Loptson 1995). They are 
important,, first, because so much can depend on them: "For 
individuals, the meaning and purpose of our lives, what we ought to 
do or strive for, what we may hope to achieve or to become; for 
human societies, what vision of the human community we may hope 
to work toward and what sort of social changes we should make" 
(Stevenson & Haberman 1998: 3). That is, because very different 
individual and political aims and understandings can be based on 
different accounts of human nature. Second, because claims about 
human nature are often an effective means of criticism, both of 
current arrangements (ibid: 9) and of schemes for their reform 
(Duncan 1983: 5). They are contested both because of their variety 
and their importance. David Morland claims that human nature is in 
fact ""An essentially contested concept" (Morland 1997: 3, my 
emphasis; for more on essential contestation, see 5.1). We can 
accept at least that the idea is a locus of continuing argument, both in 
its own right and as a battleground of political ideologies which 
involve particular claims about human nature. Existentialist and other 
negative claims about human nature - at the limit, that there is no 
56 
such thing - can also perform these functions of grounding aims and 
analysis, and of criticism. 
Historically and typically, an idea of human nature is a set of 
claims that some specified character: 1) is real or permanent or 
transhistorically present in humans; 2) is shared by all humans; 3) 
distinguishes humans by kind and not just by degree from the rest of 
the world, and especially from (other) animals; 4) is separate from 
the distortion and masking which can be created by current 
circumstances; and 5) stands as a moral, social or political norm for 
humans. These components are not necessarily connected. What is 
real or permanent rather than merely apparent or transitory in a 
human might not be shared by all or only other humans, what is 
shared by all humans might not have any normative force, and what 
distinguishes humans from other animals might precisely be the 
distortion of current circumstances. Different ideas of human nature 
make this set of claims about different characters; negative ideas 
deny that some or all of these claims are true of any character. Some 
ideas of human nature have both positive and negative elements: 
some post-Darwinian ideas, for instance, have made the negative 
claim that humans are not distinct in kind from other animals, 
because all are creatures evolved by natural selection, and the 
positive claim that what is shared by humans and other creatures is 
being vehicles for 'selfish genes' (see for instance Dawkins 1989). 
If anarchists are in general human nature primitivists, then 
their shared idea of human nature must be that what is real, 
permanent, ahistorical, shared, distinguishing, separate and 
normative in humans is a nature which is wholly pure and good, 
meaning virtuous, benevolent, altruistic, reasonable, peaceable, 
cooperative or loving (or some combination of some or all of these), 
and not vicious, malicious, selfish, irrational, aggressive or hateful. 
Even if this is the anarchist idea of human nature, that is a criticism of 
anarchism only if the idea is inaccurate, and its inaccuracy is such as 
to make it unusable as a norm. That a claim or story is literally false 
does not necessarily make it useless: it need not be the case that 
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someone called Raphael Hythloday really visited a place called Utopia 
for the idea of Utopia to be a standard of criticism for the real world. 
Similarly, that an account of human nature is literally false does not 
necessarily mean it is unusable. 
There are three ways of defending anarchism against the 
critical accusation of human nature primitivism: first, to show that 
anarchists do not in fact share such an idea of human nature; second, 
to show that this idea is true; or third, to show that although it is 
false it is still useful as a moral, social or political norm. I take the 
first path, and show by counter-example that the accusation is false. 
Some anarchists think it enough, in stating their views of 
human nature, to distance themselves from other anarchists who, 
they suppose, do hold the human nature primitivist view. Jacques 
Ellul (1991), for instance, distinguishes himself from mainstream 
anarchism on two grounds. First, he is a Christian. Second, he does 
not believe that "An anarchist society - with no state, no organisation, 
no hierarchy, and no authorities - is possible" (Ellul 1991: 19). This 
anarchist "Vision or hope of a society with neither authorities nor 
institutions rests on the twofold conviction that people are by nature 
good and that society alone is corrupt" (ibid), but Ellul does not 
accept that account of human nature. He thinks that the "Anarchist 
fight"' (ibid) is worth fighting, but that its goal is unreachable, because 
of flawed (that is, fallen) human nature. Ellul shows that his 
Christianity differentiates him from other anarchists with a concrete 
example. Guy Debord and his Situationist comrades refused to let him 
join: "Since I was a Christian I could not belong to their movement" 
(ibid: 3). But in the case of Ellul's view of human nature, the parallel 
evidence is unsupported attribution of the view with which he 
disagrees to the unnamed "True anarchist" (ibid: 19). 
Other and more famous anarchists, who perhaps wrote before 
the accusation of human nature primitivism became widespread, 
simply state quite different ideas of human nature. The accusation is 
the generalisation that anarchists, as a group, share and use the 
particular idea of human nature defined above. One counter-example 
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is enough to falsify a generalisation, but to make the point more 
strongly, and for further purposes described in 3.3,1 give two: the 
ideas of human nature in the works of Godwin and of Kropotkin. 
3.1.1 Godwin's idea of human nature 
William Godwin was born in 1756, brought up in his family's 
dissenting Christianity, and initially followed his father and 
grandfather into Presbyterian ministry. After a period as minister to a 
congregation of dissenters in Ware, he renounced his faith and, in 
1783, moved to London. He would spend the rest of his life there, 
supporting himself by writing novels, plays, political tracts and 
journalism,, and by borrowing money from, amongst many., his son-in- 
law Percy Shelley. (Godwin 1992; Marshall 1984; Marshall 1986; 
Woodcock 1946. ) 
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1985; first published 
1793), which made Godwin first famous, then caricatured, and finally 
(in combination with his frank memoirs of his wife Mary 
Wollstonecraft) reviled, is a long, confusing and perhaps self- 
contradictory text. It can be read as utilitarian, as extreme rationalist, 
as the effort of a lapsed Christian to restate his faith in secular terms, 
as a celebration of the French revolution, and as a founding work of 
anarchist theory (for discussion of these possible readings, see Philp 
1986, especially part 1). What is important here is the idea of human 
nature which it asserts. 
Godwin's idea of human nature is twofold, and essentially 
critical. He makes two claims, and in each case its value is that it 
refutes an objection to his prescription for and prediction of future 
human sociability: 
I shall attempt to prove two things: first, that the actions and 
dispositions of mankind are the offspring of circumstances and 
events, and not of any original determination that they bring into 
the world; and, secondly, that the great stream of our voluntary 
actions essentially depends, not upon the direct and immediate 
impulses of sense, but upon the decisions of the understanding. 
(Godwin 1985: 97) 
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That is, first, "The characters of men originate in their external 
circumstances" (ibid: 96), and not in any innate characteristics; and 
second, "The voluntary actions of men originate in their opinions" 
(ibid: 116), and not in their passions. So, first, there are no innate 
bars to the transformation of human character; and second, "Our 
prospects of melioration depend on the progress of enquiry and the 
general advancement of knowledge" (ibid: 117). This means that 
through progress in social and political knowledge, the exercise of 
individual judgement, and the transformation of political institutions, 
Godwin's anarchic utopia is realisable. 
It is irrelevant whether or not that claim, or the critical claims 
about human nature which support it, are believable. Anarchists are 
supposed, according to the accusation of human nature primitivism, 
to hold a particular idea of human nature, but Godwin's stated idea is 
utterly unlike it. For him, the only things which are permanent and 
shared in humans are the absence of innate limitation and the 
possibility of true and motivating judgement. This idea of human 
nature does moral and political work only in that it supports the 
practical possibility of a utopia of rational, sincere, mutually 
censorious neighbours always working without partiality for the 
greatest total happiness. That utopia does further work in providing 
both a target for social change and a critical comparison with our 
current arrangements. Godwin not only makes no assertions about 
the innate purity and goodness of humans, but explicitly denies that 
any such claim about innate character could be true. For Godwin, pure 
humans exist only in the imagined future, and only as a result of the 
transformation of current humans and their social institutions, 
through the progress of knowledge. 
This is my first counter-example to the generalisation that 
anarchists are human nature primitivists: Godwin was not. 
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3.1.2 Kropotkin's idea of human nature 
Peter Kropotkin was born in 1842, a younger son of the Russian 
aristocracy. A geographer, naturalist and mathematician, at nineteen 
a personal page of the Tsar Alexander II, and in the 1860s a military 
administrator in Siberia, he repudiated his privilege and scientific 
career to become a revolutionary, political exile and anarchist 
theorist. The major influences on his life and activity were his older 
brother Alexander; the serfs on his family estate; the socialist 
movements, and in particular the Bakuninite Jura Federation, which 
he encountered in Europe; and, most importantly here, Charles 
Darwin, as understood through the Russian evolutionist tradition 
which rejected Darwin's Malthusian metaphor of individualist struggle. 
(Avrich 1988; Kropotkin 1899; Miller 1976; Todes 1987; Woodcock & 
AvakumoviC' 1990. ) 
Kropotkin approaches the idea of human nature in two main 
ways: first, as a defender of the possibility of anarchism and 
communism; and second, as a Darwinian naturalist. 
In the first case, Kropotkin notes that it is a common objection 
to ""Communism, and socialism altogether"' that: 
The idea is so old, and yet it has never been realised. Schemes 
of ideal states haunted the thinkers of ancient Greece; later on, 
the early Christians joined in communist groups; centuries later, 
large communist brotherhoods came into existence during the 
reform movement. Then, the same ideals were revived during 
the great English and French Revolutions; and finally, quite 
lately, in 1848, a revolution, inspired to a great extent with 
socialist ideals, took place in France. 'And yet, you see/ we are 
told, 'how far away is the realization of your schemes. Don't you 
think that there is some fundamental error in your understanding 
of human nature and its needs? " (Kropotkin 1995: 4) 
We might expect a human nature primitivist to respond to this 
pseudo- historical derivation of an idea of human nature - the idea 
that it renders us incapable of communism - with a positive counter- 
assertion. We might expect an anarchist primitivist, in particular, to 
respond with the assertion that real, pure and good human nature, 
61 
which is capable of communism, has only been corrupted and 
thwarted by state reaction. 
Kropotkin does nothing of the sort. Instead, he suggests a 
more careful reading of history which leads him to two conclusions. 1) 
That "Hundreds of millions of men have succeeded in maintaining 
amongst themselves, in their village communities, for many hundreds 
of years, one of the main elements of socialism - the common 
ownership of the chief instrument of production, the land, and the 
apportionment of the same according to the labour capacities of the 
different families" (ibid). And 2) that "All we are authorized to 
conclude is, that mankind has not yet found the proper form for 
combining, on communistic principles, agriculture with a suddenly 
developed industry and a rapidly growing international trade" (ibid: 
5). Far from asserting any permanent characteristic of human nature, 
Kropotkin tentatively interprets the empirical evidence of human 
history. His interest is not in permanent characteristics at all, but in 
some temporary, changing and potentially changeable features of 
human social activity, as they have appeared. Human nature appears 
here only in a criticism of communism, in order that Kropotkin can 
refute that criticism. This concern with history, and with the tentative 
conclusions that can be drawn from it, appears throughout his work. 
In the second case, Kropotkin approaches human nature as a 
naturalist and Darwinian. For Kropotkin, humans are part of the wider 
natural world, and in Mutual Aid (1989; first published in book form 
1902) he attempts to show that cooperation within species including 
the human is a major factor in evolution (not, as has sometimes been 
asserted of him, the only factor). The details and force of this 
argument are irrelevant here. What is important is that far from 
asserting a permanent and pure human nature, Kropotkin uses 
detailed empirical evidence of change and its causes to derive 
tentative conclusions about current humans and their social 
characteristics. Humans are understood in Mutual Aid as part of the 
wider and changing system of nature (and,, in typical nineteenth- 
century evolutionist terms, as high in a hierarchy of development). In 
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an evolutionary world, there can be no human nature in the strong 
sense defined in 3.1, because nothing is permanent or 
transhistorically present in humans. Kropotkin is interested in what 
humans and other creatures have come to be, and how. His central 
conclusion is that humans, as they have evolved, have tendencies 
both to egalitarianism and mutual aid - good characteristics - and to 
hierarchy and selfishness - bad ones. That is, that they are not wholly 
pure and good, but have both good and bad tendencies, "'Now the one 
and now the other taking the upper hand at different periods of 
history" (Kropotkin 1995a: 236). 
Kropotkin is not particularly interested in permanent, shared, 
distinguishing, separate and normative characteristics in either of his 
approaches to human nature. Nor does he assert that human nature 
is pure and good. He investigates the nature of current humans as an 
empirical fact and as a moment in a long transformation, discoverable 
by research in biology and history, and admitting only tentative 
conclusions. 
This is my second counter-example to the generalisation that 
anarchists are human nature primitivists: Kropotkin was not. 
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It is unlikely that partisans of the accusation of human nature 
primitivism literally and formally mean the generalisation "all 
anarchists are human nature primitivists. If any do, they have been 
proved wrong twice over, unless they are prepared to argue that 
neither Godwin nor Kropotkin was really an anarchist. If, as is more 
likely, they mean only that most anarchists are human nature 
primitivists, or that anarchism tends to partake of that primitivism, 
then the formal way to test the claim would be to go through all 
anarchists, testing each: but how are we to list 'all anarchists'? The 
two counter-examples given above must, at least, throw doubt on the 
accusation. Godwin and Kropotkin are widely recognised to be 
anarchists, and are among the most important theorists of anarchism. 
If they were not human nature primitivists, stronger evidence than I 
can find will be needed to make the general accusation and derived 
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criticisms stick. In the absence of that further evidence, we must 
accept that anarchists are not in general human nature primitivists. 
3.2 Anarchism and golden age primitivism 
Golden age primitivism is centrally a value claim about a general 
picture of human historical development. In that general picture, 
humanity or human society are envisioned as having changed from 
some primary, natural or foundational state to some elaborated or 
artificial one. This change is understood as both qualitative and 
quantitative. The qualitative change, at its simplest., is from "primitive' 
to 'civilised", but has been further divided in various ways. The 
quantitative change is typically measured on a scale of complexity 
(from simple to complex), or of height (from lower to higher forms), 
or both. I consider this kind of "evolutionary' picture further in 8.1.2. 
For the moment, I note that such pictures are common, and used for 
a wide variety of purposes. Various kinds of evidence can be used to 
characterise the primary state, but typically the theorist will use 
historical and archaeological evidence about past social forms, or 
anthropological evidence about current social forms which are 
conceived as relics of the primary state, or both. 
A golden age primitivist claims that "The highest degree of 
excellence or happiness in man's life existed at the beginning of 
history" (Lovejoy & Boas 1973: 2). That is, that the qualitative and 
quantitative change was for the worse, whether it is thought of as 
gradual (the golden age lapsing into silver) or sudden (the fall and 
expulsion from Eden). This type of primitivism's central normative 
metaphors are return (or its tragic impossibility) and the dismantling 
or destruction of the elaboration which moved us away from the 
primary state. Its normative focus is on an ideal past. Golden age 
primitivism is in direct competition with theories or stories which use 
the same picture of history, but make the opposite value claim: that 
the qualitative and quantitative change was for the better. 
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We can now see that although human nature and golden age 
primitivism are analytically distinct, it is possible to hold both 
positions, or a position involving elements of both. Apart from 
archaeological or anthropological evidence,, another way of supporting 
a characterisation of a golden age is to use claims about an 
uncorrupted human nature, which was fully expressed before 
whatever elaboration produced our current arrangements occurred. 
Or, we might support a characterisation of human nature as wholly 
good with claims about how humans lived in a primary., natural, or 
undistorted state. 
The possible practical results of accepting golden age 
primitivism are various. We might,, for instance, try to return to the 
golden age, whether individually or collectively; or lapse into quietist 
nostalgia; or take the ideal as a reason for bitter rejection of the 
current world. Whatever practical conclusions anarchists are supposed 
to draw from their alleged primitivism, the critics' central assertions 
must be that: 1) anarchists hold such an idea of a past golden age or 
Eden, and use the metaphors of return and dismantling or 
destruction; and 2) this idea invalidates their theories because it is 
false in such a way as to make it useless as a norm. 
As in 3.1, there are three ways of defending anarchism against 
the critical assertion of golden age primitivism: first, to show that 
anarchists do not in fact share this idea; second, to show that it is 
true; or third, to show that, although false, it is still useful as a norm. 
And, as in 3.1,1 take the first path and disprove the critics' 
generalisation by counter-example. 
3.2.1 Godwin on the shape of history 
Godwin begins his scattered consideration of history by repeating the 
""Old observation that the history of mankind is little else than a 
record of crimes " (Godwin 1985: 83). If we consider the repeated 
war, torture and despotism which historians record, we may believe 
that little has changed or will change: 
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An opinion has been extensively entertained 'that the differences 
of the human species in different ages and countries, particularly 
so far as relates to moral principles of conduct, are extremely 
insignificant and trifling; that we are deceived in this respect by 
distance and confounded by glare; but that in reality the virtues 
and vices of men, collectively taken, always have remained, and 
of consequence, ' it is said, 'always will remain, nearly at the 
same point'. (ibid: 156) 
But, he says, this opinion is shown to be false by "A summary 
recollection of the actual history of our species" (ibid: 156-7). For 
Godwin, that history shows "Man" gradually improving "As an 
intellectual being"' (ibid: 157). He deduces from this intellectual 
improvement,, together with his argument that ""The voluntary actions 
of men originate in their opinions" (ibid: 116, discussed in 3.1.1), that 
human moral improvement keeps and will keep pace with it. ""Man in 
his original state" was "A being capable of impressions and knowledge 
to an unbounded extent, but not having as yet received the one or 
cultivated the other" (ibid: 157). Godwin contrasts the history of pain 
and oppression that he has noted with "All that science and genius 
have effected" (ibid), his major examples being the development of 
language and of writing. Far from harking back to a golden age from 
which we have descended,, Godwin pictures history as recording 
upward progress in knowledge and consequently in value. 
The conclusion which Godwin draws from this record of 
progress is that humans are "Susceptible of perpetual improvement" 
(ibid: 156, my emphasis). The derivation is surely invalid, but that is 
not the criticism we are dealing with here, and Godwin is only one of 
many who have made that perfectionist claim (see Passmore 2000). 
Godwin, as an anarchist, is accused of golden age primitivism, but 
what he actually says is that: 
There is no science that is not capable of additions; there is no 
art that may not be carried to a still higher perfection. If this be 
true of all other sciences, why not of morals? If this be true of all 
other arts, why not of social institution? ... This is the temper with 
which we ought to engage in the study of political truth. Let us 
look back, that we may profit by the experience of mankind; but 
let us not look back as if the wisdom of our ancestors was such 
as to leave no room for future improvement. (ibid: 163) 
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That is, he gives as explicit a rejection of golden age primitivism as 
could be expected from someone who had not had the criticism put to 
him. The central normative metaphors of golden age primitivism are 
return and dismantling or destruction; Godwin's are (perpetual) 
improvement and further building. Where its normative focus is an 
ideal past, his is an ideal future. 
This is my first counter-example to the generalisation that 
anarchists are golden age primitivists: Godwin was not. 
3.2.2 Kropotkin on the shape of history 
I have already noted Kropotkin's interest in natural and social history 
(3.1.2). In Mutual Aid he treats the two as continuous, moving from 
mutual aid amongst animals (Kropotkin 1989: chapters 1& 2), to 
mutual aid amongst 'savages' (3), amongst 'the barbarians' (4), and 
in medieval cities (5 & 6), to mutual aid amongst 'ourselves' (7 & 8). 
This natural and social history has a double purpose. First, Kropotkin 
intends to show that mutual aid is a factor in evolution. That is, to 
show that one of the things which must be taken into account in order 
to explain the facts of current animal and human nature, and their 
development, is mutual aid. For him, our current world cannot be 
explained only as the evolutionary result of individualist struggle. 
Second, he intends to display and celebrate the successes and 
continuing existence of that tendency towards mutual aid, despite 
undeniable division, self-assertion and oppression. 
Kropotkin concludes Mutual Aid with two claims, one general 
and the other more specific. The general claim is that: 
The animal species, in which individual struggle has been 
reduced to its narrowest limits, and the practice of mutual aid 
has attained the greatest development, are invariably the most 
numerous, the most prosperous, and the most open to further 
progress. The mutual protection which is obtained in this case, 
the possibility of attaining old age and of accumulating 
experience, the higher intellectual development, and the further 
growth of sociable habits, secure the maintenance of the species, 
its extension, and its further progressive evolution. The 
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unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay. 
(Kropotkin 1989: 293) 
That is, that evolution has given rise to a tendency to mutual aid, 
because that tendency is adaptive, while the opposite tendency is 
maladaptive. The more specific claim is that: 
The periods where institutions based on the mutual-aid tendency 
took their greatest development were also the periods of the 
greatest progress in arts, industry, and science. In fact, the 
study of the inner life of the mediaeval city and of the ancient 
Greek cities reveals the fact that the combination of mutual aid, 
as it was practised within the guild and the Greek clan, with a 
large initiative which was left to the individual and the group by 
means of the federative principle, gave to mankind the two 
greatest periods of its history - the ancient Greek city and the 
mediaeval city periods; while the ruin of the above institutions 
during the State periods of history, which followed, corresponded 
in both cases to a rapid decay. (ibid: 296-7) 
That is, that the expression of the mutual aid tendency has good 
social and political consequences, while its eclipse by the equally real 
opposing tendency has bad ones. In this second conclusion Kropotkin 
certainly does claim that there have been better times than now (or 
rather, than the late nineteenth century). But he does not place these 
better times at the beginning of history or of a single value-gradient, 
either for the better or for the worse. Indeed, he does not appear to 
recognise the notion of a beginning to specifically human history, 
since he treats human as continuous with natural history. Instead, 
Kropotkin pictures history as a dialectical process between egalitarian 
mutual aid and hierarchical self-assertive tendencies and social forms, 
sometimes the one and sometimes the other gaining the upper hand. 
That first tendency, although now in eclipse, has not disappeared: 
"'Neither the crushing powers of the centralized state nor the 
teachings of mutual hatred and pitiless struggle... could weed out the 
feeling of human solidarity, deeply lodged in men's understanding and 
heart, because it has been nurtured by all our preceding evolution" 
(ibid: 292). The continuing existence of this mutual aid tendency 
entitles us to (cautious) optimism about the future. 
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Again: the central normative metaphors of golden age 
primitivism are return and dismantling or destruction; its focus is an 
ideal past. Kropotkin does not recommend return to any earlier state, 
but the expression of one continuing tendency of human life over 
another. He does recommend dismantling one set of social forms - 
states and capitalism - but he wants to replace it with another, better 
one, not to dig back down to some simple or primary foundation. And 
his focus is a better future, not an ideal past. 
This is my second counter-example to the generalisation that 
anarchists are golden age primitivists: Kropotkin was not. 
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As with my argument against the accusation of human nature 
primitivism in 3.1, it is unlikely that partisans of the accusation of 
golden age primitivism literally and formally mean the generalisation 
"all anarchists... '. And again, the counter-examples above throw doubt 
on, but do not completely disprove, the looser claim they probably do 
mean. 
These interpretations of Godwin and Kropotkin are not intended 
as defences of their arguments. I have no brief here to show that 
either was correct. All I need to show, and have shown, is that they 
do not hold the views attributed to them by the accusations of human 
nature or of golden age primitivism. This must,, at minimum, make us 
doubt that those accusations are in general true of anarchism, and I 
suggest ought to make us reject them altogether. Anarchists are 
neither human nature nor golden age primitivists. 
3.3 Generalisations about anarchism 
In 1.5,1 sketched the variety of anarchism by noting some 
generalisations and internal distinctions which have been made about 
it and between different forms of it. In chapter 21 used that sketch to 
show that the central, Rawlsian concern of philosophical anarchism, 
the impossibility of justifying a universal state or its authority, is not 
the central concern of anarchism more generally. There is an often- 
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made generalisation that anarchism is a political form of skepticism, 
but it is false. I have shown here that two further often-made 
generalisations are also false: anarchists are not, in general, either 
human nature or golden age primitivists. 
I emphasise that these negative claims are about 
genera lisations. I have not argued that no anarchist is a primitivist 
(nor that no anarchist is a philosophical anarchist). Anarchism is 
various, and some self-described anarchists may hold an idea of 
human nature as wholly pure and good, or admire and even desire to 
emulate "primitive' (primary, natural or foundational) social forms. It 
is also open to future anarchists to do so. However many anarchists 
are not primitivists in either of these ways, and so being an anarchist 
does not entail being a primitivist. According to Sebastien Faure, 
"There is not, and there cannot be, a libertarian Creed or Catechism" 
(Faure 1977: 62). But if we imagine that there could be an anarchist 
catechism, it would not include a statement of primitivist belief. 
Nor would such an imagined catechism include any particular 
claims about human nature. The point of giving two counter-examples 
to the accusation of human nature primitivism was,, first, to make the 
point against that generalisation more strongly than one example 
could, but also, second, to suggest that anarchists do not share some 
other, non-primitivist account of human nature. Godwin and Kropotkin 
not only do not share that idea, they do not share any idea of human 
nature. For Godwin, humans are rational and motivated by their 
judgement, have no innate bars to transformation through education, 
and are subject to perpetual improvement. For Kropotkin, humans are 
evolved creatures, related to the rest of the natural world, and as a 
result of that evolution have opposed tendencies towards different 
kinds of sociability. So, there is no orthodox anarchist view of human 
nature. Even if accepting some set of claims is necessary to be called 
an anarchist in the ordinary sense of the term, those claims do not 
include a view of human nature. 
Nor would the catechism include a particular view of the shape 
and moral direction of history. For Godwin, history is a gradual 
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upward progress driven by the increase of knowledge. For Kropotkin, 
a dialectic of anarchic versus hierarchical tendencies. Both focus more 
on the future than on the ideal past of the golden age primitivist, but 
where Godwin celebrates an inevitable and ideal future, Kropotkin 
merely argues for the possibility of a better one. So, again, even if an 
anarchist must accept some orthodox claims, they do not include a 
view of history. 
3.4 Summary and conclusion 
I began by noting the common accusation that anarchists are in 
general deeply optimistic about human nature, or nostalgic for 
'primitive' society, or both. I then tested these two generalisations by 
specifying the claims primitivists of these two sorts make,, and 
comparing them to the claims of two major anarchist theorists, 
William Godwin and Peter Kropotkin. I showed that neither of them 
hold the views attributed to them by the accusations of human nature 
or golden age primitivism. So, the generalisations are false: 
anarchists are not in general either kind of primitivist. I also noted 
that Godwin and Kropotkin not only do not hold and share primitivist 
ideas, but that they do not share any idea about either human nature 
or the moral direction and shape of history. So,, being an anarchist 
does not require accepting any one view on either of those topics. 
Anarchism is not in general characterised by any particular view either 
of human nature or of history. 
My analyses of Godwin and Kropotkin have more general 
consequences for how we should think about anarchism. Godwin and 
Kropotkin were intensely involved in major intellectual currents of 
their times. Godwin was shaped by nonconformist Christianity and 
especially by (one strand of) Enlightenment thought. Kropotkin, by 
the political and theoretical ferment that followed the publication of 
Darwin's The Origin of Species in 1859. So, anarchists are not in 
general the marginal or isolated figures they are sometimes painted. 
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The conclusion that anarchists are not primitivists also has 
consequences for how we think about anarchism. The force of 
primitivist arguments of both kinds is that they hold out the promise 
that if only our current institutions and arrangements, however 
conceived, could be removed, then everything would be fine. Human 
nature primitivism promises that once some distorting influence is 
removed, real and good humanity will express itself; golden age 
primitivism, that once the elaboration of the decline or fall is 
removed, we will be left with a good, simple life; combinations of the 
two, that the distortion is the elaboration, and that once it is gone, we 
will return to the good and natural life with which we began. I call this 
powerful form of polemic 'post-apocalyptic', for convenience and after 
the genre of fiction which imagines the aftermath of some disastrous 
destruction of current social forms and institutions'. Anarchists are 
not in general primitivists, and do not typically share the post- 
apocalyptic faith. The anarchist utopia is one specific social form 
among many possible ones, not merely the absence of states, or 
capitalism, or any of the other features of our current arrangements 
which anarchists criticise. Anarchists claim that an anarchic utopia is a 
possible social form, not that it is a golden age to which we might 
return, nor that it would be the result of the undistorted expression of 
a wholly good human nature. Much of the rest of this thesis will be 
devoted to theorising and supporting that claim about possibility. 
However, first: given that anarchists are not primitivists, the 
obvious question is, Why have they so often been accused of 
primitivism? I take up that question in my next chapter. 
'I do not mean to suggest that post-apocalyptic literature in general 
claims that everything would be fine after the disaster. Some Will Not 
Die (Budrys 1964), for instance, is extremely pessimistic about post- 
disaster society, possibly because of Budrys' equally pessimistic view 
of human nature; The City., Not Long After (Murphy 1990) offers both 
good and bad possibilities. For analyses of the apocalyptic trope in 
science-fiction, see Seed (2000). 
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4* Criticism and Social Possibility 
This chapter has two purposes. First, to explain why anarchists have 
so often been falsely accused of primitivism. Second, to discover in 
that explanation a common anarchist rhetorical trope, which I will 
theorise and deploy in later chapters in order to prove my main 
thesis., that the anarchist utopia is possible. 
4.1 The accusation of human nature primitivism 
It is difficult to explain why anarchists have so often been 
characterised as human nature primitivists, when they have so often 
denied it and so often given clearly non-primitivist accounts of human 
nature. I tentatively suggest three possible explanations. 
First: the accusation may derive from misinterpretation of 
anarchist correctives to extreme pessimism about human nature. 
Someone who believes that humans are wholly self-interested may 
read anarchist claims that humans are also or sometimes altruistic as 
expressing unbounded optimism. But as I showed in chapter 3. that 
reading is a mistake. Kropotkin, for instance, believes that humans 
have evolved both self-interested and altruistic tendencies. Godwin, 
that whether humans are selfish or altruistic depends on their 
education and rational judgement, and not on any innate character. 
While these claims do not entail human nature primitivism, the 
misreading is understandable in the context of extreme pessimist 
assumptions about human nature. 
Second: the accusation may derive from a tacit assumption 
that only a picture of human nature as wholly good could justify belief 
in the possibility of the anarchic utopia. As I noted in 3.1, ideas of 
human nature are important for many political purposes and theories. 
But that does not mean that all such purposes and theories need to 
invoke some picture of human nature. I will show in later chapters 
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that belief in the possibility of the anarchic utopia can be justifled by 
an empirical investigation of human sociability as it has appeared, 
with reference only to a minimalist and non-normative idea of human 
nature. So, this mistake rests in the first place on a failure of 
argumentative imagination. In the second place, even if an anarchist 
did base her position on some rich and normative account of human 
nature, it is not obvious that it would have to be wholly good. To 
anticipate chapter 13: the anarchist utopia does not involve a total 
absence of conflict or selfishness. So, even an anarchist who did base 
her belief in the possibility of utopia on such an account of human 
nature would not have to picture it as wholly good. 
Third: that the accusation of human nature primitivism is so 
widespread may be to do with the way characterisations of anarchism 
have been written. Perhaps most such accusations are based not on 
readings of anarchist texts, but on characterisations in earlier 
textbooks, themselves based on still earlier ones. If this is the case, 
then the accusation is just an artefact of scholarship: a meme' rather 
than a misreading of anarchism at all. 
These three possibilities are not mutually exclusive, and 
particular accusations of human nature primitivism may be grounded 
on combinations of some or all of them. But the problem with them as 
explanations is that there is no conclusive evidence for any in the 
literature on anarchism. In 4.2 1 will suggest an explanation of the 
accusation of golden age primitivism which might also help explain 
this accusation, but for the moment, I leave it as an admitted puzzle. 
IX Meme' is Richard Dawkins' (1989) term for a putative unit of 
cultural transmission, analogous to genes, which are supposed to 
explain cultural I evolution' by their differential survival. I use it here 
only as shorthand for the idea that the apparently high survival value 
of the belief that anarchists are human nature primitivists may be to 
do with how it "reproduces' itself, not with its truth value. 
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4.2 The accusation of golden age primitivism 
There are better reasons for the mistaken accusation of golden age 
than of human nature primitivism: its reasonable element is the 
recognition of a rhetorical trope or figure of speech widely used by 
anarchists. In the style which appears to support the accusation, this 
trope characterises some past or contemporary non-hierarchical, non- 
urban, 'primitive' social form or group in rosy terms, and then 
unfavourably compares our own current arrangements with it. So, for 
instance, Kropotkin characterises 'savage' sociability by using both the 
archaeology and the anthropology of his day. It is worth repeating the 
point made in 3.2. that 'evolutionary' pictures of history are typically 
supported by archaeological evidence about past social forms, or 
anthropological evidence about current ones conceived as relics, or 
both. It is also worth noting, however, that the combined use of such 
archaeological and anthropological evidence is also common practice 
in modern archaeology, without commitment to 'evolutionary' 
pictures, and is known as "Ethnoarchaeology" (Fagan 1995: 24; see 
also David & Kramer 2001). So, Kropotkin's use of these forms of 
evidence does not in itself convict him of golden age primitivism. 
In the first, archaeological case, Kropotkin argues against 
Hobbes and against TH Huxley that past, stateless humans did not, 
as a matter of fact, live in a state of war of each against all'. 
According to Kropotkin, past stateless humans were not isolated 
individuals or families, but tribes and clans with complex ethics and 
institutions of mutual support: 
Now, if we take into consideration that this complicated 
organization developed among men who stood at the lowest 
known degree of development, and that it maintained itself in 
societies knowing no kind of authority besides the authority of 
public opinion, we at once see how deeply inrooted social 
2 It is irrelevant that Hobbes need not be read as claiming that 
humans lived like this at some past time: the point is that both 
Kropotkin and Huxley did read him in this way. See Paradis 1989 
(while noting that Paradis perpetuates the false image of Kropotkin as 
a primitivist). 
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instincts must have been in human nature, even at its lowest 
stages. A savage who is capable of living under such an 
organization, and of freely submitting to rules which continually 
clash with his personal desires, certainly is not a beast devoid of 
ethical principles and knowing no rein to its passions... The very 
persistence of the clan organization shows how utterly false it is 
to represent primitive mankind as a disorderly agglomeration of 
individuals, who only obey their individual passions, and take 
advantage of their personal force and cunningness against all 
other representatives of the species. (Kropotkin 1989: 86-8) 
As this passage makes clear, Kropotkin does hold an 'evolutionary' 
picture of human history, involving a developmental scale starting at 
'low' or 'primitive'. He also believes that this 'primitive' life was in 
some ways better than his and our own: "Unbridled individualism is a 
modern growth, but it is not characteristic of primitive mankind" (ibid: 
88). 
In the second case, Kropotkin uses anthropological research on 
Bushmen and Hotten totS3 , amongst other groups, further to 
characterise "primitive' sociability. The first ""Used to hunt in common, 
and divided the spoil without quarrelling"; "They never abandoned 
their wounded, and displayed strong affection to their comrades"; 
they were ""Good hearted, disinterested., true to their promises, and 
grateful" (ibid: 89). On the second, Kropotkin quotes the early 
anthropologist Kolben: "If anything is given to a Hottentot, he at once 
divides it amongst all present"; a Hottentot ""Cannot eat alone, and, 
however hungry, he calls those who pass by to share his food" (ibid: 
90). 
As a general characterisation of "primitive' life on the basis of 
both of these forms of evidence, Kropotkin says that "When Kolben 
wrote that [Hottentots] 'are certainly the most friendly, the most 
liberal and the most benevolent people to one another that ever 
appeared on the earth' ... , he wrote a sentence which has continually 
appeared since in the description of savages" (ibid: 91). Again, it is 
3% Bushman' is a generic term, originally from Afrikaans, for the 
hunting and gathering peoples of southern Africa, especially the 
Kalahari region; %Hottentot' is the English name for a now almost 
extinct people who occupied the area around the Cape of Good Hope. 
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clear that Kropotkin thinks this 'savage" way of life superior in some 
ways to his and our own. 
Kropotkin is not a primitivist. He does not have the required 
view of human nature; does not think that the past social forms he 
considers represent a golden age from which we have descended; 
does not recommend a return to them; does not believe that the 
contemporary social forms he also considers are relics of such a 
golden age. He does think that the anarchic mutual aid tendency 
which past and contemporary "savages' display still exists, even 
though it is currently eclipsed by the opposing hierarchical and 
oppressive tendency. But when he and other anarchists write in this 
style,, it is easy to see how they might be mistaken for primitivists. 
Kropotkin's discussion of 'savages' sounds like golden age primitivism, 
and if we add the assumption that people at the start or low point of a 
scale of human development also have an uncorrupted human nature, 
it may also sound like human nature primitivism. 
But this is only part of the story. Anarchists use the same 
rhetorical trope with non-"primitive' social forms both past and 
present, and with imagined future social forms, for several important 
purposes. So, in order to read such rhetoric as primitivist, we would 
need to read it out of context. Before showing this to be true 
specifically of Kropotkin and Godwin, I analyse the trope in general. 
4.3 The comparative trope 
The rhetorical habit of comparison between social forms is common in 
anarchism and particularly in Kropotkin's work. He displays it, for 
instance., in a remark about modern division of labour: ""The division 
and subdivision - the permanent subdivision - of functions has been 
pushed so far as to divide humanity into castes which are almost as 
firmly established as those of old India" (Kropotkin 1985: 23). His 
point is to attack a widely accepted feature of his and our current 
arrangements, by a comparison which discovers a similarity with a 
social form for which, he assumes, his readers share his dislike. The 
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remark's argumentative tactic is to criticise our social form by 
comparing it with a disapproved one, and thereby extending that 
disapproval. In other instances of this rhetoric, the comparison 
discovers a difference instead of a similarity, and the argumentative 
tactic is to attack our social form by displaying its poverty compared 
to some real or imagined alternative, or to display possible 
alternatives to it. 
Kropotkin's description of 'savages' is of this second type, 
which in general has the following structure: 1) characterise some 
social form, which differs from our own, and then 2) compare it with 
our social form, with the triple purpose of 3) deriving criticism of our 
social form from that comparison, 4) asserting the variety of human 
sociability, and 5) giving an example of the possibility and availability 
to us of the different social form, or of particular features of it. 
Kropotkin, then, uses a description of the 'savage' social form 
(whether accurate or not) to criticise his and our current 
arrangements, to assert that ours is just one among many varied 
social forms, and to give an example of an alternative to our social 
form, or at least to particular features of it (he recommends 
abandoning modern self-aggrandisement and hierarchy, but not 
modern technology, for instance). 
I now display two further, clearly non-primitivist instances of 
this rhetorical trope, in order to show that this, and not primitivist 
belief, is the context in which Kropotkin and other anarchists' 
descriptions of 'primitive' peoples ought to be read. I display: 1) from 
Kropotkin, an instance of the trope which makes use of a past but 
non-Aprimitive' social form; and 2) from Godwin, an instance which 
makes use of an imagined future social form. 
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4.3.1 Kropotkin's guild city 
Kropotkin pictures history as a dialectical process involving two 
opposing tendencies, the anarchic and the hierarchical, "Now the one 
and now the other taking the upper hand at different periods of 
history" (Kropotkin 1995a: 236). The "Free mediaeval city" (ibid) is 
the last time the anarchic tendency had that upper hand: 
Wherever men had found, or expected to find, some protection 
behind their town walls, they instituted their "co-jurations, " their 
"fraternities, " their "friendships, " united in one common idea, 
and boldly marching towards a new life of mutual support and 
liberty. And they succeeded so well that in three or four hundred 
years they had changed the very face of Europe. They had 
covered the country with beautiful sumptuous buildings, 
expressing the genius of free unions of free men, unrivalled since 
for their beauty and expressiveness; and they bequeathed to the 
following generations all the arts, all the industries, of which our 
present civilization, with all its achievements and promises for 
the future, is only a further development. And when we look to 
the forces which have produced these grand results, we find 
them - not in the genius of individual heroes, not in the mighty 
organization of huge States or the political capacities of their 
rulers, but in the very same current of mutual aid and support 
which we saw at work in the village community, and which was 
vivified and reinforced in the Middle Ages by a new form of 
unions, inspired by the very same spirit but shaped on a new 
model - the guilds. (Kropotkin 1989: 163-4) 
Kropotkin recommends and celebrates "The very same spirit", and the 
victory of the anarchic over the hierarchical tendency. 
The purpose of this celebration of the last time that happened, 
and perhaps of the whole of Mutual Aid, is threefold. First, Kropotkin 
foregrounds what is wrong with our current arrangements by 
comparing them with the creativity and resistance to authority of 
these past arrangements. Second, he asserts the variety of human 
sociability: not long ago, people lived very differently from us. Third, 
he uses the example of the guild city to argue for the possibility of a 
better, alternative social form. Because we had it once, we can have it 
again. That is, he performs the trope I described in 4.3: he 1) 
characterises medieval guild cities' social form, and then 2) compares 
it with our social form, with the triple purpose of 3) deriving criticism 
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of our social form, 4) asserting the variety of human sociability, as at 
least including both our and the medieval guild city forms, and 5) 
giving an example of the possibility and availability to us of this life of 
"Mutual support and liberty", with its good results. 
This use of the trope is clearly non-primitivist. Medieval cities 
were not "primitive" in any ordinary sense of the term. They were not 
a golden age at the start of an 'evolutionary' hierarchy, nor a relic of 
such a golden age. Kropotkin does not conceive them as expressing a 
pure and good human nature. They did not lack sophisticated 
technology (Kropotkin even suggests that our ""Arts" and "Industry" 
are grounded on theirs). Kropotkin's account of medieval guild cities, 
then, is a non-primitivist instance of the trope, which makes use of a 
real past social form, for purposes of critical comparison, assertion of 
human social possibility, and exemplification of the possibility of an 
alternative social form to ours. 
As with Kropotkin's accounts of "savage' sociability (4.2) and of 
human nature and history (3.1.2 and 3.2.2). it does not matter here 
whether his characterisation of medieval guild cities is accurate. The 
question is: What is Kropotkin doing argumentatively with this 
material? The answer, first, is that he is not doing primitivist 
argument or polemic. Second, that he is using an account of medieval 
cities' social form to criticise our arrangments by comparison, to 
assert the variety of human social possibility, and to (attempt to) 
exemplify one better social possibi lity4. 
4 Kropotkin is not the only person, indeed not the only nineteenth- 
century socialist, to use an account of the medieval for political and 
especially critical purposes. William Morris, for instance, found in such 
an account "A place, not to which he could retreat, but in which he 
could stand and look upon his own age with the eyes of a stranger or 
visitor, judging his own time by standards other than its own" 
(Thompson 1976: 28). 
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4.3.2 Godwin's future 
Godwin's faith in the perfectibility of humans is at the centre of his 
theory, and all of Enquiry Conceming Political Justice orbits his 
imagined perfect future. His purpose is in part to convince his readers 
to work towards their own perfection, but that future also stands in 
critical comparison to our own arrangements, as an assertion of the 
variety of human social possibility, and as an exemplar of one 
alternative social possibility, as does the guild city for Kropotkin. 
Godwin"s account of the "Dissolution of Government" (Godwin 
1985: 552) is one of many instances of this use of his imagined 
future. He considers the question of whether a future national 
assembly, and by extension future district assemblies and juries,. 
would command or only suggest: "'The former of these might at first 
be necessary. The latter would afterwards be sufficient" (ibid). The 
point is, first, that "'Authority and violence" (ibid: 553) are necessary 
evils for current humans, but that continuing improvement will 
remove that necessity. Our current arrangements encourage one ""To 
conceive that, while his neighbour, his parent, and his political 
governor pretended to be actuated by a pure regard for his interest or 
pleasure, they were, in reality, at the expense of his, promoting their 
own" (ibid). But in the imagined future society, everyone will know 
that this is not the case, and will accept reasonable arguments about 
what she ought to do, from neighbours or whomever else, without 
compulsion. Here and all through Enquiry Conceming Political Justice, 
Godwin criticises our current arrangements (in this case the necessity 
of force to compel just action) by foregrounding what is wrong with 
them by comparison with his imagined future. 
The second part of Godwin's point is to assert the possibility of 
a better society as one among a variety of humanly possible social 
forms. That assertion is supported by arguments that humans are 
perfectible and that the source of action is rationally modifiable 
opinion (see chapter 3.1.1 and 3.2.1), and is made again and again 
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throughout Enquiry Concerning political Justice. In the case of 
assemblies and juries, Godwin is particularly rapturous in making it: 
If juries might at length cease to decide, and be contented to 
invite, if force might gradually be withdrawn and reason trusted 
alone, shall we not one day find that juries themselves and every 
other species of public institution may be laid aside as 
unnecessary?... This is one of the most memorable stages of 
human improvement. With what delight must every well 
informed friend of mankind look forward to the auspicious 
period, the dissolution of political government, of that brute 
engine which has been the only perennial cause of the vices of 
mankind, and which, as has abundantly appeared in the progress 
of the present work, has mischiefs of various sorts incorporated 
in its substance, and no otherwise removable than by its utter 
annihilation! (ibid: 554) 
As in my discussion of Kropotkin, it does not matter whether this 
account of our future is true or even slightly believable. The question, 
What is Godwin doing argumentatively with this material?, and its 
answer, are the same. Godwin is not doing primitivist argument or 
polemic. He is making use of an imagined future to criticise our 
arrangements by comparison, to assert the variety of human social 
possibility, and to (attempt to) exemplify one better social possibility. 
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To summarise: I have displayed three instances of a common 
anarchist rhetorical trope. In the first instance, Kropotkin makes use 
of an account of past and contemporary 'savage' social forms; in the 
second, he makes use of an account of medieval guild cities; in the 
third, Godwin makes use of an imagined future. All three: 1) 
characterise some social form, which differs from our own, and then 
2) compare it with our social form, with the triple purpose of 3) 
deriving criticism of our social form from that comparison, 4) 
asserting the variety of human sociability, and 5) giving an example 
of the possibility and availability to us of the different social form, or 
of particular features of it. That is, all three make the same 
argumentative and polemical move using different social forms, 
whether real or imagined. 
So, the context in which Kropotkin and other anarchists' use of 
accounts of 'primitive' peoples ought to be read is not primitivism, but 
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this rhetorical trope. Anarchists typically make use of real and 
imagined alternative social forms to criticise our current arrangments, 
to assert the variety of human social possibility, and to exemplify 
particular, better possibilities. That is, both to perform a radical 
criticism of current arrangements and to celebrate the "Social genius" 
(Kropotkin 1989: 154) of humans. 
4.4 The trope as a form of argument 
All three purposes of the trope are typically but not uniquely 
anarchist. The first, criticism by comparison, is also present in some 
utopian and satirical literature, and I use that similarity to 
characterise this kind of criticism in 4.4.1. The second and third jointly 
express a common (and perhaps even characteristic) anarchist belief, 
which I call the belief in 'social possibility". It is the double belief that 
1) the range of social forms possible for humans is extremely wide, 
and 2) includes the anarchist utopia, as well as the particular forms 
our current sociability takes, and the other ways humans have 
organised themselves in the past and elsewhere. The descriptions of 
social forms or groups which the trope deploys are used to support 
both parts of the belief in social possibility. The value of anarchists' 
uses of the trope "Is that they bring to light modes of social life which 
show that the present mode is not eternal" or universal, and which 
"Reveal people's capacity for co-operative living" and for the other 
features of the anarchist utopia (Miller 1984: 76). 
In later parts of this thesis I argue in a similar way to the 
instances of the trope I have discussed, with the same purposes. But 
as it stands, what I have discovered is just a trope, and not anything 
as strong as a form of argument. So, I need to theorise it as a way of 
arguing. The first two parts of that necessary conceptual machinery 
are more precise accounts of the different styles of the trope and the 
argument-form I am developing from it, and of the ways their three 
purposes are carried out. 
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4.4.1 A taxonomy of the trope 
One obvious way to distinguish the different styles of the trope is 
according to what kind of social form is described and used by them. I 
have given three instances of the trope, and they divide as follows. In 
the first instance, which could be mistaken for primitivism, the social 
form which Kropotkin describes and uses is non-urban, non- 
hierarchical and 'primitive', and involves mutual aid. It existed in the 
past and still exists on the margins of states and other current 
institutions. In the second, Kropotkin describes and uses an urban, 
technically sophisticated social form which is also non-hierarchical and 
also involves mutual aid. It existed in the recent past, and has left its 
mark on our social and urban landscape. In the third, Godwin 
describes and uses an imaginary future, which is non-hierarchical and 
non-coercive, and is inhabited by rational, impartial maximisers of the 
good. The fundamental distinction is between those instances of the 
trope which use (supposedly) real and those which use (openly) 
imaginary social forms. 
These two major forms are both used by anarchists for the 
three purposes of criticism, assertion of variety, and exemplification of 
alternative possibility. However, each is more effective for some of 
those purposes than for others. 
4.4.2 Criticism 
Criticism is a significant purpose and feature of many political acts, 
including political writing. What is criticised and on what grounds vary 
greatly, but we can usefully map that variation. The first boundary to 
draw is between internal and external criticism. Internal criticism 
claims that its subject is internally flawed, perhaps by containing 
'contradictions', as Marxists have claimed of capitalism (Bhaskar 
1991; Elster 1985); or by being self-defeating, as Derek Parfit (1985) 
has claimed of some moral theories; or by being hypocritical, as we 
sometimes claim of each other. External criticism attacks its subject 
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by unfavourable comparison with something else, and it is this kind of 
criticism which the trope, in common with some utopian literature, 
makes. 
External criticism can further be divided according to the kind 
of thing with which its object is compared. Probably, there can be no 
complete list of possible comparisons, but we can list some common 
types. They include comparison with: 1) a theoretical structure or 
ideal, as when John Rawls (1972) constructs a description of a just 
society, against which our own arrangements can be measured; 2) a 
statement or set of statements about what would be good, perhaps in 
the form 'everyone has a right to X; 3) some real alternative which 
exists now or existed in the past; and 4) an account of or story about 
some imaginary better thing. 3 is the kind of external criticism made 
by the trope in its first, Kropotkinite style, which uses a real 
alternative social form. 4 is the kind it makes in its second, Godwinite 
style, which uses an imagined future social form. 
We can now see that the trope in both its styles has some 
further similarities with utopias. Utopias often are or can be read as 
broad external criticism, in the form of a story. That is, they criticise a 
large subject - an entire social form, country or world - by 
unfavourable comparison with a narrative fiction5 about an equally 
large subject. ""Utopia can serve as a mirror for society, a mirror in 
which it can see its own defects more clearly" (Morrison 1984: 139). 
Similarly, the trope criticises a subject, often but not necessarily a 
large one (as in the instances I described in 4.2,4.3.1 and 4.3.2), by 
unfavourable comparison with an anthropological or historical or 
imaginative account of some alternative social form. That alternative 
social form can also serve as a mirror. 
Thomas More (1992) uses Raphael Hythloday's travelogue and 
reports of discussions with Utopians to make a broad external 
criticism of his society. It is so broad, indeed, that it also applies to 
5 This is not a tautology, at least because narratives do not have to be 
fictional: Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass,, An American 
Slave (Douglass 1982) is a true story, for instance. 
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our society. We the readers are continually invited to compare our 
own living arrangements with the Utopians', and to find ours wanting. 
In their efficiency, justice, security, philosophy, art, technology and 
piety, the Utopians are a standing rebuke of ours. On this reading, 
one of the central things that Utopia does is criticise. Similarly, 
William Morris attacks what is wrong with his society by dramatic 
comparison with the future England where William Guest wakes up 
one morning, after an argument with his comrades about "What 
would happen on the morrow of the Revolution" (Morris 1993: 43); H 
G Wells (no date), by comparison with the other planet, physically 
identical to ours, where his lecturer and botanist inexplicably find 
themselves after descending from the Alps; Thomas Campanella 
(1889), by comparison with the City of the Sun. In general, 
utopianism can be characterised as "'A style of political theorising that 
develops a critique of the existing order by constructing a model of an 
ideal or perfect alternative"" (Heywood 1998: 193). 
Similarly, Kropotkin uses descriptions of 'savages' and medieval 
guild cities to criticise his and our social arrangements. In their 
mutual affection, support and altruism, his 'savages' are a rebuke to 
our selfish individualism. In their creativity and resistance to 
authority, his guildsmen are a rebuke to our cowardice. The similarity 
is even stronger in the case of Godwin. His future utopia is described 
in theoretical rather than literary terms, but is nonetheless an 
imagined ideal which he uses to criticise his and our social 
arrangements. 
Utopias can be a polemically effective tool for criticism, just 
because the comparison is so extreme. An ideal can be designed 
precisely to foreground what is thought wrong with our current 
circumstances, and to make them look unpalatable by comparison. 
The Godwinite style of the trope, which makes use of an imagined 
future social form, can be similarly effective (assuming, in both cases, 
that we do find the described ideal more attractive than our own 
arrangements). The Kropotkinite style, which makes use of real past 
or present social forms, is less effective. The messy reality of human 
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sociability is unlikely to throw up neat ideals for comparison, unless it 
is seriously misclescribed. 
The first purpose of the anarchist trope is criticism, which I 
have analysed as external criticism by comparison, and as in some 
ways analogous to one purpose of utopias. I have suggested that the 
style of the trope which is most suited to this purpose is the second, 
Godwinite style. 
I stated in 1.3 that I am more concerned with the factual than 
the normative elements of anarchism. So, although I do intend to 
imply a critical comparison between our and alternative 
arrangements, I am more interested in the second and third purposes 
of the anarchist trope: the assertion of social possibility. 
4.4.3 Social possibility 
The second and third purposes of the trope are assertion of the wide 
range of human social possibility, and of the specific possibility, within 
that range, of an anarchic alternative to current arrangements. This 
assertion of variety is valuable as a corrective to the careless, and 
perhaps widespread, assumption that how we now live is universal, 
obvious or natural. As I argue for states in chapter 9,. our current 
arrangements began recently in a particular place, and replaced 
other, quite different arrangements. Although many humans do now 
live like us, many others did not, and there is no reason to suppose 
that humans always will. In later chapters, I will use accounts of some 
real human social forms to exemplify the possibility of particular 
features of the anarchist utopia. 
The trope in its second major form, which uses a description of 
an imaginary social form, is certainly a dramatic way of asserting wide 
social possibility and particular alternatives. But it is not a particularly 
convincing one: that we can imagine some radically different way of 
life does not mean that it is possible, nor therefore that human social 
possibility is wide enough to include it. In its first form, which uses 
real social forms, the trope is much more convincing for these two 
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purposes. One good way of showing that human social possibility is 
wide is to display different social forms which humans have been able 
to adopt. One good way of showing that some particular feature of 
the anarchic utopia is possible for humans is to display humans living 
it. 
4.5 The problem with the trope as a form of argument 
In 4.4 1 did some initial marking out of the forms the trope takes and 
of the ways its purposes are carried out. I characterised the critical 
and social possibility-asserting purposes of the trope, and noted that 
the form of the trope which uses an imagined social form is more 
effective for the former than the latter, while the form which uses a 
real one is more effective for the latter than the former. 
In later chapters I use a combination of both forms of 
argument based on the trope. That is,, I make use both of accounts of 
real and of imagined social forms. My purposes are the same as those 
of the trope, and especially to show that the imagined social form - 
my anarchist utopia - is possible, by exemplification of its features in 
real social forms. But that ambition is problematic: there is a major 
difficulty with comparisons of the kind the trope performs. If humans 
are capable of a wide variety of different social forms, it may be that 
those forms are too different to be directly compared. Perhaps any 
comparison between, for instance, modern states and the Nuer (on 
which see chapters 9 and 11) would be meaningless. In another 
context, Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes write that: 
It is as if scientific paradigms and theoretical frameworks were 
strung out in time like islands across an archipelago. Other 
minds, other cultures, other languages and other theoretical 
schemes call for understanding from within. Seen from within, 
they make us doubt whether there is anything universal under 
the sun. This doubt is also a challenge to the very idea of a 
single world. Is not the world, as interpreted in our scheme of 
things, but one of many? (Hollis & Lukes 1982: 1) 
Similarly, different social forms might be strung out like islands, and 
there might be no way to compare them. The best way to show that 
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such comparison is possible is to do it. But in order to do that, we will 
need good conceptual tools designed to handle, dissect and compare 
sociability-stuff6. Chapters 5-8 provide those tools, which allow 
comparison by showing some features of different social forms as 
different ways of doing the same thing: creating, distributing and 
deploying power in social networks. In chapters 9-13 1 use my tools 
both to perform comparisons between some features of some selected 
social forms, and to construct an anarchist utopia out of some 
exemplified, anarchic forms of sociability. 
4.6 Summary 
I began by offering explanations for the common but false accusation 
that anarchists are primitivists. I argued that the accusation of golden 
age primitivism (and perhaps also the accusation of human nature 
primitivism) is explained by an understandable misreading of a 
common anarchist rhetorical trope. In one style, exemplified by 
Kropotkin's description of 'savages, this trope can look like 
primitivism. But that and similar instances ought to be read in the 
context of other clearly non-primitivist uses of the same trope. The 
trope in general compares our living arrangements with some other 
real or imagined ones, in order to criticise ours, to assert the wide 
range of human social possibility, and to exemplify anarchic 
alternatives. As it stands, what I have discovered is only a polemical 
habit of comparison, a trope or figure of speech. But it can be made 
into a form of argument which I will use to prove my main thesis. 
After making some initial distinctions and characterisations of the 
various forms of the trope, I noted a major problem with its use in 
argument form: that the comparison it requires may not actually be 
possible. Chapters 5-8 will provide tools for that comparison, before I 
61 allude here to E Adamson Hoebel's comment that the difficulties of 
studying "primitive' law rest on ""The fact that the anthropologist has not 
been supplied with good, sharp conceptual implements designed to 
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go on to use them in chapters 9-13 to carry out a number of trope- 
like arguments which together prove that the anarchist utopia is 
possible. 
handle lawstuff" (Hoebel 1942: 951). 1 return to Hoebel's implements in 
6.6.3. 
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Tools, Maps and Landmarks 
This chapter and the three following it develop the conceptual toolkit 
for handling sociability-stuff, which allows the comparative arguments 
I use to prove my main thesis. This chapter introduces and explains 
that toolkit. Chapter 6 develops a concept of power as a tool for 
analysing and comparing social forms; chapter 7, a concept of 
equality; and chapter 8, a model of human sociability. This chapter 
will also explain the nature and purpose of the descriptions of various 
social forms in chapters 9-13, and indicate my general strategy in the 
rest of this thesis. 
5.1 Tools and essentially contested concepts 
The point of using the metaphors of a "toolkit' and "tools' is that these 
chapters develop concepts designed and optimised for one particular 
task, at the expense of others. A screwdriver is no use for cutting 
wood, but not therefore useless. The tools I develop here are 
designed to describe some examples of human sociability, in order to 
compare them, and thereby serve the three anarchist purposes I 
identified in chapter 4: criticism, assertion of variety,, and 
exemplification of alternative possibility. That is, to solve the problem 
I identified with the comparative rhetorical trope as an argument 
form, and so allow me to use it to prove that the anarchist utopia is 
possible. My tools are intended to supplement and direct, not to 
replace, detailed description and analysis of particular cases. They are 
not intended, and not necessarily useful, for all other purposes. 
Power and equality, the first two of the three concepts I 
develop, are common in philosophical and political discourses, and I 
make use of selected theoretical literature as a foil and help in 
characterising my use of these terms. I do not claim to discover the 
A natural' meanings of 'power' or 'equality: I doubt that words have 
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natural meanings. Nor do I attempt to win an argument about how we 
ought always to understand or apply these terms. All I argue is that 
we can, and that I will, use 'power' and 'equality" in particular, stated 
senses. But I am not merely stipulating the meaning of jargon: I am 
marking out a particular area of the range of meanings these terms 
can have given their historical and cultural situation. My selection of 
that area is guided by my explicit purposes, and not by an ambition, 
for instance, to correct other people's uses of these terms,, or to end 
dispute about them. 
In an influential article, WB Gallie (1956; see also Gallie 1964: 
chapter 8) introduced the idea of essentially contested concepts. The 
point of Gallie's discovery and definition of this class of concepts is to 
open up some free territory between two other possible 
understandings of continuing argument about the meaning and use of 
a concept: 1) that the argument can and should be won by a single, 
correct meaning and use; or 2) that the argument is interminable and 
therefore pointless. According to Gallie, argument about an essentially 
contested concept is necessarily interminable, but not pointless, 
because its meaning is made up of the various competing positions on 
its application, and their continuing dispute. Theorists including 
Connolly (1993) and Freeden (1996) have challenged Gallie's criteria 
for admission to, while continuing to assert the existence of, this free 
territory. My definitions of the two concepts are intended to inhabit it: 
I describe and argue for them in the context of contestation, and 
make use of some competing understandings as foils and as help; I 
do not intend or expect them to win the contest; but I do not ignore 
their contexts by stipulating mere technical senses. My choice of 
definitions is directed by the task for which my conceptual tools are 
intended. "Until we consider the point or purpose in grouping a set of 
elements under the rubric of "politics', we lack a basis for deciding 
that one proposed definition is superior to another" (Connolly 1993: 
16). Similarly for power and equality. My point and purpose in giving 
definitions of them is to solve the problem of comparability between 
different social forms, and so be able to use comparative arguments 
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to prove that the anarchist utopia is possible. Each of my definitions 
can be thought of, in Freeden's term, as a particular, purposive 
"Deco ntestation " (Freeden 1996: 76 and passim) of a contested 
concept. 
The third concept I develop for my purpose, the idea of a social 
network, is not (essentially) contested and does not need to be placed 
in the free territory. I use it to characterise human sociability in 
general, and to draw the other conceptual tools together. I do parallel 
my use of alternative definitions as foils in chapters 6 and 7 by 
opposing my account of sociability to some alternative ones. This is in 
the first place an explanatory device: I characterise my concept partly 
by saying what it denies. However in some cases I do also argue that 
these foil positions are actually false, not merely inappropriate for my 
purposes. 
My choice of definitions for these three concepts is largely 
conditioned by my main purpose, but I also apply two further 
conditions: 1) my concepts of power, equality, and network sociability 
are intended to be useful not only for my specific, but for more 
general, anarchist purposes. I therefore argue for some of their 
features by drawing on the tradition and on anarchist practice. 2) As 
already noted, 'power' and 'equality' are important concepts in 
political and philosophical discourses. The concept of a 'network' has 
become important in sociological discourse in part through the work of 
Michael Mann (1986 & 1993). So, my use of particular versions of 
them also helps me carry out my subsidiary purpose, indicated in 1.2, 
of getting anarchists and academics to talk to one another. 
I have given reasons to choose to understand my concepts in 
the wider context of their contestation. Finally, however, we should 
note that there may be no other way of understanding them: 
A use of terms without attention to the theoretical assumptions 
and historical contexts which underlie them can lead us to adopt 
unanalyzed concepts and drag along their mystifying 
connotations into further work. Tracing out a history of our 
concepts can also make us aware of the extent to which they 
incorporate intellectual and political efforts that still reverberate 
in the present. (Wolf 1999: 21-2) 
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If this is (even partly) true, the choice available to us may be, not 
between understanding in context and stipulation, but between being 
conscious and being unconscious of the inescapable effect of context. 
Historically developed concepts already structure our thought, so an 
attempt to stipulate in a vacuum may be, at best, unproductive. 
5.2 Making maps 
I have so far used the metaphors of tools and a toolkit to describe 
what I do in chapters 6-8.1 now want to introduce another metaphor: 
mapmaking. A 'projection' is a technique, whether actually a 
geometrical projection or not, for representing the Earth's spherical 
surface (or a portion of it) on a flat surface'. Among the properties a 
map needs to represent are: the direction any one point bears to 
another; the distance between any given points; the shape of the 
region; and the area of the region. "When small areas are being 
mapped, it is possible to obtain sensibly accurate representation of all 
properties,, but in the case of large areas, something must be 
sacrificed" (Kellaway 1949: 5). Any projected map of a sufficiently 
large area will accurately represent some properties at the expense of 
distorting others. There are many possible projections, and different 
projections have different advantages and disadvantages. Gnomonic 
zenithal projections (on which see ibid: 7-11), for instance, have the 
following advantages: 1) the relative positions of places are clearly 
shown; and 2) direction from the centre is always true. They have the 
following disadvantages: 1) away from the centre,, distances rapidly 
become distorted; 2) the shape of the regions is distorted; and 3) the 
area of the regions is exaggerated, the more so the further from the 
centre they are. ""The problem is thus really a matter of selecting the 
' The other element of mapmaking is scaling: a map needs not only to 
be flat, but to be small enough to carry. I ignore this complication 
here, and assume, following Kellaway (1949), that projection is 
carried out from a scaled globe of the earth. It may be overstretching 
the metaphor to note, however, that I do in a sense choose a 'scale', 
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projection which best satisfies the requirements in each particular 
case" (ibid: 5). 
All flat maps of the Earth distort some of its properties. But this 
is not a problem, so long as we know what and how they distort, and 
have chosen the right mapping for our purposes. The analogy I want 
to make is that my conceptual toolkit can be thought of as perforning 
a mapping of human sociability. That mapping distorts in a variety of 
ways: 1) by focussing on some features, notably equality and 
inequality of power, and the logistics of social interaction; 2) at the 
expense of other features, notably culture, subjectivity, and their 
hermeneutic interpretation; and 3) by for the most part avoiding 
consideration of the causes or explanations of the forms of sociability 
I describe. But this is not a problem if we are aware of those 
distortions, and have chosen the right mapping for our purposes. 
It may be, at best, that a non-distorting mapping of human 
sociability is unlikely because it would have to cover such an immense 
number and complexity of features. It may be, worse, that all 
mappings - all interpretations - are necessarily distorting because 
they are carried out using tools (concepts, theories, perceptual and 
cognitive mechanisms) which structure the data in particular ways. 
That is, because some version of what Eric Wolf calls the "Neo- 
Kantian postulate"' (Wolf 1999: 3) that we have no transparent, 
unmediated access to a world outside us, is true. But again,, this is not 
a problem to the extent, first, that we can be aware of the distortions 
and structuring imposed by our own tools of thought and knowledge- 
gathering, and second, that we can design such tools. 
That my mapping of human sociability distorts it is not a 
problem, so long as we know what and how it distorts and what it 
accurately represents, and have chosen the right mapping for our 
purposes. What my mapping accurately represents will be shown in 
developing the conceptual toolkit, in chapters 6-8, and when I put it 
to work in chapters 9-13. 
that is a particular breadth of reference and level of detail, justified by 
my particular purposes. 
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The negative point of using this metaphor is to emphasise that 
I am not involving myself in a reductive project: I do not claim that 
the features of human sociability on which I focus are real, 
fundamental or deep in comparison to other features. Nor do I claim 
that they are uniquely or finally explanatory. I am suggesting a 
particular and purposive projection of human sociability, not a 
reduction. 
5.3 Reflective Equilibrium 
John Rawls designs his initial situation or original position (on which 
see chapter 2) by a process of reflection leading to what he calls 
"Reflective equilibrium" (Rawls 1972: 20; see also 48-51). A 
particular description of the initial situation will give rise to particular 
claims about justice, and is justified by the reflective process, which 
works as follows: 
In searching for the most favoured description of this situation 
we work from both ends. We begin by describing it so that it 
represents shared and preferably weak conditions. We then see 
if these conditions are strong enough to yield a significant set of 
principles. If not, we look for further premises equally 
reasonable. But if so, and these principles match our considered 
convictions of justice, then so far well and good. But presumably 
there will be discrepancies. In this case we have a choice. We 
can either modify the account of the initial situation or we can 
revise our existing judgments, for even the judgments we take 
provisionally as fixed points are liable to revision. By going back 
and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual 
circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and 
conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall 
find a description of the initial situation that both expresses 
reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our 
considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of 
affairs I refer to as reflective equilibrium. (ibid: 20) 
A particular description of the initial situation is justified by being 
able, as a result of this reflective process, to accommodate "'Both 
reasonable philosophical conditions on principles as well as our 
considered judgments of justice... fitting together into one coherent 
view" (ibid: 21). 
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I borrow the notion of reflective equilibrium, in the following 
form. The relationship between the tools I develop in later chapters 
and the utopia I eventually prove possible by using them is analogous 
to the relationship between considered intuitive judgements and 
theoretical principle in Rawls' argument. The utopia and tools were 
designed together, by a similar reflective process of going back and 
forth, sometimes altering the tools, sometimes the description of the 
utopia. Although the tools are designed to prove the possibility of the 
utopia, the requirements of accurately describing (some features of) 
human sociability sometimes modified the utopia. 
Rawls does not, "Of course, actually work through this process" 
(ibid) of reflection. Nor will I. But I want to note that the tools were 
designed with the utopia in mind, and the utopia modified by the 
process of investigation of human sociability which allowed me to 
design them. I did not begin with a 'self-evident' fixed utopia., and 
then attempt to design concepts which would make it look possible. 
The reflective process leading to equilibrium about the design of the 
tools and the utopia is what convinces me that I have chosen the right 
mapping for my purposes. That I have will be shown by the success of 
my argument for the possibility of utopia. 
5.4 Landmarks 
My toolkit or projection is designed to allow comparative arguments 
making use of accounts of human social forms. So, of course, 
performing those arguments requires several such accounts. Chapters 
9-13 provide them, and having used the metaphor of mapmaking,, I 
call the entire section 'Landmarks'. Landmarks rather than a complete 
map, because I do not attempt to describe anything like the entire 
sphere of human sociability, nor to fill in every detail. The landmarks I 
describe in these chapters are chosen for my particular purposes: to 
criticise current arrangements and, especially, to assert human social 
possibility. 
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My exemplification of utopia's possibility consists of a series of 
fragments of it,, displayed in some real social forms. These fragments 
are the best available empirical evidence for its possibility, because 
the anarchic utopia has never existed as a whole. But why use 
empirical evidence at all? In chapter 41 stated that the possibility of 
utopia could be supported without reference to any rich, normative 
idea of human nature: but why not use such an idea? Because, first, 
the question, What is the range of possible human sociability? is an 
empirical question,, not a conceptual one. And, second, because given 
that, an idea of human nature in the context of that question can only 
be tested empirically. In order to support the possibility of utopia by 
asserting a rich idea of human nature, we would have to support that 
idea by showing empirically that it was correct. That would be an 
unnecessary further argumentative step: we can support claims about 
human social possibility directly by displaying empirical examples of 
possible social forms. 
5.5 A minimalist account of human nature 
I do appeal to a minimalist and non-normative account of human 
nature. In 3.1 1 argued that, historically and typically, an idea of 
human nature is a set of claims that some specified character: 1) is 
real or permanent or transhistorically present in humans; 2) is shared 
by all humans; 3) distinguishes humans by kind and not just by 
degree from the rest of the world, and especially from (other) 
animals; 4) is separate from the distortion and masking which can be 
created by current circumstances; and 5) stands as a moral, social or 
political norm for humans. My account of human nature is minimalist 
in that I do not make all of these claims about the character I 
describe, and, in particular, is non-normative in that I do not make 
claim 5. That is, I do not take my account of human nature to stand 
as a moral or other norm, but only as imposing empirical demands on 
the possibilities of human sociability. 
98 
My account is as follows: humans are evolved creatures, 
related, in some cases very closely, to other animals. This does not 
entail that everything about humans or human groups can be 
explained by post-Darwinian evolutionary theory; it does mean that 
such theory is one useful explanatory resource among others. 
Because we evolved from creatures both like and unlike us, over time, 
there is no permanent or fully distinguishing human nature (that is, 
claims 1 and 3 do not apply). However human characteristics have 
been relatively stable over historical time (and perhaps for much 
longer), and therefore we can assume that if some humans live or 
lived in particular ways, then other humans can also live in those 
ways. There could be counter-evidence to this initial assumption, but 
the onus is on someone who claims that one human group is 
sufficiently different from another for this not to be the case, to prove 
it. 
Evolved humans share a number of general capacities, which 
can be expressed (or fail to be expressed) in a variety of socially and 
environmentally conditioned wa yS2 . They include capacities: to learn 
and use language; to create, understand and use symbols; to create, 
understand and act in social networks; to reason; to make and use 
tools; to make decisions; to be selfish or altruistic; to be violent or 
friendly; to create and challenge hierarchies; to have and act on a 
variety of emotional and dispositional states; to perceive oneself as a 
self in the context of other selves; and to create,, internalise and 
perform rituals. Many of these capacities are shared in some form or 
degree by our close relatives, including Chimpanzees, Gorillas, Orang- 
Utans, and other primates. 
For the same reason that we are a particular kind of evolved 
creature, humans also share some general interests. They include 
interests in food, shelter, company, continued life, the respect of 
peers, and the absence of violence. These interests can be trumped 
2 Compare Rom Harre's claim that "All human beings have various 
generic capacities to acquire skills, which, though they differ in their 
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by other, often socially constructed ones, but are typical of humans 
and very strong. So, an appeal to such interests, to a stranger, can 
often be effective. Individual humans" interests can clash in at least 
two ways, because: 1) they sometimes differ; and 2) even when they 
are shared, as with the typical interest in food, our situation of 
scarcity means that my interest in food may clash with yours. 
This account of human nature is not original. It is to some 
degree controversial, and I assume rather than attempt to prove it 
here. My central assumption is that, despite the obvious fact that 
different human groups have different social forms,, languages, self- 
understandings and rituals, we are sufficiently alike that there is some 
possibility of comparing those groups, because our differences are in 
part different expressions of shared capacities, and because we share 
some general interests. This minimalist account of human nature is 
non-normative (that is, claim 5 does not apply) in that it does not 
entail any claims about the best, right or just way for humans to live. 
That humans have some capacity does not mean that it is a duty, or 
even praiseworthy,, to express it: Marvin Harris (1989), for instance, 
has argued that human parents have a widely expressed capacity for 
infanticide. 
The point of this section is not to say anything original about 
human nature, but to stipulate a naturalist, realist, and 
internationalist perspective as a grounding assumption of my project. 
5.6 Summary 
I have set out a plan for most of the rest of this thesis. In a first 
section, the Toolkit, chapters 6-8 describe the conceptual tools, which 
allow the comparative arguments, which prove the possibility of my 
utopia. I use two central metaphors for what this section does: tools 
and mapmaking. Part of the point of both is to bring out the idea of 
something designed for one purpose, at the expense of others. 
specific forms from tribe to tribe, are nevertheless of the same 
general kind" (Harre 1993: 3). 
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Another part is to emphasise that what I am creating is a purposive 
way of looking at, not a reductive account of, human sociability. I do 
not claim that the features on which I focus are the real (as opposed 
to illusory) or deep (as opposed to surface) features of human social 
life. 
In a second section, Landmarks, chapters 9-13 set out the 
materials for and perform my comparisons. I borrow Rawls' notion of 
reflective equilibrium to describe the relationship between the toolkit 
and the last of the landmarks, utopia, and claim that the empirical 
evidence set out in the Landmarks section is the best available 
evidence for the possibility of utopia., which is jointly proved by the 
two sections. Finally, I assume a minimalist and non-normative 
account of human nature, which grounds my accounts of particular 
human social forms and the possibility of comparing them. 
The overall strategy of the rest of this thesis is: 1) to create a 
conceptual toolkit for the comparative analysis of human social forms; 
2) to use it to describe some landmark social forms; and 3) to 
construct and prove possible a utopia built from the fragments of 
anarchic sociability I discover. 
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Power 
What is power? Even if we consider the concept only as part of 
political and philosophical discourse, we are unlikely to be able to find 
a universally acceptable definition: 
It would be good to approach our theme starting from a widely 
shared, generic concept of social power or indeed of power in 
general. Unfortunately, no such concept exists. (Poggi 2001: 1) 
If we also consider power as part of such other discourses as physics 
or engineering, for instance, then finding a single, universally 
acceptable definition looks even less likely. We are unlikely to be able 
to invent such a definition, either. According to Steven Lukes, the 
concept of power is both "Ineradicably evaluative" and "Essentially 
contested" (Lukes 1974: 9). We can accept that the concept of power 
is now and historically has been contested, at least: 1) for the 
pragmatic reason that, like ideas of human nature (on which see 3.1 
and 5.5), ideas of power often have a significant role in political and 
ideological disputes; and 2) for the theoretical reasons that, when we 
consider the definition of power, "It is not clear (a) what is to be 
defined; (b) what a definition of power should clarify; and (c) what 
kind of components one is looking for to constitute a definition" 
(White 1972: 480). We can also accept that someone's definition of 
power is likely to be evaluative at least in that it will be chosen, in 
part, for reasons to do with her political purposes. Lukes links three 
views of power to three political stances: 
The liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding 
principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually 
want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their 
political participation. The reformist, seeing and deploring that 
not all men's wants are given equal weight by the political 
system, also relates their interests to what they want or prefer, 
but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect and sub- 
political ways - in the form of deflected, submerged or concealed 
wants and preferences. The radical, however, maintains that 
men/s wants may themselves be a product of a system which 
works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the 
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latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to 
make the choice. (Lukes 1974: 34) 
These three stances map onto Lukes' one, two and three-dimensional 
views of power, respectively (see 6-1). 
In the face of these problems, and for the reasons given in 
chapter 5,1 do not attempt to find or create a universally acceptable 
or evaluatively neutral definition of power. The concept of power 
given here is developed in response to the question: What concept of 
power will be useful for my and other anarchist purposes? 
I begin by assuming a loose definition of power, as follows: 
power is the present capacity to attain future goods (cf Hobbes 1994: 
50). 1 define a 'good' as anything, whether tangible or intangible, in 
which someone has a subjective interest. I do not imagine that this 
beginning definition is wholly neutral, although it may be closer to 
neutrality than some other possibilities. I do think that it is widely 
acceptable, because it is loose and general, and could be made more 
precise in a variety of incompatible ways. We should note two 
features of this beginning definition. First, it defines power as a 
capacity, and therefore as something which can be held without 
currently being exercised (I leave open the methodological question of 
whether we will be able to identify a power-holder in any way other 
than by observing her exercising power). Second, and unlike some 
others, my definition does not limit power to attaining goods by 
affecting, or against the opposition of, other agents. 
Before continuing, and in order further to distinguish my task 
here, I want to identify two alternative projects with which mine 
might be confused, but which I am not attempting. First, I am not 
attempting to show that anarchists have or need a distinctive concept 
of power, different from those used or needed by other political 
positions. Although my concept is explicitly designed for my and other 
anarchist purposes, the suggestion is not that it will be the exclusive 
possession of anarchism, nor that distinctively anarchist demands or 
normative claims will follow from it. All that it is intended to do is to 
pick out some features of human sociability which are relevant to my 
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wider project. Second, I am not attempting to distinguish situations of 
power from situations of its absence. As I go on to argue, all human 
social situations display power; the relevant questions, for me, are: 
How is it created, How is it distributed, By whom, and To whom? 
In order further to specify my concept of power in the context 
of contestation, and to make it useful for my and other anarchist 
purposes, I now consider and arbitrate some selected claims and 
debates about the definition of power. I do not consider all major 
debates, and do not intend to produce a history or a literature survey. 
I do not, for instance, consider how to specify an operational 
definition of power, nor whether power should be analysed as a form 
of causality (see for instance Simon 1969 and Nagel 1975, 
respectively). I consider only those claims and debates which help me 
to specify power as a conceptual tool for the purposes I have 
described. 
6.1 Lukes'three dimensions of power 
Lukes' analysis of the concept of power takes the 'one-dimensional' 
pluralist position of Robert Dahl (1961) and others as its starting 
point; follows through the influential critique of Peter Bachrach and 
Morton Baratz (1962), which results in what he labels the 'two 
dimensional" view; and then develops his own 'three-dimensional' 
view by further criticism of that position. 
The one-dimensional view concentrates on the observed 
success of an actor in getting her own way in a conflicted decision, 
made by or in a political institution. That actor who most often 
succeeds in having decisions on particular issues made in line with her 
explicit preferences, against the explicit preferences of others, is, 
according to this view, the one with the most power'. It is not entirely 
clear whether the pluralists intend to make an ontological or only an 
epistemological claim: that is, whether the claim is that this is the 
' Or influence: as Lukes points out, ""Among pluralists, 'power', 
"influence 1, etc., tend to be used interchangeably" (Lukes 1974: 12). 
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only situation in which power exists, or merely that this is the only 
situation in which we can reliably identify power. Lukes summarises 
the one-dimensional view as involving "A focus on behaviour in the 
making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable 
conflict of (subjective) interests, seen as express policy preferences, 
revealed by political participation" (ibid: 15). 
As Lukes characterises it, the central point of the two- 
dimensional view is a qualified critique of the one-dimensional focus 
on political decision-making between explicit preferences. Bachrach 
and Baratz accept that power on the one-dimensional view is a form 
of power, but not that it is the only (identifiable) form. They claim and 
Lukes accepts that when "A person or group - consciously or 
unconsciously - creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of 
policy conflicts, that person or group has power" (Bachrach & Baratz 
1962 quoted in Lukes 1974: 16). Power has two faces. The first is 
success in explicit policy conflicts. The second is "mobilisation of bias' 
to prevent some policy conflicts from becoming explicit. As Lukes 
summarises it, the two-dimensional view "Allows for consideration of 
the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on 
potential issues over which there is observable conflict of (subjective) 
interests, seen as embodied in express policy preferences and sub- 
political grievances" (Lukes 1974: 20). 
Lukes develops his own three-dimensional view of power via a 
critique of the two-dimensional view. He accepts that both the one 
and the two-dimensional views identify forms of power, but argues 
that they miss further forms. The two-dimensional view is inadequate 
in three ways. 
First, it focuses on individual behaviour. Lukes asserts against 
this methodological individualism that, in two cases, '"The power to 
control the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues cannot be 
adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function of collective forces 
and social arrangements" (ibid: 22). The first case is collective action, 
where the policy or activity of a collective is observable, "But not 
attributable to particular individuals' decisions or behaviour" (ibid). 
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The second case is when the mobilisation of bias results, again not 
from the behaviour of particular individuals, but from the form of 
organisation in which decision-making takes place. 
Second, the two-dimensional view sticks too close to the one- 
dimensional view's association of power with actual and observable 
conflict. Lukes argues against that association that "The most 
effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict arising 
in the first place" (ibid: 23). While power is exercised in getting its 
object to do what she does not want to do, it is also exercised in 
shaping her wants such that no conflict with the wants of the powerful 
arises. 
Third, the one and two-dimensional views both consider only 
subjective interests, whether explicitly formulated or held as 
grievances which are excluded from political decision- ma king. Lukes 
argues against this limitation that power is also exercised in 
preventing the articulation or satisfaction of real interests. The objects 
of the exercise of power ""May not express or even be conscious of 
their interests" (ibid: 25). 
I have followed through Lukes' development of his concept of 
power in order to specify part of mine, and the lessons I draw from 
him are as follows. Power is identifiable: 1) when an actor succeeds in 
getting conflicted policy decisions made in accordance with her 
subjective preferences or interests, in political institutions; 2) when 
an actor succeeds in excluding some subjective preferences or 
interests from consideration; 3) in collective action and organisational 
form; and 4) in the transformation of subjective preferences or 
interests to avoid conflict and facilitate exploitation. 
Anarchists must and do recognise all of these forms of power, 
as, for instance: 1) when they join other radicals in attacking the 
influence of corporate interest groups on the policies of western 
states; and 2) fight for the recognition of the voiceless poor outside 
those states and the non-persons inside them. 3) The fact that power 
conceived in this way can be wielded by collectives, and through 
organisational forms, importantly expresses the anarchist belief that it 
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is not only individual tyrants but 'the system' which must be 
challenged. The organisation of all human social life, not just of 
government, is able of itself to oppress, and therefore the 
transformation needed is more than a change of government. Finally, 
4) that power can be identified in the transformation of subjective 
preferences or interests, expresses the belief that the required 
transformation is deeper than a change of organisational form. Not 
only the way we organise ourselves but what we have come to want 
and believe possible may be the result of power- relations. 
Lukes asserts the importance of real as opposed to merely 
subjective interests, and I now want to say something about that 
idea. The idea of real interests is understood and used in various 
ways, and can often be polemically effective. Its uses include 
liberation,, paternalism and even oppression: 
Lukes' 3-D view of power (albeit unintentionally) supports the 
paternalistic political practice of Marxism/Leninism. If the 
proletariat does not perceive its own real interests, then it is 
others who must speak, or act, or make their decisions for them. 
If the Party claims to be privileged in having the scientific theory 
which enables it to identify the real interest of the proletariat, or 
claims to have a privileged epistemological standpoint from 
which it is able to impute to the proletariat what it should 
identify as its real interests, then it can claim to know better 
than the proletariat what the latter ought to do in order to 
realize its real interests. And if the proletariat has been 
prevented from perceiving its real interests (if it only has a 
"trade-union consciousness), it is but a short step to argue that 
the proletariat ought to obey the Party if it is to realize its real 
interests. (Carter 1992: 194) 
Among the many ways in which the idea of real interests can be 
understood, two are of particular significance. First, real interests can 
be understood as the common interests of humans, which transcend 
our particular and often clashing subjective interests. I have already 
claimed, in 5.5, that there are such interests. My account of them is 
not particularly strong, since I allow that the interests which humans 
typically share, in food, shelter, company, continued life, the respect 
of peers, and the absence of violence, can be trumped by other 
particular interests. Perhaps they could be called 'more real' or 'less 
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subjective' interests, since an appeal to them will often but not always 
be effective with any human. 
The second significant understanding of real interests is 
involved in the possibility of criticising and even attempting to change 
people's current subjective interests. Someone's immediate subjective 
interest may be in staying in the pub all afternoon, but we might say 
that she is mistaken: she has a real interest in going to the library 
instead. We might attempt to convince her of this, perhaps by appeal 
to the long-term satisfactions of that over the short-term satisfactions 
of the pub. Less trivially, we might say of or to a slave who is happy 
with her lot, that no matter what she now thinks, she has a real 
interest in freedom. We might attempt to convince her of this by 
appealing to two types of counterfactual: 1) by appeal to the choice 
she would make, if she could experience both the satisfaction of her 
current interests, and the satisfaction of (what we claim are) her real 
interests, and then pick one; or 2) by appeal to the interests she 
would have in an ideal situation of perfect information and undistorted 
rationality. The possibilities of being mistaken about our interests, and 
of being convinced that we are so mistaken,, are morally and 
politically important. They also raise considerable technical and 
political difficulties. But I do not need to consider them further, here: 
my concern, as part of my project, is in power as the capacity to 
attain future goods, whatever they are, and therefore whatever 
interests the power-holder happens to have. I do not mean to suggest 
that the idea and problem of real interests is in general insignificant. 
But given my specific project, and in line with my policy of 
philosophical minimalism (see 1.6), 1 can avoid further consideration 
of real interests here. 
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6.2 Parsons and Mann: creating and distributing power 
I have so far followed the fairly common anarchist practice of 
assuming that power, as such, is domination and an evil. So, all of the 
forms of power identified by Lukes, and included by me, are kinds of 
control or domination, and I include them in part to respect anarchist 
resistance to them. However anarchists, in other ways, need to and 
do celebrate power, particularly the collective power of people against 
or in the absence of oppression. I now consider some parts of Talcott 
Parsons' (1957,1967a, 1967b) account of power, in order to allow for 
that celebration in my concept of power, as well as to serve my 
specific purposes. 
Lukes' account of power begins with the pluralist view, which 
was itself developed in response to elite theory. Parsons' account is 
also a response to elite theory, and was first stated in a review of C 
Wright Mills' The Power Elite (Mills 1956; Parsons 1957). His later 
theory (Parsons 1969a & 1967b) is complex, suggestive and 
eccentric, and I do not give a complete account of it here. Instead, I 
consider two major features of the theory, accept one and reject the 
other. 
The final section of Parsons" critique of Mills begins with an 
analogy between power and wealth, and his later account of power 
elaborates that analogy into one between the analysis of political and 
of economic 'sub-systems'. According to Parsons, "To Mills, power is 
not a facility for the performance of function in and on behalf of the 
society as a system, but is interpreted exclusively as a facility for 
getting what one group, the holders of power, wants by preventing 
another group, the 'outs, from getting what it wants" (Parsons 1957: 
139). For him, this is metonymic: it confuses a "Secondary and 
derived"' (ibid) aspect of power with the whole phenomenon. 
Certainly, there is such power, but that is not the whole story. This is 
where the analogy with wealth first appears: 
There is obviously a distributive aspect of wealth and it is in a 
sense true that the wealth of one person or group by definition 
cannot also be possessed by another group. Thus the distribution 
109 
of wealth is, in the nature of the case, a focus of conflicts of 
interest in a society. But what of the positive functions of wealth 
and of the conditions of its production? It has become fully 
established that the wealth available for distribution can only 
come about through the processes of production, and that these 
processes require the "co-operation" or integration of a variety of 
different agencies... Wealth in turn is a generalized class of 
facilities available to units of the society - individuals and various 
types and levels of collectivities - for whatever uses may be 
important to them. But even apart from the question of where 
each share goes, the fact that there should be wealth to divide, 
and how much, cannot be taken for granted as given except 
within a very limited context. (ibid: 139-40) 
Parsons' point is that power is not necessarily or even normally ""Zero- 
sum" (Parsons 1967a: 337). Power, like wealth, is not subject to 
anything like the law of conservation of energy: it can be created and 
destroyed as well as redistributed. 
In Michael Mann's terms, power can be either "Distributive" or 
""Collective" (Mann 1986: 6; Mann's analysis is explicitly indebted to 
Parsons'). In the first case, for A to gain power over B, B must lose 
power over A. We can think of there being a fixed amount of power 
available for distribution between two agents, just as we can think of 
there being a fixed amount of money, perhaps from an inheritance, 
similarly available. In the second case, "Persons in cooperation can 
enhance their joint power over third parties or over nature" (ibid). I 
accept this distinction, while expanding the second type, for my own 
concept of power. Power can be created by cooperation, but while 
that is one important way of creating power, it is not the only one. A 
group of people can increase their power by collaborating; someone 
marooned on an empty planet can increase her power by intelligent 
use and development of her resources and skills (see 6.5). So, power 
in my sense includes "created' as well as "distributed' power. 
Most social situations and activities have aspects of both 
created and distributed power. States, for instance, both create 
massive amounts of power and distribute it in a highly unequal way 
(see chapter 9). Which aspect we emphasise in a particular situation 
will depend on our purposes in making the description. For my 
purposes, it is important to include both the distributive and the 
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creative aspects of power, while noting the distinction between the 
two. Anarchists recognise and celebrate the creation of power in, for 
instance, Spain during its civil war. There, collective action kept 
trams, trains, factories and food production going without supposedly- 
necessary hierarchy, as well as organising militias to resist Franco's 
attempted coup (see chapter 12). 
Parsons' comparison between power and wealth, which begins 
as an illustrative conceit, expands in his later theory into an elaborate 
analogy between political and economic 'sub-systems: "The initial 
assumption is that, within the conception of society as a system, 
there is an essential parallelism in theoretical structure between the 
conceptual schemes appropriate for the analysis of the economic and 
the political aspects of societies" (Parsons 1967a: 299). It would not 
be to the point here to give a complete account of this parallelism. 
Instead, I use one feature of it, which derives from the overarching 
analogy, further to specify my own concept of power. But before 
doing so, it is worth remembering that I have described Parsons' 
theory as 'eccentric, and justifying the description by noting some of 
the odd things it leads him to claim: 'authority', for instance, is 
analogous to 'property, and regular elections are analogous to banks' 
opening hours! (ibid: 319-21; 339). 
For Parsons, one of the important analogies between political 
and economic sub-systems or aspects is that power and money are 
both 'generalised. Power ""Is a generalised capacity to secure the 
performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective 
organization"" (ibid: 308); money transactions are unlike barter in 
being generalised. That is, in the second case, the medium of 
exchange is good for all economic activity, because both parties to a 
particular exchange understand that everyone else will also accept 
money, where they might not accept some particular item in barter 
(because, for instance, they already have as many carrots or shoes or 
oil-paintings as they want). 
Securing possession of an object of utility by bartering another 
object for it is not a monetary transaction. Similarly, by my 
definition, securing compliance with a wish, whether it be defined 
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as an obligation of the object or not, simply by threat of superior 
force, is not an exercise of power. (ibid) 
So on Parson's definition, what we might be tempted to call the power 
of a mugger to take my mobile phone, because she can credibly 
threaten violence, is not power. Parsons is of course free to define 
power in this way, for his own purposes. I have brought the point up 
in order to specify that my concept of power is not limited in this way. 
Any capacity of an agent to attain a good (against the conflicting 
preferences of another) is (distributed) power in my sense of the 
term. A mugger can have power, and so can a state. This point is 
important for my concept of power in part because without it,, we will 
be unable to make much sense of, and therefore unable to assess, 
many anarchist claims, including, for instance, the common polemical 
tactic of comparing states,, corporations and religious organisations to 
well-organised bandits. 
My analysis of Parsons' theory of power has helped to specify 
my own concept in two ways. First, we have recognised the distinction 
between, and included both of, created and distributed power. This is 
useful in part because anarchists' attacks on power can often be 
understood as attacks on unequally distributed power, and their 
celebrations of the power of the people as celebrations of 
(cooperatively) created power. More importantly, it is also useful in 
describing my Landmarks in chapters 9-13. Second, we have rejected 
the limited characterisation of power as only a generalised social 
phenomenon, and can therefore recognise power in single, personal 
interactions as well as generalised systems, and compare the two. 
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6.3 Philp's questions 
Mark Philp (1996) uses two questions to distinguish, and produce a 
taxonomy of, different concepts of power. They are: 1) "Whether 
power is exercised over B whether or not the respect in which B 
suffers is intended by A"; and 2) "Whether power is properly 
restricted to a particular sort of effect which A has on B, or whether it 
applies in any case in which A has some effect on B" (Philp 1996: 
658). 
In answer to 1,1 stipulate that (distributed) power in my sense 
can be exercised by A over B whether or not A intends the effect she 
has. It is a common polemical habit of anarchists and other radicals to 
attribute malicious intent to power-holders. But the point of such 
attacks is not that, if a power-holder does not intend the effect she 
has on the object of her power, then nothing is wrong. The point is to 
personify and to increase effort against injustice. For my and other 
anarchist purposes, it will be useful to talk about power even when its 
effects are unintended (because, for instance, they are the results of 
collective action and not attributable to the intentions of any 
individual agent). 
In answer to question 2.1 stipulate that power provisionally 
covers all effects, not just some sub-class of "non-trivial' effects. I 
suggest that which effects are trivial is a matter of case-by-case 
analysis in the light of particular purposes, not of conceptual fiat. 
6.4 Power: a summary 
My anarchist concept of power has developed from my initial 
assumption, via consideration of Lukes, Parsons, Mann and Philp,, as 
follows. Power is the present capacity to attain future goods. It can be 
exercised in explicit policy conflicts, in suppressing potential conflicts, 
and in modifying the preferences of the "outs' so that no conflict arises 
(following Lukes). It can be a property both of individuals and of 
groups (following Lukes and Parsons). The concept covers both of, 
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and distinguishes between, created and distributed power (following 
and expanding on Parsons and Mann), and covers both individual and 
generalised cases (against Parsons). Power can be exercised whether 
or not the power-holder intends her effect, and provisionally applies 
to all effects (in answer to Philp). 
I emphasise that I do not think power analogous to, for 
instance, energy: it is not a real independent stuff which takes 
different forms. Rather, 'power' names a generalised aspect of human 
activity, and covers a wide variety of particular capacities. The means 
used to create power condition what power it is; the means used to 
distribute it condition what powers are distributed. 'Power' is a 
metaphor, not a substance. 
What this concept of power does, in relation to my wider 
project, is to pick out some important aspects of human sociability, 
which (I suggest) can be identified in all social forms, and which I will 
identify in the particular forms I consider in the Landmarks section. 
The concept, first, allows us to identify similarities between different 
social forms, in that it allows us to see them as different ways of 
doing the same thing: creating, distributing and deploying capacities 
to attain goods. Second, it provides us with axes against which we 
can give accounts of their differences, for instance in allowing us to 
compare the distribution of capacities in Atlantic slavery with that in 
the Nuer social form (see chapters 10 & 11). So, it is a major first 
step towards being able to carry out the comparative function of the 
trope identified in chapter 4. It is also a step towards the constuction 
of my anarchist utopia in chapter 13: by seeing features of different 
social forms as different ways of doing the same thing, we can start to 
separate them (at least in imagination) from their local and particular 
contexts., and to see them as part of the joint, and jointly available, 
experience of humanity. 
0 
I now have my first conceptual tool: a specified, broadly inclusive but 
differentiated concept of power, tailored to my particular purposes 
and responsive to other anarchist concerns. The rest of this chapter 
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will consider some similarly tailored and responsive general ways in 
which power can be created and distributed. 
6.5 Creating power 
Power as I have defined it is not subject to anything like the law of 
conservation of energy: it can be created and destroyed as well as 
distributed. In this section I briefly consider two major ways, already 
noted, in which power can be created. First, two remarks: 1) 1 do not 
suppose that there is some unit of, nor some universal objective way 
of measuring, power, such that we can always unambiguously identify 
which of two social situations exhibits more power and by how much. 
All that is required for my purposes is that we can often say that 
some change in sociability involves the creation, and some other the 
destruction, of power. 2) It will occasionally be useful to distinguish 
between creating extra power and creating new powers. Which of 
these we want to say has happened in some change will depend, at 
least in part, on our purposes in making the description. 
I have already noted in 6.2 that a group of people can increase 
their power by collaborating, and that someone marooned on an 
empty planet can increase her power by intelligent use and 
development of her resources and skills. These are the two different 
ways of creating power which I want to pick out. 
The first way of creating power is cooperation. By working 
together, humans can attain more good(s) than any could attain 
individually. Further: imagine for a moment that we could sum 
individuals' powers, and precisely measure differences in power. I 
suggest that the sum of the individual powers of x humans would be 
less than the power of x humans working together. In practice, even 
if a wall is said to take one thousand person-hours to build, this does 
not mean that one person could build it in a thousand hours (nor, of 
course, that one thousand people could do it in an hour: some tasks 
have practical upper limits on the number of people who can 
cooperate on them). Many goods require cooperation to be attainable 
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at all. So, cooperation creates power, and does not merely redirect or 
redistribute a fixed amount of power. I mean "cooperation' to cover all 
cases of humans working together, and not for instance to be limited 
to voluntary collaboration. 
The second way of creating power can be called 'expertise' or 
"technique'. An increase in knowledge about how things work and in 
technique in applying that knowledge increases someone or some 
group's capacity to attain good(s), by increasing the amount of good 
attainable, or by lessening the effort required to attain the same 
amount. So, the development of technique creates power. I will 
consider some ways in which humans and especially states have used 
technique to create extra power and new powers, in later chapters. 
Technique and cooperation are analytically distinct, but often 
appear intertwined and codependent in real social situations. Much 
development of technique is and must be cooperative; much 
cooperation depends on particular kinds of technique. 
6.6 Changing and maintaining power distributions 
Power can be distributed in a wide variety of ways, from equality to 
slavery. In this section I consider three ways in which power can be 
redistributed or some distribution of power maintained (I call both 
processes "distribution' from now on). They are: 1) violence and the 
threat of violence; 2) authority discourses; and 3) property 
discourses. These are not the only ways to distribute power, but they 
are widespread and effective ones, and distinguishing them will be 
useful for the descriptions of particular social forms I give in the 
Landmarks section (chapters 9-13). During that section I will also 
discover some further ways in which humans can distribute power. 
We should note that, since I have defined power as the capacity to 
attain some good, the capacity to use these or other ways of 
distributing power is itself power. 
First, two remarks about distributing power: 1) as already 
noted in 6.5,1 do not suppose that there is some unit of, nor some 
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universal objective method for measuring, power. All that is required 
is that we can often identify and describe a power distribution to the 
extent of being able to say, for instance, that A has more power than 
or power over B. 2) 1 stipulate that for my concept of power, there is 
no groundstate or state of nature for power distributions. No one 
distribution of power,, be it equality, patriarchy or slavery, is natural 
or original. We can say about different power-distributions that they 
differ, and in what way, and we can make judgements about which is 
better on a variety of moral and other grounds. But we cannot 
suppose that one is more natural than another, nor make moral 
judgements about them on that ground. For further argument against 
'groundstates', see 8.1.3. 
6.6.1 Violence 
Violence and the credible threat of violence (from now on called just 
Molence') are effective and common ways of distributing power. I call 
violence used to change a power distribution 'revolutionary', without 
intending to imply that the change is necessarily sudden, and its 
opposite, therefore, 'counter-revolutionary'. It has sometimes been 
argued, as for instance by John Hospers (1971), that states' power- 
distributions are centrally or solely maintained by violence, in the 
form of publically known coercive sanctions, up to and including (the 
threat of) death, monopolised by state institutions. That is, that 
violence is a state's only means of counter-revolution. This is 
simplistic: as I show in 6.6.2 & 6.6.3 and chapters 9& 10, there are 
other ways in which states and other organisations can and do 
maintain particular power-distributions. But it is undeniable that 
states and other organisations do make considerable use of this way 
of maintaining their distributions of power. 
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6.6.2 Authority discourses 
It is fairly common practice among anarchists and their critics to 
characterise anarchism as anti-authoritarianism. On the face of it, the 
gloss has some force: anarchists do devote much of their time and 
energy to activities, from research to pamphleteering to rioting, which 
can easily and plausibly be described as anti-authoritarian. However 
there are good reasons not to focus anarchist theory too strongly on 
the concept of authority, especially given my particular purposes. 
First: the arguments in 1.5 against characterising anarchism as 
anti-statism also apply to a characterisation of it as anti- 
authoritarianism. Such a characterisation is not distinguishing, 
complete or helpful. 
Second: I have shown in chapter 2 that the philosophical 
anarchist concern with the justification or legitimacy of authority is 
not typical of anarchism in general. 
Third: we can distinguish between at least two kinds of 
authority. Someone can be: 1) an authority on something, that is 
respected in, an expert on, or worth listening to about,, some subject 
or domain; or 2) in authority over someone, that is in an institutional 
position which is supposed to confer the right to command, and to 
impose a corresponding duty to obey, in some domain (see for 
instance Flathman 1980). Anarchists sometimes explicitly, and very 
often implicitly, accept and even celebrate authority of the first kind. 
Kropotkin, for instance, is widely remembered by anarchists with 
respect and affection, and his work is still read for more than 
nostalgic reasons (as by me). Anarchists certainly do set themselves 
against the second kind of authority, whether held by teachers, 
sergeants, priests or politicians. But at least some anarchist attacks 
on this kind of authority can be read as meaning that the people in 
authority can be condemned because they are not authorities on, for 
instance, the right way to live. 
Fourth: anarchists are typically opposed to anyone having 
authority over other people, but also typically for everyone having 
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authority over herself. So, again, the anti-authoritarian gloss 
misrepresents anarchism. 
Fifth: anarchists are certainly worried about authority of the 
second kind distinguished above. But they are also typically just as 
worried about power over people which does not involve any concept 
or pretence of authority. For anarchists, a powerful bully is just as bad 
as an authoritative drill-sergeant. 
For all these reasons, authority is not a particularly useful focus 
for my or other anarchist purposes. For the fifth reason in particular, 
power is a better focal concept, because authority can be brought in 
derivatively, as here, as one way among others of changing or 
maintaining power-distributions. 
By an 'authority discourse' I mean a shared vocabulary and 
habit of social action which makes use of, and is justified and 
motivated by, a concept of (legitimate) authority. To take one 
example: the shared vocabulary and habit of social action of 
democratic politics involves a concept of authority. The idea of people 
and politicians' authority is used to maintain the power distribution in 
which they are involved, and to justify and motivate their use of 
power. This is not a necessary, but is apparently a widespread and 
effective,, way to maintain power-distributions in which one group of 
people have power over others. It is also a widespead and effective 
way to challenge power-holders. Because democratic politicians' 
authority is discussed in terms of their representation of 'the people'. 
their power can be challenged by discourse about their loss of 
authority through failing to be representative. Further, authority 
discourse can be a way of attempting to move towards a situation of 
(more) equal power. Claiming my authority over my own person is 
one way to resist a distribution of power where someone else has 
power over, for instance, my sexual choices (this is the way in which 
the idea of authority is used in anarchist moves of the kind described 
in my fourth reason not to take authority as focal). So, using the 
terms I introduced for violence in 6.6.1, authority discourse can be 
both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. 
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Two remarks: 1) as I have characterised it, authority discourse 
involves the related concept of duty. Authority to command is 
understood to convey a reciprocal duty to obey. I am aware that the 
idea of duty is not in general restricted to this role (and describe 
another of its roles in 6.6.3), but do not need to consider it further 
here, for my purposes. 2) By focusing on the idea and discourse, 
rather than the fact, of authority, I do not mean to imply acceptance 
of the philosophical anarchist position that there is logically no such 
thing as real or legitimate authority. I do not have or need an opinion 
about that claim. I focus on authority discourse rather than real 
authority because I am interested here in the ways in which we can 
distribute power, and authority discourse appears effective for that 
task, whatever view we take of the reality of its subject, so long as it 
is understood by, and at least partially convincing to, the people 
involved in it. 
6.6.3 Property discourses 
Although the justice of property-ownership has often been a topic of 
interest for anarchists, property,, unlike authority, is not a potential 
focus for anarchism. So, I do not need an argument analogous to the 
one in the previous section against so using it instead of power. 
By a 'property discourse' I mean a shared vocabulary and habit 
of social action which makes use of, and is justified and motivated by, 
a concept of (legitimate) property. It is worth analysing the elements 
of such concepts in some detail. 
Property-ownership is minimally a triadic relation between two 
(individual or collective) agents and some (tangible or intangible) 
good: "A owns B against C" (Hallowell 1967: 239). If I say that this is 
my copy of Leviathan, I am asserting a complex relationship between 
A) me, B) this tangible object, a book, and C) some (perhaps all) 
others. The relationship asserted by property discourse is not single, 
and can profitably be analysed into a bundle of relations. This 
Hohfeld-Honore analysis has been widely used and modified in legal 
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and philosophical accounts of property (see for instance Becker 1977, 
Christman 1994, Munzer 1990 and Waldron 1988). 
The bundle of relations, variously asserted and socially 
instantiated by particular property discourses, in relation to particular 
goods, is as follows: 
Elements Correlatives Opposites 
Claim-right Duty No-right 
Privilege (liberty) No-Right Duty 
Power Liability Disability (no-power) 
Immunity Disability Liability 
(Munzer 1990: 19; cf Hoebel 1942: 951). 
This "Analytical vocabulary" (Munzer 1990: 18) allows us to unpick 
particular examples of property-talk. So, for instance, if I own a farm, 
I have a power to transfer that ownership, and some other people 
have a corresponding liability to receive it. Or, if I owe you ; E10, you 
have a claim-right for E10 from me, and I have a corresponding duty 
to give it to you (both examples after Munzer 1990). The vocabulary 
does not give any guidance on how to resolve particular disputes 
about property, but merely allows us to describe particular property- 
claims and their differences. Nor does it necessarily identify all of the 
possible relations we might want to include in a description of some 
property discourse. However it does identify some important and 
common ones. 
Although the Hohfeld-Honore analysis was originally designed 
as a conceptual toolkit for lawyers and judges working in a "Mature 
system of law" (Honore 1961: 108), it has wider application. Hoebel 
(1942), for instance, puts it to use in describing the property 
discourse of the Yurok Indians of Northern California. Whether or not 
a property discourse is enacted in the context of a formal legal 
system, and whatever legal, customary or other sanctions are used to 
support it, the vocabulary is useful in describing the ways in which 
people understand, claim and dispute the various claim-rights, 
privileges, and so on, which make it up. 
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So, property as a discourse and social institution can profitably 
be analysed into a bundle of distinct incidents which may attach to one 
person, be shared by a group of people, or be divided amongst several 
people. Modern western property law has tended to attach most or all of 
these incidents to one legal person, the owner of the object in question. 
However there is nothing necessary or universal about that 
agglomeration. The different incidents of ownership which are involved 
in property discourses can be distributed between people in many 
different ways, for many different practical, traditional and moral 
reasons. So, for instance, "In the early middle ages, land in England 
could not plausibly be said to be 'owned" because" the various relations 
of power, privilege and so on "'Were so divided between lord and tenant 
that the position of neither presented a sufficient analogy with the 
paradigm case of owning a thing" (Honore 1961: 109). 
Property discourses are a means of distributing power because, 
where a particular discourse is understood, mostly convincing and 
sanctioned in a social form, it is an effective way of controlling access 
to and the use of particular goods. Again: if I own a farm in the social 
context of "The 'liberal' concept of 'full' individual ownership" (ibid: 
107), then I am involved in a bundle of relations with other people 
with respect to it, including the power to transfer that ownership (with 
others' correlative liability to have it transferred to them), the 
privilege of making use of the farm in various ways (with others' 
correlative no-right to use), and so on. If I have a subjective interest 
in the money I get from the sale, or the products of the farmland 
(that is, if they are goods for me), then my capacity to exercise my 
powers and privileges is power in the sense developed in this chapter. 
Property discourse can be both revolutionary and counter- 
revolutionary. For instance: the workers on my farm might argue 
that, because the wheat crop is the product of their labour (while I sit 
in the farmhouse counting my money), they rather than I own it. I 
might respond by asserting a legal property discourse and by calling 
on the sanctions with which the state backs it up. 
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As in my account of authority discourse as a way of distributing 
power, I do not mean to imply any view on the reality of property by 
concentrating on the social effectiveness of property discourses. For 
my purposes, I do not need a position on that question. The 
significance of property discourse, here, is that it is apparently a 
widespread and effective way of distributing power, whatever view we 
take of property's reality, or of the justice of the particular property 
distributions which a particular discourse supports or challenges. 
All three of the ways of distributing power I have noted are common 
and apparently effective. They also commonly appear intertwined and 
in concert, at least in our current arrangements. States in particular 
use all three, and support one with another (see chapter 9). 
6.7 Summary 
In this chapter I have defined a concept of power, in the context of 
contestation, for the purposes stated in chapter 5 and in response to 
some more general anarchist concerns. It is summarised in 6.4. In 
the rest of the chapter I considered some widespread ways in which 
power is created (by technique, cooperation and combinations of the 
two) and distributed (by violence, authority discourses, property 
discourses, and combinations of some or all of the three). My 
definition., and my accounts of the creation and distribution, of power 
are tested in 8.5 in relation to a simplified example, and then put to 
use in the Landmarks section. My next two chapters complete my 
conceptual toolkit. 
123 
7* Equality 
Like power, equality fails Gallie's test for being essentially contested 
(see 5.1). But as with power, we can accept that it is now and 
historically has been contested, as a matter of fact if not of necessity, 
and for similar practical and theoretical reasons'. Equality's 
contestation revolves around four questions: 1) For what purpose 
should we use a concept of equality? 2) Why equality? 3) Equality of 
what? And 4) Equality between whom? I postpone consideration of 
question 4 until chapter 8; here, I give answers to 1,, 2 and 3 in the 
light of my purposes, in the context of contestation, and in response 
to more general anarchist concerns. 
As with power, I do not consider all claims and debates about 
equality, and do not intend to produce a history or a literature survey. 
I do not consider, for instance, the question of whether the demands 
of justice, and therefore of equality, apply only to the basic structure 
of society (Rawls 1973; Cohen 2000); nor the question of whether to 
apply different standards of justice to inequalities which result from 
luck as opposed to those which result from choice (for a useful sketch 
of this ongoing debate, see Matravers 2002); nor concerns about 
whether we should be egalitarian about people's whole lives, or about 
portions of them (McKerlie 1989; Temkin 1993: chapter 8). Again, I 
consider only those claims and debates which help to specify my 
concept of equality. 
' For a subtle account of the various decontestations of equality, see 
Rae (1981). 
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7.1 The purpose of my concept of equality 
Concepts of equality have been and can be used in a number of 
different ways. Equality can be used, first, as a demand of morality or 
justice, which takes its place in the arena against various other 
competing and perhaps incompatible demands, including demands for 
freedom, for getting what one deserves, for happiness, and for not 
having one's rights violated. This is probably the most common use of 
equality, at least in the philosophical and political literature. Second, 
as a factual claim about humans, as by Hobbes: 
Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and 
mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes 
manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet 
when all is reckoned together the difference between man and 
man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim 
to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well 
as he. For as to the strength of body, the weakest has strength 
enough to kill the strongest,, either by secret machination, or by 
confederacy with others that are in the same danger with 
himself. And as to the faculties of the mind... I find yet a greater 
equality amongst men than that of strength. For prudence is but 
experience, which equal time equally bestows on all men in 
those things they equally apply themselves unto. (Hobbes 1994: 
74-5) 
We could call this the egalitarianism of fear: no matter what small 
inequalities you benefit from, others can always gang up on you, and 
they know where you sleep. Other possible factual claims about 
human equality include, for instance, that humans are equally 
valuable, or equally God's children, or have equal rights, or equal 
ownership of the world. Factual claims can further be used to support 
demands for equality: if, for instance, humans have equal ownership 
of the world, we might derive a demand for equal access to its 
resources. Third, as part of a project of political egalitarianism,, 
defined in opposition to luck egalitarianism, as follows: 
The proper negative aim of egalitarian justice is not to eliminate 
the impact of brute luck from human affairs, but to end 
oppression, which by definition is socially imposed. Its proper 
positive aim is not to ensure that everyone gets what they 
morally deserve, but to create a community in which people 
stand in relations of equality to others. (Anderson 1999: 288-9) 
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Fourth, equality can be used as a measuring device, and this is how I 
will use it. 
My concept of equality is part of a toolkit for comparing 
different social forms. For me, equality is a metrical concept, and my 
interest is in the extent to which and ways in which particular social 
forms instantiate or fail to instantiate it. So,, to anticipate chapter 13, 
one major feature of the anarchist utopia is equality, and many of the 
real fragments of that utopia which I discover will display the 
possibility of that equality. 
So, for me, describing some state of affairs as equal or unequal 
is not in itself a normative claim. It might form part of an external 
criticism by comparison with some other, more or less unequal, state 
of affairs: but in that case, the normative work is done by the 
comparison and not just by the fact of equality or inequality. 
Using a concept of equality for this limited purpose is justified, 
first, by the anarchist habit of attacking current arrangements as 
unequal, by comparison with possible utopian equality. My use of the 
concept is thus responsive to anarchist concerns and the anarchist 
tradition. Second, this use is justified by being in reflective equilibrium 
with the utopia (see 5.3). Third, and most importantly, using equality 
in this way helps me to make the descriptions and comparisons of my 
Landmarks in chapters 9-13. 
7.2 Why Equality? 
When equality is used as a demand of morality or justice, the pressing 
question is, Why equality rather than some other demand? I have 
already noted that other possibilities include demands for freedom, for 
getting what one deserves, for happiness, and for not having one's 
rights violated. A theorist who focuses on equality needs some 
justification for prioritising it, and some argument against others who 
argue for prioritising, for instance, freedom, which is often thought to 
be incompatible with equality. 
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I do not need such a justification or argument. I am using 
equality as a metrical concept, not as a demand, for particular 
comparative purposes. So, for me, the Why equality? question is 
practical rather than normative, and answered by its help in carrying 
out my purposes. 
7.3 Equality of what? 
The Equality of what? question was put in that form in an influential 
article by Amartya Sen (1982). but was pressing long before. It is 
pressing at least because: 1) if we use a concept of equality, what it 
is equality of will clearly make an enormous difference to what we are 
demanding, claiming, or measuring, and therefore to our subsequent 
argument and practice; and 2) when we use equality as a demand, 
"The inherent diversity of human beings means that treating them 
equally with respect to one... 'focal variable' may lead to considerable 
inequalities in other dimensions" (Callinicos 2000: 52). 
Suggested, attacked and defended currencies of equality have 
included equality of welfare, resources (Dworkin 1981a and 1981b 
attack the first and defend the second), primary goods (defended by 
Rawls 1972), opportunity (attacked by Radcliffe Richards 1998), 
access to advantage (defended by Cohen 1989), and capabilities (first 
suggested by Sen 1982). 1 adopt a different currency: power. 
The proximate source of the idea that equality of power is an 
appropriate focus for anarchism is Alan Carter (2000; see also Carter 
1999: chapter 3). However, he uses that idea very differently from 
me, as part of an attempt to found an analytical anarchism to match 
and challenge analytical Marxism (on which see, for instance, 
Callinicos 1989). The idea of equality of power also appears in a 
debate begun by Dworkin (2000: chapter 4) and continued, for 
instance, by Brighouse (2001) and Armstrong (2003), about whether 
equality of specifically political power is an appropriate focus for 
egalitarians, or an appropriate understanding of democracy, but this 
debate is not relevant to my purposes. 
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For my metrical purposes, I use the concept of equality of 
power, and therefore, derivatively, of inequality of power, with power 
defined as in chapter 6, and specifically understood as distributed 
power. 
As with my other stipulations about equality, my use of power 
as the currency of equality is primarily justified by this particular 
concept of equality's use for my comparative purposes, to be 
displayed in later chapters. But I show in 7.5 that it is also, to some 
extent,, responsive to the anarchist tradition. 
7.4 Equality: a summary 
I have answered three of the four questions around which the 
contestation of equality revolves, as follows. I use a concept of 
equality as a measuring device, for my comparative purposes (7.1). 
Given those purposes, I need only a practical rather than a normative 
answer to the Why equality? question (7.2). My currency of equality is 
distributed power as defined in chapter 6 (7.3). 1 have postponed 
consideration of the fourth question, Equality between whom?, until 
chapter 8.1 now have my second conceptual tool: equality (and 
inequality) of power as a measuring device to allow comparison 
between my Landmarks. I will use it throughout the Landmarks 
section, as for instance in characterising Atlantic slavery as a social 
form in chapter 10.1 now define a useful derivative concept: freedom. 
7.5 Freedom 
Freedom is very obviously an important concept for anarchists. They 
are not alone: "Almost every moralist in human history has praised 
freedom" (Berlin 1969: 121). Anarchists and others therefore share a 
problem, because freedom is one of the most contested concepts 
available to writing, speech and action: ""The meaning of this term is 
so porous that there is little interpretation that it seems able to resist" 
(ibid). The problem of freedom may indeed be worse for anarchists 
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than for some others, because freedom is a systematically ambiguous 
term in anarchist discourse. For all the references to it in anarchist 
thought and polemic, freedom most often appears as something lost, 
buried and unknown. Consider Proudhon's rallying cry for anarchists: 
To be governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, 
directed, legislated, regimented, closed in, indoctrinated, preached 
at, controlled, assessed, evaluated, censored, commanded... 
Government means to be subjected to tribute, trained, ransomed, 
exploited, monopolized, extorted, pressured, mystified, robbed... 
Then at the first sign of resistance or word of complaint, one is 
repressed, fined, despised, vexed, pursued, hustled, beaten up, 
garroted, imprisoned, shot, machine-gunned, judged, sentenced, 
deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed, and to cap it all, ridiculed, 
mocked, outraged, and dishonoured. (quoted in Marshall 1993: 1) 
Freedom does not explicitly appear in this often-quoted passage, but 
the idea is there as something lost, stifled and betrayed. Freedom in 
that form of something lost and desired is a significant but often ghostly 
presence in anarchist thought. Given these facts that freedom is (even) 
more contested than power or equality, and that it appears in anarchist 
texts and speech almost entirely as something desired but unknown, we 
have good reason to reject freedom as a focal concept for anarchism, at 
least for my particular purposes. 
Nonetheless, a decontested and derivative concept of freedom 
will be useful for those purposes. I stipulate that here, to be free is not 
to be at the sharp end of an inequality of power. Free people have equal 
power; I am unfree to the extent, and in the particular ways, that 
others have power over me. This definition of freedom does not, and is 
not intended to, solve many of the problems associated with this 
contested concept. It focusses, to the exclusion of other issues, on 
freedom from domination. It will, however, be useful in describing my 
Landmarks. 
I have argued that freedom is not an appropriate focus for my 
anarchist project. But we should note that unfreedom, and in particular 
that variety of unfreedom which results from social domination, is a 
typical focus of anarchist polemic. Since this kind of unfreedom is 
usefully defined as being at the sharp end of an inequality of power, my 
use of power as the currency of equality is responsive to this feature of 
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the anarchist tradition. My point is not the (dubious) claim that 
anarchists 'really mean' inequality of power when they criticise and 
resist lack of freedom, but that this is a useful general analysis of a 
persistent anarchist theme, using new terminology. 
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In this section I have argued against using a concept of freedom as a 
focus for my anarchist project, and instead stipulated a derivative 
concept which relies on the prior definition of equality. In 6.6.2 1 did 
something similar for the concept of authority, by arguing that we have 
good reason not to focus anarchist theory on it and not to characterise 
anarchism as anti-authoritarianism, but nonetheless including an 
account of authority discourse as one way of changing and maintaining 
power distributions. These concepts of authority and freedom will be 
useful for my particular purposes. Considering and rejecting them as 
focal for anarchist thought, but including derivative versions of them, is 
another way in which my toolkit is responsive to general anarchist 
concerns. Authority and freedom are important concepts for anarchists, 
and I have responded to that fact in these sections. 
7.6 Summary 
I have described my second conceptual tool by responding to the first 
three of four questions about equality: 1) For what purpose should we 
use a concept of equality? 2) Why equality? 3) Equality of what? And 
4) Equality between whom? I turn to question 4 in chapter 8. For the 
moment, I have answered that I will use equality of power as a 
measuring device for the practical reason that doing so is useful in 
carrying out my comparative task (in answer to questions 3,1 and 2, 
respectively). I have also rejected freedom as the focal concept of my 
anarchism, and instead stipulated a derivative concept of freedom: to 
be free is not to be at the sharp end of an inequality of power. I have 
not intended a general intervention in the problems of equality or of 
freedom, but only to specify one conceptual tool, for my particular 
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purposes. In chapter 8,1 pull this tool and my concept of power 
together, by describing a model of human sociability. 
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The Network Model 
Chapters 6&7 developed decontested concepts of power and of 
equality, in the light of my purposes, in the context of contestation, 
and in response to more general anarchist concerns. In this chapter I 
complete and draw together my conceptual toolkit by developing, and 
arguing for the adoption of, a model of human sociability. My model is 
adapted from the work of Michael Mann (1986 & 1993) and I call it 
the network model, for reasons which will become clear as I describe 
it'. 
This chapter has five sections: in 8.1,1 describe and argue for 
the network model, partly by comparison with some other ways of 
thinking about human sociability; in 8.2,1 answer the question 
Equality between whom?, postponed from chapter 7; in 8.3,, 1 note 
some general features of human social networks; in 8.4., 1 summarise 
the network model; and in 8.5,1 summarise the toolkit as a whole. 
8.1 Description and comparisons 
Humans, pursuing a wide variety of interests, create,, discover, modify 
and destroy social organisations. These organisations consist of 
networks of humans interacting in ways including cooperation, 
negotiation, production,, exchange, coercion, hierarchy, friendship, 
emnity, violence, ritual, and play. Interactions are carried out both 
face-to-face and through various media. Almost all humans are 
involved in many such networks, in many roles, and these networks 
overlap, interpenetrate and sometimes include one another. Networks 
change in response to changes in or discoveries of interests, to the 
effects of other networks, and to changing environments and the 
opportunities and demands they create. 
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Although it is perhaps possible that some humans could 
organise themselves into a single, unified and discrete organisation in 
and through which they carried out all of their social activity., this has 
never in fact happened. There are and have been no social totalities: 
"We can never find a single bounded society in geographical or social 
space" (Mann 1986: 1). Society is best thought of as an activity, 
apparently natural for humans as for many other animals. It 
importantly involves both the creation and the distribution of power. 
So, human social life is "Constituted of multiple overlapping and 
intersecting networks of power" (ibid). Accounts of particular forms of 
that life must therefore recognise and describe "Overlapping networks 
of social interaction" which are also "Organisations, institutional 
means of attaining human goals" (ibid: 2), and which involve the 
creation of power by, and its distribution between, some individuals or 
groups. 
Because human social life has historically been both various, 
and sometimes quite stable, I use 'social form' as a term of 
convenience for any relatively stable and persistent bundle of 
networks, where it is useful to have a shorthand for such a 
distinguishable way of life. I refer to the Ik social form in 8.1.3. and 
the Nuer social form in chapter 11, for instance. However I do not 
intend to imply that any such social form is fully discrete,, nor that it is 
a higher-order entity than the individuals and networks of which it 
consists. 
I now fill out and argue for this model, by contrasting it with 
three other ways of characterising human sociability, chosen to 
emphasise and support those aspects of the model which are 
important for my purposes. I do not make use of Mann's work in 
order to claim him as an anarchist, which he certainly is not; nor to 
attempt to answer his central question, "Are there one or more core, 
decisive, ultimately determining elements, or keystones, of society? " 
1 The term "network' has also been used in recent work by Manuel 
Castells (e. g. 2000). His use of it differs from mine, but his project, so 
far as I can see, can happily coexist with mine. 
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(ibid: 3); nor to take on his project of writing a history of power. My 
plan here is to adopt and where necessary adapt his work as part of 
my own project. 
8.1.1 Against social totalities 
To the extent that it is not simply a casual way of talking or a 
traditional theoretical assumption, the assertion of the existence of 
social totalities is the claim that humans are typically found in 
discrete,, unified social 'boxes, which have boundaries, subsystems, 
levels or dimensions, and perhaps an internal 'evolutionary' dynamic. 
On this view, social change and conflict can be divided into 
endogenous and exogenous types, human behaviour can be explained 
by reference to "Social structure as a whole" (ibid: 1-2), and there are 
two distinct but analogous problems for political theory: one about 
how individuals within a society should or do organise themselves, 
and the other about how distinct societies should or do organise their 
interrelations. These problems have been thought sufficiently 
analogous by Kant (1991) and by Rawls (1999a), for instance, that 
they have attempted to answer both with the device of a hypothetical 
contract. These claims can be empirical ones about how humans now 
or always live. But they are empirically false. As Mann argues: 
Empirical proof can be seen in the answer to a simple question: 
In which society do you live? Answers are likely to start at two 
levels. One refers to national states: My society is ""the United 
Kingdom, " "the United States, " "France, " or the like. The other is 
broader: I am a citizen of "'industrial society" or "capitalist 
society" or possibly '"the West" or "the Western alliance. " We 
have a basic dilemma -a national state society versus a wider 
'"economic society. " For some important purposes, the national 
state represents a real interaction network with a degree of 
cleavage at its boundaries. For other important purposes, 
capitalism unites all three into a wider interaction network, with 
cleavage at its edge. They are both "societies. " Complexities 
proliferate the more we probe. Military alliances, churches, 
common language, and so forth, all add powerful, sociospatially 
different networks of interaction. We could only answer after 
developing a sophisticated understanding of the complex 
interconnections and powers of these various crosscutting 
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interaction networks. The answer would certainly imply a 
confederal rather than a unitary society. (Mann 1986: 16) 
The argument so far is that we in particular do not live in unified and 
discrete societies, despite the enormous power and reach of modern 
states which try to divide us up into such boxes (see chapter 9). This 
is shown especially by the overlapping coexistence of two different 
kinds of social network, national states and capitalism, and 
emphasised by the range of other sociospatially different networks in 
which we are also involved. Mann continues by arguing that this 
confederal situation is typical of human life: 
The contemporary situation is not exceptional. Overlapping 
interaction networks are the historical norm. In prehistory, 
trading and cultural interaction was of enormously greater extent 
than could be controlled by any "state" or other authoritative 
network... In most ancient empires, the mass of the people 
participated overwhelmingly in small-scale local interaction 
networks yet were also involved in two other networks, provided 
by the erratic powers of a distant state, and the rather more 
consistent, but still shallow, power of semiautonomous local 
notables... Increasingly there arose within, outside and across 
the boundaries of such empires more extensive,, cosmopolitan, 
trading-and-cultural networks, which spawned various "world 
religions"... Social relationships have rarely aggregated into 
unitary societies - although states sometimes had unitary 
pretensions. "In which society do you live? " would have been an 
equally difficult question for the peasant in Roman North Africa 
or twelfth-century England... Or again, there have been many 
"'culturally federal" civilizations, like ancient Mesopotamia ... I 
classical Greece..., or medieval and early modern Europe..., 
where small states have coexisted in a wider, loosely "cultural, " 
network. The forms of overlap and intersection have varied 
considerably, but they have always been there. (ibid: 16-17) 
It is not only we who live in a confederal situation: most humans have 
always lived like that. The belief in unified and discrete societies badly 
misrepresents the current and historical experience of social humans, 
and should therefore be abandoned. In its place, we need to 
recognise the typical human situation of being involved in multiple, 
crosscutting networks of interaction with particular and different 
spatial and social reaches, tactics and dynamics. Humans "Are social, 
but not societal, animals" (ibid: 14). 
135 
8.1.2 Against cultural evolution 
Since the nineteenth century, evolutionary rhetoric and metaphor has 
colonised our political and historical imagination,, partly in the form of 
a discourse of 'cultural evolution'. It is not a single position, but a 
cluster of notions and research projects which differ in their purposes, 
claims and results. Its unity may rest on little more than the rhetorical 
heft of the idea of evolution after Darwin, and a shared and 
reasonable ambition to focus on social change and its explanation. 
However the members of this cluster also tend to share some 
contingently associated central ideas and plans, as follows. Cultural 
evolution stories typically involve: 1) A recognition that human social 
life has changed over prehistorical and historical time, and a resulting 
ambition to describe and explain that change at a fairly high level of 
generality. 2) A division of human social forms into a small number of 
ideal types. LH Morgan, for instance, distinguished savages, 
barbarians, and the civilised (and influenced Engels); V Gordon 
Childe, hunter-gatherers, farmers and the civilised; Elman Service, 
bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states; Morton Fried, egalitarian society, 
ranked society, stratified society and states. 3) A mapping of these 
ideal types onto a scale running from low to high, from primitive to 
civilised, from less to more evolved, or, most commonly, from simple 
to complex, bringing with it the not always admitted normative 
baggage of those oppositions. Marshall Sahlins, for instance, claims 
that: 
Higher cultural forms arise from, and surpass, lower. Culture 
produces successively higher levels of organisation as new forms 
capable of harnessing increasing amounts of energy emerge. In 
popular terms, this is culture's movement towards complexity, 
the general, progressive aspect of evolution. (Sahlins 1961: 324) 
4) Unilinealism, that is "The view that societies (most or all) pass 
through the same sequence of stages of social types,, irrespective of 
what these may be" over time (Gellner 1986: 80). And some of the 
time, 5) Metaphors of organic growth, as for instance when Eric 
Hobsbawm claims that Mafia are "'A sort of embryo" of "More highly 
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developed movements" (Hobsbawm 1971: 30; see further 12.1). 
Particular examples of cultural evolutionary projects and interventions 
include Abrahamson (1969), Childe (1963), Eisenstadt (1959), Engels 
(1972), Lomax & Arensberg (1977), Morgan (1877), Sanderson 
(1995) and Service (1962). For histories and literature surveys, see 
Earle (1994),, Lewellen (1992) and Sanderson (1990). My examples 
are all from anthropology, not because anthropologists are especially 
prone to tell such stories - they seem currently to be out of fashion in 
the discipline - but because these examples display this cluster of 
ideas with particular starkness. 
Individually, these ideas and plans are interesting and may be 
useful. But we have good reason to reject their contingent association 
in a research project, certainly for my particular purposes and 
perhaps in general. 
First, and following on from 8.1.1, there is no tendency for 
societies to grow up through different ideal types from low to high (or 
primitive to civilised, or simple to complex), because there are no 
unified, discrete societies. So, societies are not born, they do not age, 
and they do not die. The activity of society involves many changing 
and overlapping networks of individuals. The multiple networks which 
make up human social activity are not coextensive in space,, in time, 
or in the set of individuals involved in them. Particular people create 
new relationships, detach themselves from old ones, move away, die, 
and are born and initiated, or not initiated. Individuals grow up, but 
societies do not. 
Second,, the cultural evolutionary project involves a "Disastrous 
tangle between the ideas of time, height, and value" (Midgley 1995: 
153), and that tangle makes important kinds of comparison between 
different social forms difficult or impossible. In the first place, being 
more recent is not the same as being more valuable (and just as 
importantly, being in the future is not, either). If we suppose that it 
is, our ability to make moral comparisons between social forms is 
hamstrung. Why would we want to limit the possibility of judgement 
about which of the ways in which people can live is better (higher, 
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more civilised, more evolved, more complex) in this way? It is of 
course possible that some social form existing now is better than 
Some past one. It is equally possible that it is worse, and we need to 
be able to make that judgement without begging the question. In the 
second place, the relationship between time and height is obscure. 
Time does not move up, or in any direction: it passeS2 . And in the 
third place, height is a strange metaphor for value, as Ursula Le Guin 
dramatises in The Dispossessed. Her central character Shevek, who is 
from the anarchist world Anarres, is en route to Urras, whose politics 
are more familiar to us, and has been talking to his doctor: 
Kimoe flustered easily. He had the physician's brisk self- 
assurance, but Shevek continually upset it. All his explanations 
ended up, after two or three of Shevek's questions, in 
floundering. Each took for granted certain relationships which the 
other could not even see. For instance, this curious matter of 
superiority and inferiority. Shevek knew that the concept of 
superiority, of relative height, was important to the Urrasti; they 
often used the word 'higher' as a synonym for 'better' in their 
writings, where an Anarresti would use 'more central'... It was 
one puzzle among hundreds. (Le Guin 1975: 20) 
My point is not that centrality is a better metaphor than height, but 
that the equation of height with value would be inexplicable to 
someone who had not been brought up casually making it. Height is 
perhaps a passable synonym for status, and makes metaphorical 
sense in the context of a hierarchy: but it is not the same as value. 
The confused association of height, time and value may, as 
Midgley argues,, be a hangover from pre-evolutionary modes of 
thought: 
Before anyone thought of evolution, [the idea of height as value] 
was expressed in the idea of a Great Chain of Being -a scale of 
creatures reaching from the least to the most important. From 
inanimate matter the chain led through the simpler living things 
2V Gordon Childe claims that the association of height with time is 
borrowed from stratigraphical geology: "'Later than' means '*higher up 
than' in an undisturbed sequence of sedimentary deposits. So the 
terms 'higher' and "lower' in organic evolution acquired an objective 
meaning and were emancipated from their anthropocentric 
subjectivity. Homo Sapiens became the highest mammal not only by 
his own prejudice, but as the latest species to emerge" (Childe 1963: 
14). 
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to the more complex, then on through man and the Heavenly 
Beings to God. It was eternal and unchanging. When, however, 
people began to think about evolution, they made (as commonly 
happens) no more changes in their ways of thinking than they 
were forced to. They did not scrap the Great Chain of Being. 
Instead, they simply unhooked the top end from Heaven and 
slung it into the Future. Its axis now was time. But its 
associations with value did not vanish. (Midgley 1995: 152) 
Whatever its source, this three-stranded knot should be cut. To take 
one important case: states are not "higher' than other social forms. 
They appeared later than some (nomad bands, chiefdoms and male 
outgroups, for instance) and earlier than others (trade-unions, 
environmental pressure groups, and rock bands). This order of 
appearance is a matter of interest, and may not be coincidental: 
large, widespread and powerful states probably had effects on what 
other forms were possible or likely in their shadows. But that tells us 
nothing about their value. In general: lateness in time is not value; 
nor is it height; nor is height value. 
Third, and following on from this, we should remember that my 
purposes here involve comparison. So, more generally, an account of 
human (pre-)history which already builds in a number of comparisons 
of relative height, complexity and so on, between social forms, is a 
bad idea for those purposes. It begs too many questions. 
Fourth: cultural evolutionary projects' ambitions to describe 
and explain change (1) and to produce a typology of human social 
forms (2) work against one another, in two ways. In the first place, 
change in human social forms does not happen as if a switch has been 
flicked, but gradually, with new forms of interaction emerging out of 
and competing with surviving older ones. So, if we focus on change in 
human sociability, we are focussing on the point where the boundary 
between two types of sociability is most blurred. In the second place, 
at least some social change is not change from one type to another, 
but within social forms which are in other ways relatively stable. So., if 
we focus on change from one of a small number of ideal types to 
another, we ignore some of the changes we had intended to 
investigate. For both reasons: it is a reasonable research project to 
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distinguish, for instance, the chiefdom as a type of human social form, 
and to investigate whether non-tautological generalisations hold of all 
examples of that type. It is also a reasonable project to investigate 
the nature and causes of social change. But trying to do both at once 
limits our ability to do either. 
Fifth, unilinealism is a very strong claim about the pattern of 
human history, and at best unproven. Even supposing what is not in 
fact the case, that we can, for instance, distinguish unified and 
discrete Spanish and Maya societies (from each other and from all the 
other networks in which their members were also involved), is it 
plausible that the two went through "The same sequence of stages of 
social types ,3 (Gellner 1986: 80)? Even if we perversely ignore the 
fact that Spanish and Maya people had enormous and complex effects 
on each other (on which see for instance Clendinnen 1987), 1 suggest 
that the unilinealist claim requires very strong empirical evidence, not 
so far forthcoming, to be plausible. 
Sixth, and finally: cultural evolutionary stories typically invoke, 
and map their typologies of social forms to, a linear scale from simple 
to complex. A representative textbook, for instance, offers "A 
classification of early states based on degree of complexity" (Lewellen 
1992: 21). But the idea of complexity is at best ambiguous, and may 
well be worse than that: "The concept of complexity includes too 
much which makes it a lumpen catch-all that explains everything but 
signifies nothing" (Gamble 1986: 28-9). 1 return to the question of 
simplicity and complexity, in relation to states and their appearance in 
history, in chapter 9. For the moment, I note that the unexplained 
introduction of a scale running from simple to complex, and its 
unargued application to typologies of social forms and to the passing 
of time, is at best problematic. I further suggest, and will show in 
chapter 9, that complexity is an ambiguous and non-distinguishing, 
3 The claim would perhaps be that "the Maya society' was at a (lower, 
more primitive, less evolved, less complex) stage already passed by 
"the Spanish society', and that it was cut off before it could complete 
its "natural growth. 
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and therefore bad, metrical concept for analysing change in human 
sociability, and especially the development of states. 
I have given six objections to cultural evolutionary projects 
involving the contingent association of five ideas or plans: 1) an 
ambition to describe and explain human social change at a high level 
of generality; 2) a typology of human social forms; 3) a linear scale of 
height,, civilisation., evolution or, most commonly, complexity; 4) 
unilinealism; and 5) metaphors of organic growth. These objections 
can be taken to support either a strong or a weaker claim. The first is 
that the association of these ideas and plans has been in general a 
mistake, and ought to be abandoned. I believe that this strong claim 
is true, but am not convinced that I have proved it, and do not need 
to insist on it for my purposes. All I need, and therefore all I take on 
from this section, is the weaker claim that we should not use this 
cluster of ideas for my anarchist and comparative purposes. The 
network model does not assert or use, in particular, 2,, 3,. 4 or 5, 
either individually or in concert. I do describe, but for the most part 
do not attempt to explain, some social changes, in particular the 
development of modern states and Atlantic slavery (chapters 9& 10). 
8.1.3 Against the state of nature 
The idea of a state of nature is one motif of the social contract 
vocabulary, which can be and has been used in a wide variety of ways 
(H6pfl & Thompson 1979). States of nature and their analogues can 
be hypothetical scenarios, or (attempts at) realistic descriptions of 
historical or contemporary circumstances; they can refer to pre- or 
apolitical or even pre- or asocial forms of life; and the individuals in 
them can be presented as driven only by appetite, or as rational and 
self-interested (either because the theorist believes that humans are 
really like that, or because doing so allows morality or justice to be 
derived from or justified by minimalist amoral assumptions). Other 
past variations could be noted, and there seems no reason to bar 
future reuses and modifications of the notion of a state of nature. 
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I oppose the network model to the state of nature in only one 
of its meanings. The state of nature is sometimes thought to be an 
empirically real groundstate, in which humans naturally live, up from 
which societies and especially states can be built like skyscrapers, and 
back down to which the collapse of fragile social institutions might 
throw us. The groundstate can be described in various ways, and be 
positively or negatively assessed, but it is typically thought of as 
simple by comparison with our complex arrangements, and associated 
with past and contemporary "primitive' groups. 
I deny these claims. Almost all humans live in social networks, 
of various kinds, between which we can make moral and 
organisational comparisons. Particular networks have particular 
histories, and that two social forms are in some ways similar does not 
mean that they have the same history, nor, in the case of "primitives', 
the same or any 'lack of history'. If there are some similarities 
between, for instance, aboriginal Australian and Amazonian hunting 
and gathering groups, this tells us very little about how they got to 
those somewhat similar forms, and certainly does not show that they 
got there in the same way, nor that either are relics of a natural 
groundstate. The distinction between nature and artifice does not cut 
at these joints. All human social networks are natural in the sense 
that we could not make them, and would not make the particular ones 
we do, without being the particular evolved creatures we are., and 
having the natural capacities we have. And we do deliberately make 
social networks, although not always according to explicit plans, at 
least in part because that is a natural thing for us to do. We are 
naturally social artificers. So, for instance, a human brought up by 
wolves would not be a natural human, untainted by culture, but an 
incomplete one, deprived of the conditions of her natural development 
and of the exercise of some of her natural capacities, including 
language, conceptual reasoning and human social interaction. This is 
not because humans are higher, or more evolved, or more complex 
than wolves, but just because they are different (despite also having 
many similarities). 
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Similarly, Colin Turnbull's claim that the Ik, the once-nomadic, 
then starving, disintegrating and callous tribe he studied in northern 
Uganda, show us that "Our much vaunted human values are not 
inherent in humanity at all, but are associated only with a particular 
form of survival called society, and that all, even society itself, are 
luxuries that can be dispensed with" (Turnbull 1972: 294), is false. 
The Ik are not without society, but trapped, at least partly by 
environmental and political factors outside their control, in a particular 
and disastrous social form. Humans are capable of creating and 
maintaining other disastrous social forms, from abusive marriages to 
fascist dictatorships. But this does not show that humans are 'really', 
'fundamentally' or 'in the state of nature' like that, and that better 
ways of life are artificial or just window-dressing. It shows only that 
these are human social possibilities. 
In general: humans are capable of a wide variety of different 
social forms, and we can and often must make moral and other 
comparisons between them, but no one form is more natural than 
another. Change, including the collapse of particular institutions, may 
take us in various directions,, and it may for better, for worse, or 
neutral. There is no single, simple social form into which we naturally 
fall, or which is a groundstate on which we might build more complex 
ones. 
0 
I have described and argued for the network model by comparing it 
with some alternative ways of thinking about human sociability, and 
emphasised the points that: 1) humans do not live in social totalities 
(8.1.1); 2) at least for my purposes, we should not adopt cultural 
evolutionary projects' contingent association of the cluster of ideas 
described in 8.1.2; and 3) there is no state of nature, in the sense 
that there is no single, fundamental, natural groundstate on which 
societies are built or "down' to which we might fall (8.1.3). 
Finally in this section, we should note a consequence of 
accepting the network model: there is no such thing as a 'primitive' 
society (hence my use of scare-quotes around the term throughout 
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this thesis). Other social forms differ from and can be compared with 
our own, but the forms we are sometimes inclined to call 'primitive' 
are not low or simple, not necessarily older or less valuable than our 
own, and not the natural groundstate of human life. The changes 
which perhaps turned some social forms like them into ones like ours 
were not like organic growth. Even if we are correctly identifying 
similarities between different 'primitive' groups, this does not mean 
that they have the same history or the same or any lack of history. 
(On the history of the illusion of 'primitive society" in anthropological 
theory, see Kuper 1988. ) 
I emphasise in particular that there are no relics. Elman Service 
expresses his opposite view as follows: 
If the aboriginal culture of the Arunta of Australia [for instance] 
is not a form of adaptation to a particular kind of (total) 
environment made long, long ago and preserved into modern 
times because of its isolation, then what is it? Does a people 
have whatever kind of culture it might dream up at any given 
time? Obviously not... What else can explain such a culture, then, 
but that there have been survivals into the present of ancient 
cultural forms which because of relative isolation have 
maintained a relatively stable adaptation. Many primitive 
societies have changed greatly in modern times and all 
ultimately will be changed, assimilated or obliterated, but that 
only makes the point more clear. Where an Arunta-like way of 
life is not yet significantly altered by modern influences it is a 
culture that is primitive,, ancient, and preliterate. And it has a 
very long history, too, for the Arunta culture is paleolithic in 
type, although the paleolithic era ended when and where higher 
stages arose -a long time ago. (Service 1962: 8) 
On my view, first, what explains Arunta culture (if it or any other 
culture is explicable) is that the Arunta are people making a living and 
pursuing their other interests in a particular, historically and 
environmentally conditioned but not determined way, just as we are. 
Second, the claim that all Arunta-like cultures will ultimately be 
"Changed, assimilated or obliterated" - and how could we be sure of 
that? - is irrelevant to the question of whether they are relics. Third, 
the derivation of the claim that the Arunta have a very long history 
from the assertion that their culture is paleolithic in type assumes that 
no group could have adopted a paleolithic lifestyle any later than the 
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'paleolithic era'. Why should we believe this? And fourth, "Higher 
stages" is either meaningless or bald self-congratulation: "Hooray for 
us! 
No social form stands to ours or to any other as a child does to 
an adult, and still less as a child does to the particular adult she will 
become. And in any case, that child is not lower or less valuable than 
that or any adult. "Primitive' is a term of contempt, or occasionally of 
praise, but not of understanding. 
8.2 Equality between whom? 
In chapter 7,1 postponed consideration of the fourth question around 
which the contestation of equality revolves: Equality between whom? 
I can now stipulate that I am concerned with equality and inequality 
of distributed power between individuals in social networks. The 
response to this stipulation may be to point out that it misses too 
much of traditional egalitarian concern: What about inequalities 
between people who have no social interactions, perhaps because of a 
deliberate refusal on the part of those who benefit from them to 
consider those on their sharp end? But this response misunderstands 
my concept of equality. I am not using equality as a demand of 
morality: if I was, inequalities between non-interacting people would 
certainly be an object of concern. To the extent that I assert a moral 
demand at all in this thesis, it is a demand for the anarchist utopia, 
which includes but is not limited to equality of power as a demand. 
So, I stipulate equality of power between individuals in networks as a 
metrical device, not as a (too limited) demand of morality. Since 
networks typically crosscut and include one another, and since most 
humans are connected with each other through multiple networks of 
interaction, this in fact covers a great deal of traditional egalitarian 
concern. 
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8.3 Some general features of human social networks 
In 6.4,1 summarised my concept of power as follows. Power is the 
present capacity to attain future goods. It can be exercised in explicit 
policy conflicts, in suppressing potential conflicts, and in modifying the 
preferences of the 'outs' so that no conflict arises. It can be a 
property both of individuals and of groups. The concept covers both 
created and distributed power, and both individual and generalised 
cases. Power can be exercised whether or not the power-holder 
intends her effect, and provisionally applies to all effects. In 7.6,1 
stated that I use equality of distributed power as a measuring device 
for the practical reason that doing so is useful in carrying out my 
comparative task. 
I now want to say something about how networks of power 
have manifested themselves in human social history. First, and 
following directly from my definition of power, we should note that 
power is a feature of all human interaction. Power in my sense 
inhabits or infests the whole of human life. 
Second, human social networks and forms typically both create 
and distribute power. Indeed creating power entails maintaining or 
changing its distribution, because there is no state of nature: no 
groundstate in which power is naturally the property of the strongest,, 
or of the heads of households, or of the heirs of Adam. In general, 
there are no human social situations which do not involve the creation 
and distribution of individual and collective capacities to attain goods. 
Third, one of the important features of human social networks is 
that we often create mechanisms for their maintenance, for regulating 
the relationships between different networks, and thereby for 
maintaining a particular mode of the creation and distribution of 
power. In particular, we tend to create not just social networks but 
institutions, which are formal, rule-guided and ritua I ly- performed 
networks or bundles of networks. They often involve the idea of roles, 
including king, priest, minister and managing director, which can 
survive the removal of their current incumbents. Institutions are also 
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often regarded as having (legal) personae of their own, separate from 
any of the individuals involved in them (cf Hobbes 1994: chapter xvi). 
Institutionalisation is perhaps distinctively human: certainly, no other 
animals institutionalise to the extent that we do. 
However, fourth, the tendency to institutional ise is continually 
challenged by another human tendency, to create new networks and 
power distributions: 
In pursuit of their goals humans further develop these networks, 
outrunning the existing level of institutionalization. This may 
happen as a direct challenge to existing institutions, or it may 
happen unintentionally and "interstitially" - between their 
interstices and around their edges - creating new relations and 
institutions that have unanticipated consequences for the old. 
(Mann 1986: 15) 
There are tendencies both to deliberate resistance and to what Mann 
calls "interstitial emergence'. In general, there is a tendency to try to 
create stable, unified and discrete social forms which embody 
particular equal or unequal power distributions, but "'Underneath, 
human beings are tunneling ahead to achieve their goals, forming 
new networks [and] extending old ones" (ibid: 16). Human social 
forms have never been sufficiently institutional ised to prevent all 
resistance or to resist all interstitial emergence. Further,, institutions 
are vulnerable to many changes which are not the result of either: 
one can collapse, for instance, because of environmental change, 
natural disaster, disease, or because it exhausts a resource on which 
it relies. 
Fifth, human social networks are "Functionally promiscuous" 
(ibid: 17). By this, I mean that even when deliberately created for 
some particular purposes, they tend: 1) also to perform other actions; 
and 2) to be available for use for other purposes. Having set up or 
discovered some network or bundle of networks, individuals often use 
them for new purposes, and find that they do more (and sometimes 
completely other) things than expected or intended. 
I have made five general points about the ways in which 
networks of power manifest themselves in human social life: 1) power 
is a feature of all human social networks and forms; 2) all such forms 
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involve both the creation and the distribution of power; 3) there is a 
tendency to institutionalise; but 4) that tendency is never completely 
successful, because there is also a tendency towards resistance and 
interstitial emergence, as humans create new social networks, and 
because institutions are fragile; and 5) networks frequently perform 
or come to be used for new and unexpected actions and purposes. 
8.4 Networks: a summary 
Humans, pursuing various ends and interests, create, discover, 
modify and destroy social organisations, which consist of networks of 
humans interacting in various ways, creating power and distributing it 
equally or unequally. These networks overlap and interpenetrate each 
other. Networks change in response to changes in or discoveries of 
interests, to the effects of other networks, and to changing 
environments and the opportunities and demands they create. 
Humans have not historically organised themselves into unified and 
discrete social totalities, but have lived in multiply confederal social 
situations. At least for my purposes, human history is not best 
understood by cultural evolutionary stories, and there is no single, 
simple groundstate of human social life. 
We can note some quite general features of human social life as 
it has historically appeared: all social networks create and distribute 
power, whether equally or unequally; display opposing tendencies to 
institutionalisation and to resistance and interstitial emergence; and 
are functionally promiscuous. 
Humans have lived in a wide variety of different social forms, 
and can change them in a wide variety of ways. We can create power 
in many different ways, including but not limited to technique and 
cooperation. We can distribute power in many different ways, from 
equality to extreme inequality, and by many different means, 
including but not limited to violence, authority discourses and 
property discourses. We can also create new ways to distribute power 
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in response to our interests and our social and environmental 
situations. 
This is my third, final, and synthesising conceptual tool: the 
picture of human sociability as consisting of overlapping and 
interpenetrating networks of humans creating power, and distributing 
it equally or unequally, by a variety of means. 
8.5 The toolkit: summary and conclusion 
In chapter 41 explained the false accusation that anarchists are 
primitivists as a misreading of a common anarchist rhetorical trope. I 
stated my plan to use an argument-form derived from that trope to 
prove my main thesis, that the anarchist utopia is possible, and 
admitted a dangerous problem with that ambition: the comparison 
between different social forms which it requires may not be possible. 
In chapter 51 set out a plan to solve that problem by developing a 
conceptual toolkit or projection, in the light of my purposes, in 
response to more general anarchist concerns, and in the context of 
the contestation of some of its conceptual elements. Chapters 6&7 
and this chapter have together carried out that plan. I now have the 
tools to analyse and compare some selected, Landmark examples of 
human sociability, and do so in chapters 9-13. 
As a first,, simplified example of the toolkit in use, consider the 
social form of some humans in a (modern, western-style) factory. 
This group of individuals are involved in a bundle of networks of 
interaction with each other. Some of them are friends, some 
colleagues, some boss-a nd -worker. Most are involved in many such 
relationships, in different roles. They are also involved in networks 
with others outside the factory: with family, friends, neighbours, the 
people who work in or frequent the shops and pubs they visit, and so 
on. The various tasks which make up their manufacturing activity are 
divided, fairly stably, between them: A runs a lathe, B programs a 
computer, C advertises the factory's products. Some of them form an 
elite. They have positions in a hierarchy, understood and mostly 
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accepted by everyone, which give them various powers to control the 
activity of others, and which are rewarded with more money than 
other people get (money, since it is a means for gaining goods like 
food, shelter, and so on, is a form of power). That is, power is 
unequally distributed in their favour. They certainly have distributed 
power in the one-dimensional sense: they typically get their way in 
conflicted decisions, probably by calling on an authority discourse 
('We are in charge'). They probably have power in the two- 
dimensional sense: many of the people involved in the factory do not 
have a voice in decision- ma king,, and so potential policy conflicts do 
not become explicit. They may have power in the three-dimensional 
sense, whether or not they realise that they are involved in a system 
which transforms the preferences of the 'outs" (recall that on my 
definition of power, it can be exercised whether or not the power- 
holder intends her effect). The factory social form also exemplifies 
created power: by cooperating, all of the individuals involved in it 
create capacities to do things, and thereby to attain goods, which 
they could not individually do and attain. This creation of power 
makes the unequal distribution of power in the factory possible. 
Without the cooperation of all, neither the elite's control nor their 
differential rewards are possible. It may be supposed that the reverse 
is also true: that without the hierarchy and the elite's control, perhaps 
even without greater rewards for the elite, the cooperation which 
creates this power would be impossible. But this is false, as I will 
show in later chapters. The tactics of organisation and distribution of 
power which the factory exemplifies are one, but not the only, way of 
creating its power. 
In general, humans are extremely socially creative and plastic. 
Some social forms create more power than, and different powers 
from, others. Social forms distribute power in many different ways, by 
many different means. The range of possible power, powers, 
distributions and means of distribution is large, but not infinite. The 
question, What are the limits of that range?, is an empirical question, 
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and I give a partial answer to it by showing that it does include the 
anarchist utopian social form, amongst many other possibilities. 
In chapter 91 describe the state social form, concentrating on 
two of its types: pristine and modern states. In chapter 10, the 
Atlantic slave system. In chapter 11, the social form of the African 
Nuer people as the best-documented example of acephalous society. 
In chapter 12, the briefly successful anarchic experiments during the 
Spanish Civil War. And in chapter 13, my anarchist utopia. 
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9* States 
States are not the only, but are the pre-eminent., power-creating and 
distributing institutions in our world (despite challenges by and partial 
integration with multinational corporations and international 
organisations). Although I argued in 1.5 that anarchism should not be 
characterised as anti-statism, it is undeniable that anarchists are 
against and interested in states, amongst other things, and also 
undeniable that they ought to be, on their principles. Here I consider 
two anarchist distinctions and definitions of states (9.1), before going 
on to analyse two important kinds of state: pristine (9.2) and modern 
(9.3) states. But first,, I describe states in general. 
The question, What is the state? invites the response, Which 
one? Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) list nearly two hundred 
currently existing states, and even if we ignore past ones and limit 
ourselves only to those, are we asking about the Republic of the Ivory 
Coast, or the Kingdom of Thailand, or the Federation of Malaysia, or 
the United States of America? Post-colonial states or superpowers? 
"'Modern states come in a variety of shapes and sizes, and they 
arrived by different routes" (Anderson 1986: 1). Even that list 
assumes that we can separate states from the nations or forms of 
production or other networks in which they are embedded or with 
which they compete. Are armed forces part of the state? Are 
corporations based in its territory? We might come to agree with AIP 
Taylor that "'One of the great blunders of modern political thinking is 
to invent an abstract entity called the State" (Taylor 1967: 131). 
State is ""Undeniably a messy concept" (Mann 1986a: 112), and 
names a large set of ideas, institutions, organisational tactics and 
social networks with a complicated history of invention, change, 
interaction and collapse. In one sense, a history of the state would be 
a history of humanity: "Most questions about the origins of the state 
could be answered very simply: discover the origin of Homo sapiens 
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sapiens" (Gamble 1986: 22). In another, the states we find around us 
now are no more than, and often very much less than, seven hundred 
years old. They appeared in the latest moments of a human history 
stretching back perhaps one hundred thousand years (see Leakey 
1995: chapter 5 on the debate over the age of modern humanity; 
estimates range between forty thousand and two hundred thousand 
yea rs). 
However, we can note some general characteristics of states. 
Michael Mann, for instance, gives this beginning definition: "'The state 
is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outward to cover 
a territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of 
binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence" 
(Mann 1986: 37; Mann 1986a gives an almost identical definition). 
States operate, first, in a geographically defined area, a territory, 
where they fairly successfully claim a monopoly in the control of many 
(potentially all) human activities; and second, usually, in an 
international arena made up of other sovereign states. The territory is 
organised around an administrative centre containing or representing 
the elite in whose favour power is unequally distributed. That elite 
consists of a network or several networks of power-holders including, 
for instance, kings, parliamentarians, aristocrats, bureaucrats, the 
wealthy, and military and religious leaders. Elite networks are 
typically hierarchically organised, and claim permanent authority over 
the citizens or subjects of 'the country', usually for their defined roles 
rather than for the particular individuals who happen currently to 
inhabit them. They have and exercise distributed power in all three of 
the dimensions I identified in 6.1: they frequently get their way in 
explicitly conflicted decisions, suppress potential conflicts, and modify 
the preferences of the governed such that conflict does not arise. All 
of the individuals involved in interaction with and governed by states 
cooperate in creating the power which is distributed in favour of the 
state elite, and the social form in which all are involved. 
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States (and especially modern states) are highly 
institutionalised bundles of networks which direct the creation of 
enormous power and distribute it unequally, and which have 
successful, but not completely successful, unitary pretensions. These 
pretensions are of two kinds, and tend to be unsuccessful in two 
ways. First, states attempt to create unified and discrete societies in 
defined territories, which contain their subjects and physically or 
administratively exclude others, and which have precise cleavages at 
their boundaries. But humans - gypsies, traders, asylum-seekers, 
internationalists and the members of diasporas - keep forming new 
networks across such boundaries. Second, states attempt to turn 
themselves into single power organisations, but are in fact internally 
differentiated: "States have multiple institutions, charged with 
multiple tasks, mobilizing constituencies both through their territories 
and geopolitically" (Mann 1993: 75). States typically involve unstable 
compromises between different institutions, all attempting to gain 
primacy and to unify on their own terms. However despite these two 
kinds of failure, states have been more successful than any other 
social form in making their subjects and territories tend towards unity 
and discreteness. 
State power is available, and has been used, for an enormous 
variety of purposes: codification and control of behaviour; 
redistribution of resources; organisation of warfare; imposition or 
encouragement of some and suppression of other kinds of social 
network; promulgation of some and suppression of other kinds of 
speech and claims; maintenance or transformation of patterns of 
ownership; maintenance or transformation of social hierarchies; 
organisation of knowledge-gathering, exploration and colonisation; 
and the simplification of lives and networks through tactics of 
legibility. All of these purposes have also been carried out by non- 
state networks and institutions, despite state attempts to monopolise 
them. 
In general, there seem to be no limits set by the structure of 
states on the uses to which their immense power can be put. Because 
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of the functional promiscuity which is characteristic of them as of all 
human networks and institutions, states are available to be used by 
any individual or network which can get hold of their reins. Left-wing 
anarchists can in fact approve of some of the uses to which they have 
been put: state power has been used by socialist political parties in 
particular to redistribute some kinds of power more equally by 
redistributing wealth to the poor and by extending the franchise in 
democratic states, to set up welfare and socialised health systems, 
and to limit the influence of elites like aristocracies and wealthy 
capitalists (on the history and successes of parliamentary socialist 
parties, see for instance Sassoon 1997). Most anarchists would be 
likely to argue that even these achievements are poisoned by their 
use of state tactics and forms including authority and property 
discourses, (the threat of) violence, hierarchy and attempted national 
unification, but there is no denying that there are worse uses for 
states. To note some obvious examples: state power is available, and 
has been used, for the personal benefit of dictators and their cronies, 
for repression, to start and prosecute wars, and for genocide. The 
Holocaust required, amongst other preconditions, the use of a state 
(on Nazi infiltration, use and transformation of the state, see for 
instance Burleigh 2001, particularly part 2; on the bureaucratic detail 
of extermination, Dawidowicz 1976). 
I now consider how and why some anarchists have separated 
states from non-states,, before filling out my general characterisation 
of states for two of their particular kinds: pristine and modern states. 
9.1 Two distinctions of state from non-state 
Anarchists have often made and argued for a distinction between 
states and other forms of human social activity, both concurrent with 
and previous to the existence of states. Kropotkin, for instance, notes 
that: 
There is the German school that likes to confuse the State with 
Society. This confusion is to be met even among the best 
German thinkers and many French ones, who cannot conceive 
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society without State concentration; and thence arises the 
habitual reproach cast on Anarchists of wanting to "destroy 
society" and of "preaching the return of perpetual war of each 
against all. " (Kropotkin 1943: 10) 
The point of this distinction between state and society is that ""The 
State is but one of the forms taken by society in the course of history" 
(ibid), and that humans are capable of organising themselves in other 
ways. Kropotkin goes on to define the state as involving a governing 
power,, territorial concentration, and "A concentration of many or even 
all of the functions of the life of society in the hands of a few" (ibid). 
His distinction is useful for at least two purposes. First, to make the 
argumentative point that anarchists want to remove the state 
(amongst other things), not social organisation and cooperation, and 
therefore that the common equation of anarchy with chaos cannot 
stand (without further argument to show that the state is the only 
way to avoid chaos). Second, to make the historical point that current 
states are only one, recent human social form amongst many other 
possibilities. That is, to serve the second purpose of the anarchist 
comparative trope, as identified in chapter 4: to assert the variety of 
human sociability. 
Another example of anarchist separation of state from non- 
state: 
This latest form of the state, based on the pseudo-sovereignty of 
a sham popular will, supposedly expressed by pseudo- 
representatives of the people in sham popular assemblies, 
combines the two main conditions necessary for [capitalists] 
success: state centralization,, and the actual subordination of the 
sovereign people to the intellectual minority that governs them, 
supposedly representing them but invariably exploiting them. 
(Bakunin 1990: 13) 
Bakunin's separation of the state from the people is intended, first, to 
attack the false identification of the interests of the capitalists and 
governors with the interests of the oppressed people. Second, in this 
particular case, to assert a continuity of function between democratic 
and non-democratic states. "Sham popular assemblies" do not, on 
this account, change the fundamental character of the state, which 
Bakunin goes on to decribe as organised exploitation of "The people's 
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labour" maintained by ""Constant coercion and compulsion" (ibid), and 
as necessarily expansive and aggressive. 
Both of these distinctions and characterisations have their uses 
for particular purposes. For my purposes, I now go on to describe two 
kinds of state and their histories in more detail. First, pristine states. 
9.2 Pristine states 
A 'pristine' or 'primary' state is one which got started without 
influence from other states. They are very unusual: there have 
probably been six pristine states in the history of humanity. The exact 
count depends particularly on whether the Minoan state on Crete is 
included; the generally accepted members of the set are, in Eurasia, 
the Sumerian, Egyptian, Indus Valley and Yellow River, and in 
America, the Mesoamerican and Peruvian, states (Mann 1986: 74; for 
a map of their distribution, see Lewellen 1992: 49)1. Every other state 
formed at least partly under influences from states,, including but not 
limited to conquest, colonisation, secession, importation of skilled 
state bureaucrats, and deliberate mirroring intended to share in the 
perceived advantages of statehood, or to fight an invading state 
effectively. 
What I have to say about pristine states is necessarily 
tentative, for three reasons. 1) With just six examples, our sample 
size is too small to support anything else. We can say something 
about how these particular states in fact got started, but cannot 
support many firm claims about how pristine states must get started. 
2) The available evidence is fragmentary and often difficult to 
interpret. And 3), although we can make some genera I isations, the six 
pristine states differ from one another in a number of ways. For 
1 Debate about this list of pristine states has often been of two kinds: 
first, about diffusionist theories which argue that the transition to a 
state happened only once, probably in the Middle East, and that the 
form then spread to the other supposed pristine states; and second, 
about monocausal theories which argue that transitions to states had 
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instance, they appeared in differing environments: Mesopotamia and 
Egypt are "Basically great arid river valleys with little of the ecological 
variability of the New World regions" (Service 1975: 203),, and the 
New World lacked the large domesticable animals of the old (for 
discussion of the significance of environmental differences, see 
Diamond 1998). 
The background to the appearance of pristine states is not a 
gradual climb through lower or simpler stages towards the pinnacle of 
statehood. Humans had complex and various social arrangements 
before they had states, and went through a long history of cycles of 
the creation and collapse of various social organisations and 
distributions of power. People ""Would freely give collective, 
representative authority, to chiefs, elders, and bigmen for purposes 
ranging from judicial regulation to warfare to feast organisation" but 
those figures ""Could not convert that into permanent,, coercive power" 
(Mann 1986: 63). Not only did the conditions of such conversion, 
discussed below, not usually obtain, but "Human beings devoted a 
considerable part of their cultural and organisational capacities to 
ensure"" (ibid: 39) that stable institutionalised power-distributions 
could not be created, or were rapidly destroyed. People without 
states, on the archaeological and ethnographic evidence, live 
complicated lives; make their livings in many different ways (as 
hunters and gatherers, herders, farmers, or various combinations of 
these modes); know a great deal about their environments and each 
other; interact in highly mediated and complex ways, and across very 
large distances; and very rarely create states. 
There are two major, necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
the creation of a pristine state. First, ""The population not only had to 
be large (about 10,000 to 30,000 people), but it had to be 
'circumscribed"' (Harris 1989: 388). Circumscription means that 
people who would prefer not to submit to an incipient state are either 
unable to leave, or think the costs of doing so too high. This may be 
one shared cause across all of these cases. I do not need to consider 
these problems for my purposes. 
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because of a lack of empty fertile land to move to; because of their 
investment in the land, often over generations, by planting, building 
and irrigation; or because they lack the technologies and skills 
necessary to make a living elsewhere. That is, for these or other 
reasons, they do not or cannot use one major tactic by which people 
have typically avoided state-formation: moving away. Second, some 
technologies, including writing, accounting, and techniques for long- 
term food storage, had to exist. Once a state had got going, these 
technologies were further developed, particularly by the bureaucratic, 
aristocratic or priestly class which unequal distribution of resources 
could be used to support. 2 
These conditions did not guarantee the creation of a state, 
which was, it must appear from the small number of times it actually 
happened, extremely difficult. On such rare occasions, the typical 
features of the state were: 1) ceremonial and administrative 
centralisation; 2) institutionalised unequal distribution of power and 
especially of control of resources; 3) the maintenance of classes of 
aristocrats, bureaucrats, priests, and soldiers; 4) the organisation of 
war and conquest in search of new territory,, slaves,, tribute or 
sacrificial victims; 5) conscription of labour for large public works and 
monumental projects; 6) the codification of law; 7) the creation and 
administration of central stores of goods for redistribution; and 8) the 
ability to maintain itself past the death of particular individuals, by the 
creation and use of roles - king, priest, champion - separate from the 
people who happen currently to inhabit them. These features may or 
may not have appeared simultaneously, and they may individually 
have developed slowly or suddenly. 
Pristine states maintained their institutional structures, and the 
ways of creating and distributing power they operated, especially by 
2 It has sometimes been thought that there is a third condition: the 
existence of a food surplus over subsistence level, allowing a 
community to support political and ritual specialists who do not 
produce their own sustenance. This claim has been attacked 
especially on the ground that "subsistence level' is not and perhaps 
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calling on 1) authority discourses (on which see 6.6.2), and 2) ritual 
and mythical discourses relating political to cosmic order, and often 
attributing divine attributes and ancestors to power-holders. This 
second is another general mode of distributing power, and also used 
elsewhere. 
It is not clear to what extent the redistributed power involved 
in this new social form was taken, and to what extent given: 
One school of thought concerned with the origin of the state 
rejects the idea that ruling classes gained control over 
commoners as a result of a violent conspiracy carried out by the 
chiefs and their militia. In contrast, they see commoners 
submitting peacefully out of gratitude for the services that ruling 
classes provided. These services included emergency rations in 
times of famine, protection against enemy attacks, and 
construction and management of agricultural infrastructures such 
as dams and irrigation and drainage canals. Also, people 
believed that the rituals carried out by chiefs and priests were 
essential for everyone's survival. (Harris 1989: 383) 
Harris plausibly suggests that ""Both voluntaristic submission and 
violent repression were present" (ibid: 384); we can add that there 
were probably different mixtures in different cases. Administrative 
centralisation would seem or be a good idea for the organisation of, 
particularly, the irrigation agriculture which was so important for the 
Eurasian river-valley civilisations, and such centralisation would then 
be pre-adapted for the other features of pristine states, or for coups 
by would-be kings. But simultaneously, once a ruling mafia 
organisation had settled itself, it could come to be used and valued by 
the commoners for purposes the rulers did not intend. 
In summary: humans can organise and have organised 
themselves in a wide variety of ways, and for most of the time there 
have been humans, there have not been states. People can distribute 
power in various ways, for various purposes, but most of the time 
"Authority was freely conferred, but recoverable; [distributed] power, 
permanent and coercive, was unattainable" (Mann 1986: 39), not 
least because people often deliberately resisted or moved away from 
cannot be defined (see Harris 1959). Again, I do not need to consider 
this debate for my purposes. 
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unequal (or more unequal than they had been used to) power 
distributions. But on a few occasions, in somewhat unusual 
circumstances, a new social form appeared: a pristine state. This 
centralised, administrative, expropriating institution made use of 
several tactics and technologies, for a variety of purposes, but 
particularly for war, the creation and maintenance of class divisions, 
the codification of behaviour, and the organisation of large collective 
projects. In general, it both allowed the creation of extra power and 
new powers, and distributed them in a distinctive, unequal way. 
What I have said here is an account, not an explanation, of the 
appearance of pristine states. For recent reviews of explanatory 
theories of that appearance, see Fagan (1999: chapter 8) or Lewellen 
(1992: chapter 3). 
What morals and interest can I and anarchists in general derive 
from this account of pristine states, and their separation from the vast 
majority of human history? First, it reiterates, expands on and gives 
evidence for Kropotkin's point, noted in 9.1, that the state is just one 
of many possible human social forms. Moreover, it is not a commonly 
created one. States have appeared only rarely without influence from 
other pre-existing states. Second, seeing how pristine states got 
started may be helpful in suggesting how to avoid their formation in 
the currently, but not necessarily or normally, unusual situation of 
being stateless. Third, the rarity of pristine states suggests an 
interesting question: Given that states are so hard to start, why are 
they currently ubiquitous? An answer to that question, which I 
approach in 9.3.4, may provide useful information on how states 
spread and therefore on how we might prevent their doing so. 
Fourth: perhaps the most obvious characteristic of pristine 
states was their violence. Non-state groups do carry out limited and 
often formalised wars, and individuals obviously hurt each other, but 
only states maintain an army, carry out long campaigns, or hold onto 
and exploit conquered territory. While this does not show that 
(pristine) states are necessarily violent, violence does seem, as a 
161 
matter of fact, to be one of their typical characteristics. War is 
historically a practice of states, not of humans in general. 
Fifth, and finally: the appearance of a pristine state is not an 
increase in complexity. In many ways, pristine states simplify their 
territories and the interactions of the people involved in them. 
According to Kent Flannery,, states may typically be associated with 
deliberately simplified ecosystems (Flannery 1972: 399 note 1). More 
importantly, in place of interactions between mutually known 
individuals with complex kinships, friendships and other relationships, 
pristine states put, or try to put, stereotyped interactions between 
roles: king, priest, farmer, slave. In place of an often-immense web of 
trade and gift-giving negotiated by individuals and overlapping 
groups: a simple, central store of goods administered by rulers. In 
place of a lifestyle often involving a wide range of skills and activities: 
craft specialisation, the division of labour, and the narrowing of 
individuals' activity and knowledge (this last did not begin with, but 
was increased and formalised by pristine states). 
The last point will become important in chapter 13: although 
division of labour is now widespread, and is a tactic available in the 
absence of states, it is not a human universal. Humans have not 
always organised their production by assigning (ever-smaller) sub- 
tasks within some larger project to individuals who perform only that 
task. I take up the point about complexity again in discussing modern 
states, in the next section. 
These pristine states did not turn into modern states: all six 
collapsed long before modern states appeared. In between, many 
other human social forms including universalist religions and their 
heresies, empires, communes, guild-cities and monasteries appeared, 
were transformed or absorbed, and collapsed. Some are still extant. I 
move from considering pristine to modern states not in order to write 
a history of states in general, but to describe two types of state which 
are important for my purposes. 
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9.3 Modern states 
Modern states are not the result of any general tendency, but a 
historically unique occurrence, and so, to describe them, we need to 
understand their unique background and development. They appeared 
quite gradually, in Europe, from the early fourteenth century. It took 
them several hundred years to develop their repertoire of 
organisational, technical, social and ideological means, and to spread 
across the world (I adopt this long perspective, including absolutist 
states as modern, in order to indicate continuities between then and 
now; for other purposes, absolutist states are often regarded as mere 
ancestors of modern states - see, for instance, Anderson 1986a). I 
now sketch their background, development, nature and spread. 
By definition, individual pristine states appeared in a stateless 
context. We should note, first, that modern states did not: they 
appeared and developed in a European and eventually a world state 
system, in competition and consort with each other. The system we 
now find ourselves in consists of modern states with sovereign legal 
personalities in relation to one another, not of 'the' modern state. 
In order to simplify a complex story, I divide my account into 
four sections: The background and rise of absolutism (9.3.1); 
Surveillance (9.3.2); Nationalism (9.3.3); and The spread of modern 
states (9.3.4). The division is based on Martin Van Creveld's The Rise 
and Decline of the State (1999). Although these sections do roughly 
follow the temporal order of appearance of the major features of 
modern states, I am more interested in analysing them than in 
reviewing their precise histories. I divide the spread of modern states 
from the rest of the story not because it happened afterwards - it did 
not - but in order to see the methods of that spread clearly. 
Again in order to simplify a complex story, and to focus on the 
points which are important for my purposes, I deliberately exclude 
consideration of two other important developments over roughly the 
same period as the development of modern states: the economic 
transformation of western Europe and then the rest of the world; and 
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the development of scientific, technical and other knowledge, together 
with institutions which maintain and produce more of it. I do not 
suppose that these developments were independent of the rise of 
modern states, or of each other. But,, first, their interdependence is 
extremely complex, and very unlikely to be resolved into the causal 
primacy of any one of the three; and second, to consider them would 
be to tend towards writing a general history of our last thousand 
years, which, quite apart from its length, would obscure the points I 
want to make. 
A final exclusion: I do not treat liberal democracy as typical of 
modern states, for the simple empirical reason that it is not. 
Derbyshire & Derbyshire's markers for identifying a liberal democracy 
a re: 
1 Evidence of constitutional government. 
2 Evidence of free elections for assemblies and executives. 
3 The active presence of more than one political party. 
4 Evidence of checks and balances between the three elements 
of government: executive, legislative,, and judicial. 
5 Evidence of an independent judiciary. 
6 Evidence of the protection of personal liberties through 
constitutional or other legal guarantees. 
7 Evidence of stability in liberal democratic government [defined 
as the system having been in place for at least the decade up to 
1996]. (Derbyshire & Derbyshire 1996: 24-5) 
Only 73 of the 192 states considered by Derbyshire & Derbyshire 
meet even these, quite weak,, criteria. So. liberal democracy is one 
form, but not typical, of modern states. 
9.3.1 The background and rise of absolutism 
The background to the gradual development of modern states is the 
social form usually known as feudalism. The name is problematic, for 
three reasons. First, feudalism was not static, but an unstable 
compromise changing and eventually collapsing under a variety of 
pressures. Second, the term is ambiguous: feudalism can mean not 
only "A lot of different things" (Reynolds 1994: 1), but may, as 
Reynolds goes on to argue, be so multivalent as to mean nothing 
164 
useful. Third, the idea of feudalism may, as Brown (1974) argues, be 
an artefact of nineteenth-century historiography, an ideal type 
without application to concrete history. I continue to use the term for 
convenience, and as better than clumsy phrases like 'the social form 
which prevailed in Europe before the rise of absolutism", while bearing 
these caveats in mind, and without intending to imply either that 
feudalism was monolithic, or that the term covers everything 
important about European life in this period. 
Feudalism was "The outcome of the violent dissolution of older 
societies" (Bloch 1961: 443), and characterised by fragmentation and 
by various attempts at reunification. In a narrow sense, feudalism 
involves the exchange of allegiance for a grant of land, with 
conditions on its use and linked duties of service and protection on 
both sides of the bargain. In an even narrower sense,, it applies only 
to such a relation between nobles (Reynolds 1994: 2). More broadly, 
it is characterised by: "A subject peasantry; widespread use of the 
service tenement (i. e. the fief) instead of a salary, which was out of 
the question; the supremacy of a class of specialised warriors; ties of 
obedience and protection which bind man to man ... ; [and] 
fragmentation of authority" (Bloch 1961: 446). The features I want to 
emphasise are that feudalism involved: 1) a deep fragmentation of 
power and of the incidents of property; and 2) a proliferation of 
overlapping and competing institutions and power-holders. The major 
players in this competition were the Church, the Holy Roman Empire, 
the nobility, the self-governing towns, and the monarchies which 
would become modern states. 
Absolutist states appeared out of a long struggle between these 
players, which some of the monarchies eventually won. So, for 
instance, the Church was strong at the start of the period, having a 
near-monopoly on literacy, estates all over Europe, and the 
sophisticated financial, judicial and administrative apparatus required 
to manage them. But by the end of it, the Church had been weakened 
by the papal schism, humanist scholarship, and the Reformation, all 
encouraged or utilised by the monarchies to consolidate their own 
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power (Van Creveld 1999: 62-75). The victory of the monarchies may 
have depended in part, as Van Creveld argues, on the multiplicity of 
power-holders, who could be played off against one another, Church 
against Empire and towns against nobles. It was not complete: 
although nobles and towns lost their political independence, the 
former retained their privileges and monopoly on government 
positions, and the latter's merchants and manufacturers were "Able to 
flourish as never before" (ibid: 119). However some monarchs did 
manage to unify many of the feudal fragments and networks in 
particular territories into single, hierarchical structures. The social 
form which resulted is usually called absolutism (perhaps with similar 
caveats as for feudalism). 
The central features of absolutism were: 1) its territoriality. 
Although feudal power-holders did claim and operate in bounded 
physical spaces, their powers and reach did not typically coincide with 
those spaces, because others also had claims within them, and 
because they had equally important claims and links outside them or 
unrelated to physical boundaries (in particular, bonds of service and 
formal kinship). The absolutist states importantly linked both their 
internal hierarchies and their external powers to territory. Rather than 
a map of (theoretically) distinct territories, feudal Europe was a web 
of overlapping familial, communal, fealty and authority relations. As 
Hendrick Spruyt puts the point, the vital transformation from 
feudalism to absolutism was the development and realisation of the 
"Principle of territorial exclusivity", involving "Internal hierarchy" and 
"External autonomy" in relation to other sovereign states (Spruyt 
1994: 3). 2) The sedentarisation of the monarch and centralisation of 
the administrative apparatus, increasingly in elaborate palaces with 
large staffs, as opposed to the near-nomadism of earlier monarchs. 3) 
The increasing isolation of the monarch from commoners and from 
traditional tasks. Kings were less and less easy to approach 
personally, and more and more required to socialise and marry only 
within a very limited group. They stopped being active war-leaders: 
where earlier monarchs had led their armies personally, absolute 
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monarchs retired to their palaces and left the fighting to others. This 
isolation was accompanied by an increasing heroisation of the 
monarch, often involving comparisons with pagan exemplars like 
Hercules and superstitions about the ability to cure disease. Finally, 
4), a symbolic theatre of power: elaborate court ritual., etiquette, 
costumes, triumphs and celebrations (for a vivid description of such 
theatre, see Yates 1975: chapter 1; on rituals of power in a variety of 
contexts,, see for instance the studies in Cannadine & Price 1987 and 
Theuws & Nelson 2000). These features, and the power-distribution at 
their heart, were supported by violence, by discourses of authority 
and property, and by ritual. 
Territoriality is perhaps the most significant feature of 
absolutist, and an important feature of modern, states. During the 
feudal period, an individual became considerable by forging or 
maintaining multiple, overlapping networks of fealty, duty and power. 
In the modern state, these networks are effaced by one loyalty, to the 
state. An individual normally belongs to only one state. She is either 
physically and administratively inside it, or outside it. Considerable 
efforts are made to sedentarise "People who move around" (Scott 
1998: 1) like nomads, refugees, slash-and-burn agriculturalists and 
gypsies, who are hard to fit into this scheme. More, becoming 
stateless -a refugee or asylum-seeker - is now a disastrous fate, and 
to be without a territorial state is to be 'primitive', without history, a 
non-person. 
Although they involved the first appearance of features 
characteristic of modern states, absolute monarchies were not yet our 
states. In particular, they lacked the vast apparatus of management 
and control of more recent states. That missing feature is considered 
in my next section. Absolute states contained the germ of their own 
transformation: 
Other things being equal, the more absolute any monarch the 
greater his dependence on impersonal bureaucratic, military, and 
legal mechanisms to transmit his will and impose it on society at 
large. In the end, those mechanisms showed themselves capable 
of functioning without him and were even destined to take power 
away from him. (Van Creveld 1999: 125) 
167 
I focus on this transformation and its results next. 
9.3.2 Surveillance 
Surveillance, involving both information-gathering and supervisory 
discipline, is a central feature of modern states (Dandeker 1990: 37- 
8). It involves: 1) the creation and empowerment of bureaucratic 
institutions, which allow and are further empowered by, 2) the 
formalisation of law, 3) the creation of legal tender, and 4) the 
monopolisation of internal and external violence. 
1) Bureaucracies are institutions made up of salaried 
administrators filling a hierarchy of professional roles, which: survive 
the removal or promotion of their current incumbents, ideally on 
impersonal criteria of competence; have clearly defined functions; and 
are enacted according to prescribed rules (this definition is based on 
Beetham 1987: 3 and Mann 1993: 444, and ultimately, through both, 
on the work of Max Weber). They create and distribute a great deal of 
extra power and many new powers. Having appeared, they gradually 
created internal functional distinctions into treasuries, foreign 
ministries and so on, at the same time as the monarch's personal 
property and household were gradually distinguished from the 
territory and administration of the state. Bureaucracies took over 
many of the activities of absolute monarchs, and created many of the 
distinctive features of modern states (for a detailed account of one 
such development, see Elton 1953; on the process in general, Mann 
1993: chapter 13). 
"Bureaucracy both presupposes the existence of information - 
the indispensable grist to the administrator's mill - and enables more 
of it to be generated" (Van Creveld 1999: 143). The new 
bureaucracies made use of or created a variety of techniques for the 
creation, storage and application of information, in order to facilitate 
control and taxation. In particular, they made use of cartography, 
both for describing the resources and defences of the state's territory 
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and for defining boundaries with other states; of statistics, particularly 
from population censuses; and of standardisation in names, 
measures,, customs of land tenure, and ways of recording births, 
cleaths, and transfers of property. "In each case,, officials took 
exceptionally complex, illegible, and local social practices... and 
created a standard grid whereby it could be centrally recorded and 
monitored" (Scott 1998: 2). More, these maps, literal and figurative, 
were intended to remake as well as to record: "A state cadastral map 
created to designate taxable property- holders does not merely 
describe a system of land tenure; it creates such a system through its 
ability to give its categories the force of law" (ibid: 3). These 
bureaucratic ""Attempts at legibility" (ibid: 2) were tactics of rule and 
means of creating and distributing power, and their development and 
spread allow modern states their extraordinary reach into the details 
of the lives of their subjects. (On one example of the development of 
taxation structures, see Braddick 1996; on some examples of the 
developing uses of cartography, the studies in Buisseret 1992; on the 
developing use of statistics in various countries, the studies in Koren 
1918; on these developments in general, Tilly 1975). 
Over the history of modern states, there has been a great 
increase in their technical and social powers of surveillance. Early 
bureaucratic states attempted to make their subjects and territories 
legible, but there were still many areas which were outside states' 
reach and oversight, because of technical difficulties or lack of 
interest. More recent states have tended towards conquering these 
difficulties, and increasingly left nothing invisible: sexual behaviour, 
private assembly and knowledge are now all at least theoretically 
matters of interest to and legible by states. In twentieth-century 
totalitarianisms an attempt was made to read and control all of these 
in practice (a trend satirically extended by George Orwell in Nineteen 
Eighty-Four). 
2) Law can in general be defined as "The body of rules, whether 
formally enacted or customary, which a particular State or community 
recognises as governing the actions of its members and which it may 
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enforce by imposing penalties" (oxford English Dictionary, my 
emphasis). Probably, no human community has ever lacked law in 
this wide sense. But many human communities have certainly lacked 
what we might think of as paradigmatic law, which is defined, written 
down and procedurally enforced by states which fairly successfully 
claim a monopoly on doing so in their territories (on the relationship 
between and study of common and state law, see Knafla & Binnie 
1995). There are of course many different kinds of law, including for 
instance business, comparative, constitutional, criminal, family, 
international, military, procedural, tax, tort, sumptuary and 
immigration law, and they have their own specific histories and 
interactions (see for instance Hunt 1996 on sumptuary law; 
Radzinowicz & Hood 1990 on criminal law in Victorian and Edwardian 
England; Garland 2001 on the transformation of criminal justice in 
Britain and the United States over the last thirty years). But the 
central change which the surveillance state brought about was to 
transform law from customary to formal, and to monopolise its 
definition and enforcement. This process is not and probably cannot 
be complete, for two reasons. First, humans continue to create, 
maintain and modify rules and sanctions outside state control. And 
second, the promise of an effective monopoly on social control may 
never have been realistic: 
In crime control, as in other spheres, the limitations of the 
state's capacity to govern social life in all its details have become 
ever more apparent, particularly in the late modern era. So, 
having arrogated to itself control functions and responsibilities 
that once belonged to the institutions of civil society, the late 
modern state is now faced with its own inability to deliver the 
expected levels of control over crime and criminal conduct. 
(Garland 2001: 110) 
But modern states' control of social activity, through the techniques of 
formal law and its enforcement, is deep and effective even if 
necessarily incomplete. 
3) "Unlike their successors, premodern rulers and communities 
did not themselves create value by fiat; instead, all they could do was 
confirm, by adding their seal, that existing valuable commodities... did 
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in fact conform to a certain standard of purity, weight, etc. " (Van 
Creveld 1999: 225). Modern states, in order both to increase their 
power and to claim the immense resources required to support 
themselves, had not only to increase taxation to previously impossible 
and unimagined levels, but to redefine the meaning of money by 
inventing 'legal tender'. That is, tokens issued or licenced by states 
which must legally be accepted for all debts. Once this confidence 
trick has succeeded, states' control of the economy is greatly 
deepened. Modern states literally do have a licence to print money. 
4) Over the course of the development of modern states, war 
has been transformed from a "Vocation of the upper classes" (Van 
Creveld 1999: 155), via being an activity of temporary, 
entrepreneurial bands of mercenaries, to being conducted by 
professional armed forces, recognised by the enemy as servants of a 
state doing their duty, and formally entitled to consideration if 
captured or wounded. This transformation created not only the armed 
forces themselves, with a culture, tradition and organisation of their 
own, and distinguished by wearing uniform, but two other excluded 
categories: the state which conducts the war, distinct from those who 
fight and die in it; and the civilian population. (On the development of 
modern armed forces, see Howard 1976. ) 
Permanent armed forces both require elaborate bureaucracies 
to manage their hierarchy, pay, training and supply, and are tools of 
bureaucratic surveillance. They are used to monopolise internal 
violence, crush rebellions and control subject populations, through the 
development of networks of roads, garrisons, forts and ordnance 
survey maps, as much as to fight external wars. Functional 
distinctions within these institutions were gradually created: police, 
including secret police, became distinct from armies, navies and 
eventually airforces, and prisons were built and staffed. 
After these transformations, the institutional structure of 
modern states was largely in place. Their apparatus of control of 
space, sociability and violence, and many of their means of creating 
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and distributing power, were in place, but in order for our states to 
come into being, one further element was needed. 
9.3.3 Nationalism 
Nationalism is a successful "Form of politics" (Breuilly 1994: 2) which 
appeared in the late eighteenth century, and by the twentieth had 
become ""Easily the most powerful political phenomenon in the 
contemporary world" (Gray 1995: 13). A political movement is 
nationalist when it seeks or exercises state power and justifies such 
action with ""Nationalist arguments" (Breuilly 1994: 2), which are built 
on three basic assertions: 
(a) There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character. 
(b) The interests and values of this nation take priority over all 
other interests and values. 
(c) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually 
requires at least the attainment of sovereignty. (ibid) 
The third of these is perhaps the most important, encapsulating as it 
does the doctrine that state territorial boundaries ought to be 
coterminous with often imaginary linguistic, cultural and/or ethnic 
boundaries (which of these supposed boundaries is emphasised 
depends on how the character of the nation is conceived). That is, 
that "'The only legitimate type of government is national self- 
government" (Kedourie 1960: 9). 
This definition of nationalism is not the only one available: for 
discussion of alternatives, see Smith (1971) and Guibernau (1996). 1 
adopt this short and political perspective for two reasons. First, 
although some elements of nationalism can be discovered long before 
the late eighteenth century, they did not appear together. For 
instance: while part of the powering doctrine of the Hussite revolution 
in Bohemia, in the fifteenth century, was ""Linguistic nationalism" 
(Lambert 1977: 319), it was not linked to a demand for a linguistically 
unitary state. The Hussites demanded a vernacular liturgy, and the 
reservation of judicial and academic positions for Czech-speakers, but 
wanted a reformed church, or in some cases a universal 'primitive' 
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church in place of the papacy, not a Czech state. Second, I am 
considering nationalism in the context of modern states, and it did not 
become a mass political project, and therefore significant in that 
context, until the recent date I have set for its beginning. Nationalism 
as a mass form of politics appears in consort and competition with 
modern states,, and is best understood in that context: "'The key to an 
understanding of nationalism lies in the character of the modern 
state, which nationalism both opposes and claims as its own" (Breuilly 
1994: 15; for further argument for this perspective, see ibid: 
appendix). 
The territorial boundaries which are justified or attacked by 
nationalist movements often pre-exist those movements, having 
appeared several centuries earlier with absolute states. These 
administrative cleavages may even have helped to form nationalist 
consciousness, by creating a fracture in communication: 
communicative possibilities were greater inside these boundaries than 
across them, which created a sense of something shared inside the 
boundary which excluded those outside (Deutsch 1953). However 
nationalist movements often attack existing states. Opposition 
nationalism takes three major forms: reform nationalism, which 
"Accepts existing state territory as approximately coterminous with 
national territory" but disputes "The non-national basis of state 
legitimacy and sovereignty"'; unification nationalism, which "Regards 
the existing states as occupying fragments of the national territory"; 
and separatist nationalism, which '"Regards the existing state as an 
imperial power"" (Breuilly 2001: 771). 
Nationalist movements very often oppose the particular states 
in which they find themselves, and attempt to take them over in order 
to transform them. Nationalism is often a central force in, especially, 
secession and decolonisation movements, and is in general an 
effective form of political opposition. Since its appearance, states 
have either been split, absorbed or ousted, or have tamed 
nationalism: 
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Rising to the challenge, the state, embracing nationalism, 
deliberately sought to turn the situation to its own advantage 
and began to sing its own praises by every means at its disposal. 
Gone were the days when such things as national food, national 
costume,, and national habits could be left to the care of mere 
patriotic societies; by means of its education system... the state 
sought to harness not only them but also "culture" in the form of 
history, painting, sculpture, literature, drama, and music... As 
one of the greatest expressions of human freedom and 
spontaneity, sport too became nationalised. Previously it had 
been organised on a purely local scale ... ; now, however, it was taken over by the state which turned it to its ends, including 
above all preparations for war... From Argentina to Spain, the 
second half of the nineteenth century also saw the invention of a 
whole series of new festivals: such as Independence Day, 
National Day,, Armed Forces Day, Jubilee Day, Flag Day, Heroes' 
Day, Memorial Day, Victory Day, Great Trek Day... During the 
last few decades before 1914, the existence of any state without 
such celebrations had become almost unthinkable. Dreaming 
about a future Jewish homeland, Theodore Herzl as the founder 
of Zionism became fascinated with the problem; his diary is 
peppered with descriptions of imaginary spectacles, the more 
grandiose the better. (Van Creveld 1999: 201-3; on Herzl, see 
Laqueur 1989: chapter 3) 
These spectacles were part of the broader category of national 
symbolism, which also includes, particularly, the investment of flags 
with an immense if ambiguous weight of meaning (Smith 2001). 
After World War 1, the world was reorganised according to 
nationalist principles: "The 'peoples' entitled to exercise the right to 
[national] self-determination, according to the Paris Peace accord of 
1919, were ethnic groups which had become nationally mobilized, and 
numerous states were carved out of the ruins of the Russian, German, 
Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires along broadly ethnic lines" 
(Moore 1998: 3). States which could or would not turn nationalism to 
their advantage were soon replaced with ones which did. The post- 
World War 1 settlement gave ""Sixty million people a state of their 
own, but it turned another twenty-five million into minorities" 
(Mazower 1998: 41) inside nation-states characterised by an 
(imagined) exclusive identity to which they were aliens. 
Nation-states and nationalist challenges to states are now 
ubiquitous, and ""Nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value 
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in the political life of our time" (Anderson 1983: 12). The success of 
nationalism has had two consequences, one major and one minor. 
The minor consequence is that its doctrine of national self- 
government has become a presupposition of diplomacy and of political 
thought: ""The existence of nations is a tacit presupposition of most 
current discourse in political theory" (Canovan 1996: 13). Its major 
and disastrous consequence is that it makes possible and to some 
extent causes the mobilisation of whole populations and economies 
for total war, which "Involves all citizens and mobilizes most of them... 
is waged with armaments which require a diversion of the entire 
economy to produce them, and which are used in unimaginable 
quantities... produces untold destruction and utterly dominates and 
transforms the life of the countries involved in it" (Hobsbawm 1995: 
44), as well as being involved in numerous smaller but equally terrible 
civil wars and ethnic cleansings. The twentieth century was the era of 
nation-states, and one of the most violent in human history: during it, 
something like 187 million people were "Killed or allowed to die by 
human decision"' (ibid: 12; the estimate is Zbigniew Brzezinski's). 
Nationalism is both a way of creating power, by motivating and 
channelling particular kinds of cooperation, and a way of maintaining 
or challenging power distributions and the elites which benefit from 
them. It is also an example of the general fact about human 
sociability, noted in 8.3, that there is a persistent tendency both to 
resist particular institutions, and towards the interstitial emergence of 
new networks. States did not create nationalism, but had to deal with 
it. 
9.3.4 The spread of modern states 
Modern states began in Europe, and for the first century of their 
existence ""Occupied only between 2 and 3 percent of the earth's 
surface" (Van Creveld 1999: 263). They are now ubiquitous: nearly all 
of the earth's land area is the territory of nation-states, and what little 
is not, like Antarctica, is managed, together with the oceans, by 
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collaborating nation-states. The spread of states differed in detail in 
each case according to local conditions, decisions,, mistakes and 
chance, but can broadly be divided into four forms. Modern states 
spread by: 1) deliberate mirroring; 2) colonisation of sparsely 
populated spaces; 3) colonisation of densely populated spaces; and 4) 
commercial contact (this division follows Van Creveld 1999: chapter 
5). 1 use the spread of modern states into Russia, North America, 
South America and India, respectively, as exemplary cases of these 
forms. I do not suppose that any of these cases were really as simple 
or monocausal as my accounts may suggest: I intend only to provide 
illustrative sketches. 
Before considering the spread of states in more detail, we 
should note that in no case did modern states expand into entirely 
empty spaces. In the rare cases where there were no human 
inhabitants, states still encountered and made immense changes to 
native ecosystems, typically in order to exploit their resources. In no 
case did states meet isolated 'savages' in a "state of nature: 
"European expansion everywhere encountered human societies 
characterised by long and complex histories" (Wolf 1997: x). 
1) The Russian monarchy initially failed to consolidate itself into 
an absolute state, when several western European monarchies 
succeeded. But Peter the Great deliberately mirrored those western 
states in his reforms, turning a powerful independent nobility into part 
of a hierarchy whose titles were granted by him, becoming de facto 
head of the Russian church, and reforming and greatly enlarging 
taxation and the armed forces. In many cases these reforms were 
carried out ""At the hands of western experts, both civilian and 
military, specifically imported for the purpose" (Van Creveld 1999: 
281; see ibid: 264-81; for a detailed account of Peter's life and 
reforms, see Anisimov 1993). 
2) In North America (and Australia), the British and other 
states expanded into vast but very sparsely populated spaces. These 
new territories were initially administered as extensions of the 
colonising states, but later became sovereign modern states. 
176 
Typically, this form of expansion has involved the nea r-exterm i nation 
of the native populations, and the assimilation of the survivors into 
the expanding state culture. In the specific case of North America, it 
involved the population and exploitation of the territory by huge 
numbers of mostly African slaves. (Van Creveld 1999: 281-97; on 
North America, Taylor 2002; on Australia, Hughes 1987; on slavery, 
chapter 10. ) 
3) In South America, the Spanish, Portuguese and other states 
expanded into a densely populated, resource-rich space. Again, the 
territory was initially administered as an extension of the colonising 
state, but has become a complex system of often military-run, 
sovereign modern states. In this form of spread, the native population 
was typically enslaved rather than exterminated. (Van Creveld 1999: 
298-314; on Mexico, Thomas 1994; on the anthropologies developed 
to explain and in some cases to justify colonisers' encounters with and 
treatment of native populations, Pagden 1986. ) 
4) In India, the British and other states expanded by 
commercial contact backed by state power. Initially, trade was carried 
out by organisations like the East India Company, which technically 
were not organs of their home states. But in practice the personnel of 
states and companies were often interchangeable; they collaborated 
in particular by lending each other military personnel and equipment; 
and the companies used many state forms and tactics,, especially 
including modern armed forces and bureaucratic techniques of 
reading and control. Companies traded with local power-holders, and 
therefore had an incentive to encourage or create distributions of 
power structured for their advantage, and power-holders sympathetic 
to them. Their help to such power-holders typically involved the loan 
or supporting use of their military and bureaucratic expertise for the 
creation of state-like surveillance, taxation and armies. In many 
cases, this process was accompanied by deliberate mirroring by local 
power-holders of the companies' techniques for creating and 
distributing power, which were so obviously effective, often to resist 
the company or company-backed rivals. So, in trying to structure the 
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social space they operated in to their commercial advantage, the 
companies helped to spread state forms and tactics. (Van Creveld 
1999: 315-32; on India, James 1997. ) 
The result of these processes, separately or in combination and 
modified by local circumstances, was our social world. Nation-states 
structure the lives of all humans, create enormous amounts of power, 
and distribute it extremely unequally. Complex social networks of 
state power-holders exercise their power over the entire earth. States 
are not the only powers or structures in the world: but they are large 
and important ones. 
9.3.5 Modern states: summary and morals 
In 1200, there were no nation-states: now, they are everywhere. The 
world and its human population are structured and controlled by a 
system of centralised, territorial institutions, making use of elaborate 
techniques of surveillance and taming or being challenged by 
nationalism. In general, the appearance of modern nation-states was 
the development and use of a collection of effective techniques for 
organising human social networks, creating immense power, and 
unequally distributing it in favour of bureaucratic elites. As with 
pristine states, I have given an account,, not an explanation, of the 
development and nature of modern states: for attempts at 
explanation, see for instance Tilly (1992) and Spruyt (1994); for a 
recent review of explanatory theories of the modern state, see 
Axtmann (1993). Now, what morals and interest can I and other 
anarchists draw from my account of modern states? 
First, and as with pristine states, the account reiterates, 
expands on and gives evidence for Kropotkin"s point that this is just 
one of many forms of social organisation possible for humans. We 
have not always organised ourselves in this way, did not until 
recently, and such organisation is therefore not necessary for us. 
Second, the account emphasises the fact that modern states 
are differentiated. That is, that they consist of several different 
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structures and techniques, including a centre, a territory, a 
bureaucracy (or even seve ra I competing or collaborating 
bureaucracies), law, armed forces, nationalism and an apparatus for 
its control. These elements are not necessarily linked: they are 
currently found together, but need not be. 
Third, and again as for pristine states, we have noted the 
immense capacity for violence of modern states. Nothing I have said 
shows that they must be violent, but it is clear that they have as a 
matter of fact been so. Probably, no other kind of institution or social 
form in human history has had the power to mobilise whole 
populations for war, for years at a time; probably, no other has killed 
or been responsible for the deaths of so many people. 
Fourth: I argued in 9.2 that the appearance of pristine states 
was not necessarily an increase in the complexity, and was in some 
ways a simplification, of human social life. The point needs further 
discussion in relation to modern states. There are senses of 'complex' 
in which the appearance of modern states was, or accompanied, an 
increase in complexity. For instance, we might choose to follow 
Randall McGuire (1983) in defining complexity as involving two 
variables: heterogeneity and inequality. Heterogeneity describes "The 
frequency of individuals among social parameters" of two kinds: 
nominal, "Such as sex, kinship and occupation" which "Define roles 
and are categorical groupings that have distinct boundaries and lack 
inherent rank ordering"'; and graduated, "'Such as age, power and 
wealth" which "Define status and are inherently rank ordered and 
continuous" (McGuire 1983: 101). Inequality describes "The extent of 
differential access to material and social resources, such as wealth 
and power" and "Measures how much difference there is between 
comparable levels of access" (ibid: 102; Blau 1977 gives a nearly 
identical two-variable definition of complexity). The point of this 
definition, for McGuire, is to help answer the question "What changes 
separate Pleistocene hunter-gatherers from the modern industrial 
world system? " (ibid: 101), and his answer is that the central change 
is an increase in heterogeneity and inequality, which he proposes to 
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call 'complexity'. This is reasonable for his purposes. But here our 
question is whether or not the appearance of modern states was an 
increase in complexity, and we need not deny that it was an increase 
in heterogeneity and inequality. So, this definition is question-begging 
for my purposes. 
McGuire's definition of complexity is not intended to, and does 
not, catch all we might mean by the term. For example: in his novel 
Big Planet, Jack Vance (1977) imagines Kirstendale,, which appears on 
its surface to be a somewhat feudal city of aristocrats and their 
servants. Its secret is that everyone plays both kinds of role: a porter 
in the morning, a duke in the afternoon, and "Every man a 
millionaire" (Vance 1977: 77) some of the time. In an ordinary sense 
of 'complex', this social form is more complex than the feudal one it 
appears to be, a change from the latter to a Kirstendale-like form 
would be an increase in complexity, and the lives of the Kirsters are 
more complex than the lives of people who are only and always 
porters. But McGuire's definition of complexity cannot catch this 
difference. Because the social roles remain the same, while being 
played by different people at different times, there is no difference 
between the ordinary feudal and the Kirster heterogeneity or 
inequality. 
Further, there are three important senses in which modern 
states create or are accompanied by a simplification of human life. 
First, bureaucracies typically simplify complex local social forms for 
purposes of legibility. Second, modern states have partially effaced 
complex and overlapping webs of association with simpler, exclusive, 
hierarchical ones. Third, while our networks of interaction in modern 
states often involve a larger number of people than networks in other 
known social forms, they do so by making use of technologies which 
simplify our interactions, often by making many people (and objects) 
interchangeable. In a strange town, I do not have to form any 
complex relationship in order to get food and a bed for the night, just 
so long as I have the simplifying tool: money. In a strange landscape, 
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I can read the roadsigns. And these simplifying technologies, of 
course, were created or are maintained by modern states. 
On the grounds of the multivalence of 'complexity, and the fact 
that in some ordinary senses of the term, the appearance of modern 
states involves a simplification of human social life, I suggest that it is 
not helpful or particularly meaningful to regard the appearance of 
states as an increase in complexity. Only confusion is added to 
McGuire's useful point about heterogeneity and inequality by involving 
the term 'complexity'. So, we should abandon the scale of simple to 
complex in comparing states with other social forms. 
9.4 States: summary and conclusion 
I have characterised states in general as one particular social form 
among the many possible for humans. They are centralised, 
territorial, differentiated institutions,, which create immense power 
and distribute it unequally by using a variety of techniques. In the 
common human situation of being without and uninfluenced by states, 
we very rarely create them, and when we do, the transformation is 
not an unambiguous increase in complexity. Our modern states are a 
recent, historically unique development, which adds further 
techniques and forms, including bureaucracies, armies and 
nationalism, to the basic pattern of the state. Again, their appearance 
is not best thought of as an increase in complexity, both because 
'complex' is multivalent and because there are senses of the term in 
which that appearance is a simplification of human life. 
I argued in 1.4 that it is difficult to say much about how likely 
the realisation of some social form is or was. But we should note that 
anyone who wants to claim that states, and especially our current 
state-infested arrangements, were very likely, must deal with three 
strong counter-arguments: 1) pristine states have appeared only very 
rarely; 2) the development of modern states involved a series of 
apparently adventitious victories and inventions; and 3) for most of 
the time there have been humans, there have not been states. This 
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does not entirely preclude an argument that (modern) states were 
actually likely: it does make such argument difficult. 
I have analysed states, using my conceptual toolkit, by 
considering their historical development in the context of human 
history and states' particular historical situations. As I have 
emphasised throughout this chapter,, states are just one of many 
ways humans can organise and have organised themselves. Further, 
the alternative to having a state is not chaos. There are multiple and 
differently ordered alternatives to the state social form (I consider two 
of them in more detail in chapters 11 & 12). 
As I argued in 1.5, anarchism cannot be characterised merely 
as anti-statism. But anarchists certainly are against states, as one 
disastrous and currently ubiquitous social form, among other 
possibilities. In chapter 10,1 consider another non-state social form 
against which anarchists should and do set themselves. 
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* Slavery 
On the historical evidence, any complete list of the general capacities 
of evolved humans (see 5.5) would have to include the capacity to 
enslave. According to Peter Kolchin., "Throughout most of human 
history, slavery and other forms of coerced labour were ubiquitous" 
(Kolchin 1993: xi). According to Orlando Patterson: 
There is nothing notably peculiar about the institution of slavery. 
It has existed from before the dawn of human history right down 
to the twentieth century... There is no region on earth that has 
not at some time harboured the institution. Probably there is no 
group of people whose ancestors were not at one time slaves or 
slaveholders. (Patterson 1982: vii) 
But the world-spanning form slavery took between the fifteenth and 
nineteenth centuries is distinctive in a number of ways, and I 
concentrate on it here. I follow common practice in calling it "Atlantic 
slavery' or 'the Atlantic system". Before considering it further, I 
characterise slavery in general. 
10.1 A general characterisation of slavery 
Slavery is extreme and institutionalised inequality of power, in favour 
of masters,, over slaves. Centrally, it is created and maintained by 
violence and the threat of violence: people are violently enslaved, and 
then held in subservience by the use and threat of corporal and 
ultimately capital punishment. But slavery also involves other modes 
of creating and maintaining power distributions. It involves authority 
discourses, grounded in various ways, including the use of ideas of an 
authority derived from having spared the slave's life in battle, or from 
natural superiority, or from an unpaid debt (all of which can be 
stretched far into metaphor or formal fiction). It involves property 
discourses. A slave is the object of many of the incidents of property, 
including being something someone has an exclusive right to use and 
a right to sell to some others. 
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A slave is also an object in another sense: masters attempt to 
make slaves non-persons, in a number of ways. First, slaves are 
natally and culturally alienated: 
Not only was the slave denied all claims on, and obligations to, 
his parents and living blood relations but, by extension, all such 
claims and obligations on his more remote ancestors and on his 
descendants. He was truly a genealogical isolate. Formally 
isolated in his social relations with those who lived, he also was 
culturally isolated from the social heritage of his ancestors... 
Slaves differed from other human beings in that they were not 
allowed freely to integrate the experience of their ancestors into 
their lives,, to inform their understanding of social reality with the 
inherited meanings of their natural forebears, or to anchor the 
living present in any conscious community of memory. 
(Patterson 1982: 5) 
Slave families are typically broken up, or always afraid of being 
broken up, by their masters. The escaped American slave and 
abolitionist campaigner Frederick Douglass, for instance, records that 
""My mother and I were separated when I was but an infant - before I 
knew her as my mother", that it was ""Common custom, in the part of 
Maryland from which I ran away, to part children from their mothers 
at a very early age", and that "I was not allowed to be present during 
her illness, at her death, or burial" (Douglass 1982: 48-9; 1 use 
Douglass illustratively as an especially articulate slave-voice; for 
many other voices and testimonies, see for instance Blassingame 
1977 & Gates 1987). 
Second, masters attempt to limit slaves to having a social 
personality only through them. Slaves are dishonoured and nameless. 
In Atlantic slavery specifically, according to Robin Blackburn: 
Planters gave slaves names normally used for dogs, horses, 
donkeys or cows ('Jumper, 'Gamesome, 'Ready', 'Juno', 
"Caesar', Tido', and so forth). Alternatively, the adult slave 
would be known by a diminutive and would often lack any family 
name. (Blackburn 1997: 325) 
In general, a slave has '"No name of his own to defend. He can only 
defend his master's worth and his master's name" (Patterson 1982: 
10-11). 
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Third, masters attempt to stop slaves joining and forming new 
social networks of their own, for whatever purpose. Douglass records 
that when he and other slaves set up a Sunday-school, mostly so that 
he could teach the others to read, "Messrs. Wright Fairbanks and 
Garrison West... in connection with others, rushed in upon us with 
sticks and stones, and broke up our virtuous little Sabbath school, at 
St. Michael's - all calling themselves Christians! " (Douglass 1982: 
120). In some cases this prevention is rhetorically justified or really 
motivated by a (rational) fear of conspiracy to revolt or to escape. But 
it is also a more general part of the maintenance of slavery: if slaves 
form social networks of their own, in their own interests, they become 
less socially and psychologically dependent on their masters, and 
therefore less enslaved. 
Fourth, masters attempt to keep slaves as tools created for 
their purposes, instead of people who create themselves for their own 
purposes. In a slave, the skill of reading and the consequent ability to 
gain knowledge, for instance, is dangerous. Douglass, with the help of 
his mistress Sophia Auld and despite her later, corrupted attempts to 
stop him, learned to read. Both he and his owners recognised the 
liberating power of education. According to Sophias husband Hugh: 
"Learning would spoil the best nigger in the world... If you teach 
that nigger... how to read, there would be no keeping him. It 
would forever unfit him to be a slave". (ibid: 78)' 
And according to Douglass himself, ""From that moment, I understood 
the pathway from slavery to freedom" (ibid): "Education and slavery 
were incompatible with each other" (ibid: 82). 
These four ways of trying to make slaves animals or objects 
instead of people all lead towards Patterson's definition of slavery: a 
slave is "A socially dead person" (Patterson 1982: 5). She is 
metaphorically dead because alienated from familial and community 
""Some of the language in this book may disturb readers; it disturbs 
me. Whenever "nigger' appears in the sources, it has been retained... 
The word is offensive, but I believe that its omission would only 
anesthatize subject matter infinitely more offensive" (Genovese 1974: 
xvii). 
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networks, prevented from having a social personality except through 
her master, prevented from forming new social networks, and 
prevented from recreating herself as anything other than a tool of 
others" purposes and interests. 
None of these attempts to make slaves non-persons could 
succeed completely, for at least three reasons. First,, because of the 
technical difficulty of continuous surveillance and control. Second, 
because even the extreme and supposedly permanent social divisions 
between slave and master are to some extent permeable. David Brion 
Davis, for instance, notes the case of the slave April Ellison, who: 
Won his freedom after learning how to build and repair cotton 
gins. After changing his first name to William, buying the 
freedom of his wife and daughter, and winning a legal suit 
against a white man who had failed to pay a debt, Ellison 
became a wealthy planter and owner of sixty-three slaves, a 
statistic that placed him by 1860 among the upper 3 percent of 
the slave holders in South Carolina. (Davis 1998: ix-x) 
Third, because resistance of various kinds is a permanent feature of 
slavery, of which masters are always afraid. I consider some of the 
forms this permanent resistance took against Atlantic slavery in 
particular, in 10.5. First, I sketch the Atlantic system and consider its 
distinctiveness. 
10.2 A brief history of the Atlantic system 
In 9.3.4 1 considered the spread of state social forms into North and 
South America. But this was not the only spread of networks and 
forms, or the only social activity, going on there. At the same time as 
states were spreading, the Atlantic system was being created. These 
two changes were related, but not identical. 
The immediate sources of the Atlantic slave trade are in the 
Portuguese and Spanish trade with and exploitation of West Africa, 
especially in search of gold and spices, and in their increasing 
colonisation of Atlantic island-groups including the Canaries and 
Azores, beginning in the fifteenth century. The import of fairly small 
numbers of African slaves to these islands, to South America, and 
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especially to the Caribbean, began in the early sixteenth century; 
African slaves were first brought to North America in the early 
seventeenth century. (Blackburn 1997: chapter 2; Wolf 1997: 196-7. ) 
Atlantic slavery reached its peak in the eighteenth century, and 
involved two interlinked networks and institutions, apart from slavery 
itself: the triangular trade and the plantation mode of production. A 
trading ship would set out from a home port, for instance Liverpool, 
for the African west coast, carrying trade items including rum, 
firearms and cotton goods. These would be exchanged for slaves 
procured from a deep African hinterland, mostly by other black 
Africans, at factories along the coast. These slaves were taken to the 
islands or the American continent (the 'middle passage) and sold, 
usually to be workers on plantations. The ship would then return 
home loaded with the products of those plantations, including 
tobacco, coffee, rice, cotton and especially sugar. (Eltis 1998; Rawley 
1981; Unsworth 1992 gives an impressive fictional account of the 
triangular trade. )2 
By 1860, there were approximately four-and-a-half million 
slaves in North America alone. Altogether, perhaps eleven or twelve 
million black people were transported (the first estimate is from 
Rawley 1981 and the second from Eltis 1998; a widely-accepted 
earlier estimate of fifteen million now seems to have been ill- 
grounded; for further estimates and consideration of the difficulty of 
making them accurately, see Curtin 1969). "It is thought that 20 to 
40 percent of the slaves died while being transported to the [African] 
coast, another 3 to 10 percent died while waiting on the coast, and 
about 12 to 16 percent of those boarded on ships died during the 
voyage" (Cohn 1998: 290),, mostly from disease. The slave mortality 
rate for the middle passage, which is probably the most accurate of 
these estimates, is approximately six times higher than the mortality 
rate for free immigrants to the Americas (ibid). 
2 This account of the triangle is in fact a simplification: as Blackburn 
(1997: 530) points out, much plantation produce was brought to 
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The Atlantic slave trade was immensely profitable, and a major 
condition of the industrial revolution and the development of 
capitalism,, especially in Britain (Blackburn 1997: chapter 12; Inikori 
1998; Wolf 1997: 199-200). It ceased in the nineteenth century: why 
it did so is a matter of controversy, focussed in particular on the 
relative weight of moral and political campaigns, shifting ideas of 
progress, and changing economic, social and geopolitical factors 
(Blackburn 1988: chapter 13; Davis 1984; Eltis 1981; Engerman 
1998; Steckel 1998). 
10.3 The distinctiveness of Atlantic slavery 
The Atlantic system of slave procurement, transportation and 
exploitation partook of the general character of slavery, as described 
in 10.1, and had many continuities with other forms of slavery. To 
note one example: as in many other forms, the central implement of 
punishment and physical threat in Atlantic slavery was the whip. But 
Atlantic slavery was also distinctive,, in four major ways. 
First, slaves in this form were very largely used only for a 
limited range of menial tasks. In other slaveries, slaves: 
Served a multitude of diverse purposes. To those accustomed to 
thinking of slaves as agricultural laborers and house servants, it 
may be startling to learn that slaves have also served as 
warriors, government officials,, wives, concubines, tutors, 
eunuchs, and victims of ritual sacrifice. In many pre-modern 
societies there were high-status slaves who exercised 
considerable authority; such elite slaves ranged from stewards 
who managed vast agricultural estates in China and early- 
modern Russia to high government officials in Rome and the 
Ottoman Empire. Throughout much of Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America, slaves served in the armed forces, at times - especially 
in the Islamic world - achieving high rank and wielding 
considerable power. (Kolchin 1993: 4) 
But Atlantic slaves were almost entirely used as agricultural workers 
on the plantation, "A productive unit ideally suited for the 
regimentation of agricultural labor and hence the large-scale 
Europe by ships which specialised in that commerce, and which did 
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cultivation of staple crops" (ibid: 5). The profitability of the Atlantic 
system, and therefore part of the demand for slaves, depended on the 
demand in the old world for these staples from the new. 
Second, Atlantic slavery involved a racial discourse dividing 
white European masters from black African slaves. Institutions of 
slavery have typically required some division of 'us' from 'them", 
grounded in varied ways including differences of religion, of 'level' of 
culture, of origin, and of mythical lineage. But Atlantic slavers created 
and used a complex, political discourse of race to distinguish 
(potential) slaves from (potential) masters. Atlantic slavery ""Was 
predicated on new, unequal relationships between Europe and Africa 
and between white and black"' (ibid: 6). With few exceptions, slaves 
were black Africans and their descendants, and masters were white 
Europeans and their descendants. This racial discourse is another 
means of distributing power to add to the list I gave in 6.6. 
Third, Atlantic slavery was ""Intensely commercial"' (Blackburn 
1997: 3). Slavery was largely powered by desire for profit, and not, 
for instance, for status, or for the maintenance of traditional social 
hierarchies. Slavers used and developed new techniques of 
bookkeeping, long-distance exchange, insurance and business 
planning. 
Fourth, and as I have already suggested with some statistics in 
10.2, the Atlantic system was distinctive in its sheer size and global 
effects. Atlantic transport of slaves populated the new world and 
transformed the old. Not only Europe, and especially the developing 
capitalist nation-states of Europe, and not only America, were 
changed by the trade: "The demand for African slaves reshaped the 
political economy of the entire [African] continent" (Wolf 1997: 230). 
not visit Africa. However, the point about the flow of goods stands. 
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10.4 Slavery and civil society 
The Atlantic system appeared in the context of (developing) modern 
states, and the spread of its institutions was simultaneous with the 
spread of theirs, but it was not created nor wholly maintained by 
states. "Modern states bore their share of responsibility for the 
cruelties of the Atlantic slave traffic" and "The process of colonisation 
itself was to a greater or lesser extent state-sponsored" (Blackburn 
1997: 6; 7), but the Atlantic system was created and maintained by 
commercial organisations and networks of slave-owners, not by 
states. The vast infrastructure required to procure and distribute 
slaves, the plantation mode of production, and the racial justification 
of slavery, were "Invented by European traders and settlers with little 
prompting from state functionaries" (ibid: 12). Indeed it appears that 
"Slavery was inversely proportional to the exercise of metropolitan 
authority" (Blackburn 1988: 17) by colonising states. 
For anarchists, the moral of this point is that states are not the 
only institutions worth criticising and resisting. Even if I am wrong 
that historical anarchism cannot be characterised merely as anti- 
statism (see 1.5), we have good reason here to extend anarchist 
consideration beyond states. The creation, maintenance and actions 
of states are not the only social activities with forms and 
consequences anarchists should resist: "The spontaneous dynamic of 
civil society is also pregnant with disaster and mayhem" (Blackburn 
1997: 6). 
10.5 Resistance 
The "Bitter central fact" about Atlantic slavery is that "The planter 
class kept this vicious system going" for so long (Dunn 1984: 175). 
But despite the masters' general success in maintaining the slave 
system, they faced continuous resistance of various kinds from their 
slaves. 
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A number of different taxonomies of resistance have been 
developed. Eugene Genovese, influenced by Marxism and especially 
by the pioneering work of CLR James (1980), distinguishes two 
major forms of slave resistance: 
Until the Age of Revolution the slave revolts did not challenge 
the world capitalist system within which slavery itself was 
embedded. Rather, they sought escape and autonomy -a local, 
precapitalist social restoration. When they did become 
revolutionary and raise the banner of abolition, they did so 
within the context of the bourgeois-democratic revolutionary 
wave, with bourgeois-democratic slogans and demands and with 
a commitment to bourgeois property relations. (Genovese 1979: 
xxi-ii). 
This distinction between restorative and revolutionary resistance is 
useful for some purposes; other, more fine-boned distinctions are 
useful for others. In Testing the Chains, Michael Craton distinguishes 
between "Revolts of the Maroon type, those led by unassimilated 
Africans, and the late slave rebellions led by Creole (colony-born) 
members of the slave elite" (Craton 1982: 13). in the Caribbean. In 
later work, Craton has further distinguished seven "Forms of slave 
resistance and planter response" (Craton 1997: 224) as follows. 1) 
General uprising, or plots for it, responded to by the formation of 
planter militias, by draconian laws, and by conscious attempts to instil 
fear in the slave population. Examples of this first form include 
rebellions in Jamaica in 1760,1776,1795 and 1831-2; Barbados in 
1816; Antigua in 1736; and, most successfully, Haiti in 1791-1804.2) 
Mass running away to form colonies of Maroons (the term is from 
American Spanish cimarron, wild, applied especially to runaway 
cattle). Responses included attempts at extermination, but also 
negotiation and non-aggression pacts. Examples include Barbados in 
the 1650s, Antigua, Martinique and Guadeloupe up to the 1730s, and 
even ""New Providence in the Bahamas as late as 1823" (ibid: 230). 3) 
'Petit marronage, that is short-term, short-distance running away by 
individuals and very small groups. This especially seems to have been 
a continuous feature of Atlantic slavery, and a continuous problem for 
slave-owners, throughout the lifespan of the system. 4) Poisoning, 
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industrial sabotage, feigning stupidity, and malingering. 5) Subtle 
social sabotage including exaggerated deference, disguised satire, and 
the deliberate fostering of divisions between masters. 6) Internalised 
rejection including abortion, suicide, intra-slave violence and 
madness. 7) Resistance through the maintenance or recreation of 
African culture: African language and writing, craft skills, religion, 
music, traditional family life and ways of making a living. 
I do not intend, and am not qualified, to arbitrate between 
these different taxonomies (and am not convinced that arbitration is 
necessary: they are intended for different purposes, and may be able 
to coexist). I note them for two purposes of my own. First, to 
emphasise the permanence and variety of resistance, by the slaves 
themselves, to the Atlantic system (for more evidence of that 
permanence, see for instance the chronology of slave- resistance in 
the Caribbean in Craton 1982: 335-9). Second, to note the social 
creativity of resistance. In Maroon colonies throughout the Caribbean, 
runaway slaves created and maintained viable social forms and 
networks even under extreme pressure and attempts at extermination 
by white colonists and planters. Maroon groups did not merely 
reproduce African social forms: 
Maroons were socially opportunistic and eclectic. Practices 
derived from any available culture area - African, European, 
plantation slave culture, occasionally even Amerindian - were 
incorporated. (de Groot 1997: 188) 
The 'Black Caribs', for instance: 
Traced their origins to a cargo of African slaves wrecked on the... 
island of Bequia around 1690 who were harboured by the "Yellow 
Caribs' there who were in control of St Vincent. Within a few 
decades - and not, it seems, without some internal disruption - 
the black refugees, reinforced by runaway slaves from nearby 
islands, had become the dominant element in an increasingly 
miscegenated warrior community that fearsomely combined 
African and Amerindian weapons and tactics of resistance. 
(Craton 1997: 237) 
In general, then, resistance was permanent, varied, and socially 
creative. Even the extreme institutionalised inequality of power, and 
techniques for its maintenance, of the Atlantic system, were not 
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sufficient to prevent the expression of the general human tendencies 
to resist and to form new social networks (see chapter 8). 
10.6 Slavery: a summary 
The potential for slavery is always with us. Slavery is in general an 
extreme, institutionalised form of inequality of power, created and 
maintained by violence and by authority and property discourses, and 
it attempts to make slaves socially dead in a variety of ways (10.1). 
Between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries it took a distinctive 
global form, the Atlantic system. It used enormous numbers of mostly 
black African slaves, understood by a new racial discourse and as one 
object of the triangular trade, to operate the plantation system of 
production. It was one condition of the transformation of the world 
towards our current arrangements. That is,, it created considerable 
extra power and new powers, and distributed them in favour of a 
white, western elite and against black Africans, including those who 
remained in Africa (10.2 & 10.3). It developed at the same time as 
the development and spread of modern states, but was largely not 
created by those states, and this has consequences for anarchist 
thought (10.4). Despite its effectiveness and longevity, the Atlantic 
system could not prevent the expression of the general human 
tendencies to resist and to form new social networks, in a variety of 
ways (10.5). 
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10.7 States and slavery: a comparison 
States and slavery are both similar and different. While slavery is 
common, states are a recent and unusual innovation in human 
sociability. The institutions of the two, the ways in which they use 
violence and discourses of authority and property, and the lives those 
involved in them typically lead, are all different. States' institutions 
are more functionally promiscuous than slavery's, and have been 
available to be used for better purposes. But the two are in general 
alike and comparable in being organisations of humans in confederal 
social networks, creating and distributing power. Specifically, modern 
states and Atlantic slavery are alike in creating large amounts of 
power and distributing it extremely unequally. They are also 
historically connected: the world in which modern states operate, the 
wealth of some and poverty of others, are conditioned by the Atlantic 
system. Indeed, Atlantic slavery's effects may be even deeper than 
that: 
Its development was associated with several of those processes 
which have been held to define modernity: the growth of 
instrumental rationality, the rise of national sentiment and the 
nation-state, racialized perceptions of identity,, the spread of 
market relations and wage labour, the development of 
administrative bureaucracies and modern tax systems, the 
growing sophistication of commerce and communication, the 
birth of consumer societies, the publication of newspapers and 
the beginnings of press advertising, 'action at a distance' and an 
individualist sensibility. (Blackburn 1997: 4) 
Whether or not this strong claim is true, modern states and Atlantic 
slavery are distinctive forms of human sociability which condition our 
current lives in many ways, and which are similar at least in their 
creation and unequal distribution of power. 
Comparisons with slavery have long been available for moral 
and polemical purposes, and have often deployed the notion of 'wage 
slavery'. The notion appears to have two sources: first, in pro-slavery 
polemic from the American South, where the term was used to make 
a tu quoque attack on Northern anti-slavery campaigners, on the 
grounds that the condition of the 'free' workers they employed was at 
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least as bad as that of Southern slaves; second, in socialist polemic 
by people like Bronterre O'Brien, from the 1830s onwards, about the 
condition of the British proletariat (Cunliffe 1979: chapter 1). In the 
second case, the comparison works in the same way as Kropotkin"s 
comparison between modern division of labour and the Indian caste 
system: it attempts to extend disapproval by comparison between an 
accepted and a supposedly unacceptable social form (see 4.3). The 
notion of wage slavery has since been used in variety of ways, 
including its use: 1) by Marx, to emphasise the continuity, despite 
historical transformation, of exploitative class- relations; and 2) to 
analyse the transformation of slavery in particular histories of, for 
instance, apartheid South Africa (Tsotsi 1981) and slavery in Jamaica 
(Sheridan 1993). 1 now want briefly to pursue an alternative, but 
structurally similar, comparison, between slaves and the subjects of 
states. 
To what extent are slaves and subjects similar? The institutions 
and tactics by which states and slavery create and distribute power 
are somewhat different, although both use cooperation, technique, 
violence, authority discourses and property discourses. Some 
subjects' lives are less controlled, at least in some spheres, than are 
some slaves'. But states certainly can have and exercise as much 
distributed power as, and modern states in particular have the tactics 
and technology to exercise considerably more power than, any past 
system of slavery. Both slaves and subjects are at the sharp end of an 
extreme inequality of power (and are thus similarly not free, on my 
definition of freedom - see 7.5). It may be thought that the difference 
is that we would rather be subjects than slaves. But this is too quick: 
subjects of which state? Being a subject of a liberal democratic state 
is fairly obviously preferable to being a slave, but recall my point in 
9.3 that liberal democracy is one form, but not typical, of modern 
states. Some states are at least as bad as slavery (and some slave- 
masters, just possibly, are not irredeemably brutal). It would be false, 
and offensive to the memory of slaves, to acclaim myself, a subject of 
a wealthy liberal democracy, as sharing their suffering. But it would 
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be equally false, and offensive to the memory of the victims of Pol Pot 
in Cambodia, Idi Amin in Uganda, or Stalin's purges, to claim that 
they were better off for being subjects instead of slaves. The shared 
experience of inequality of power and extreme violence makes some 
subjects comparable with slaves. 
The notion of 'state slavery, like the notion of wage slavery, is 
available for moral comparative purposes. However, in line with my 
specified intention to concentrate on the factual over the normative 
elements of anarchism (see 1.3), 1 do not so use it here. My less 
ambitious purposes in this section have been: first, to note some 
similarities in the experience and condition of some people involved in 
two distinct but related social forms; and second, to make the 
comparison implied by the notion of state slavery available for more 
normative projects. 
10.8 A record of crimes 
I have already quoted William Godwin's repetition of the "'Old 
observation that the history of mankind is little else than a record of 
crimes" (Godwin 1985: 83; see 3.2.1). In this and my previous 
chapter, I have added to that gloomy genre. The general capacities 
and social creativity of humans have recently been used to build and 
maintain two extremely effective systems for the creation of power 
and its unequal distribution, and for the creation and use of violence, 
with pleasant consequences for some of us but terrible ones for many 
others. Anarchists, and others, might be inclined to despair. But there 
are also reasons for hope: although it is clear that these and other 
disastrous possibilities are within the human social range, so too are 
some better ones. In my next two chapters, I display some of them. 
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* The Nuer 
States are one, recent and historically uncommon way in which 
humans have organised themselves. For most of the time there have 
been humans, there have not been states: 
For 30,000 years... life went on without kings, queens, prime 
ministers, presidents, parliaments, congresses, cabinets, 
governors, mayors, police officers, sheriffs, marshals, generals, 
lawyers,, bailiffs, judges, district attoneys, court clerks, patrol 
cars, paddy wagons, jails, and penitentiaries. How did our 
ancestors manage to leave home without them? (Harris 1989: 
344) 
Harris suggests that "Small populations provide part of the answer" 
(ibid) to this question. But in his attempts to explain war and sexism, 
he also appeals to the fact that these small populations in bands and 
villages interacted across their borders, especially in trade, 
exogamous marriage and competition for food resources. Again, there 
are no discrete social totalities (see chapter 8), and so the small 
populations of bands and villages cannot fully explain how they 
organised themselves without states. Their problems were of the 
same type as ours: how are we to live together and manage conflict 
resolution, despite the differences and clashes between our interests? 
The general answer to Harris" question is that our ancestors 
managed in many different ways. They did to a considerable extent 
succeed in living together in relatively ordered ways, and to limit and 
resolve violent conflict. Stateless life has not in general been chaotic 
or a 'war of each against all', any more than life in and under states 
has been (and perhaps less so). But the tactics used by people in 
non-state arrangements, and the ways in which they live together, 
are various. This is unsurprising: %non-state' means nothing more 
than 'not using one particular, historically unusual set of institutions 
and tactics for living together. In particular, non-state people vary in 
their types of social network, means of creating and distributing 
power, mode of subsistence, equality (especially gender equality), 
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and level and type of violence. On the latter two: the ! Kung of the 
Kalahari desert, for instance, have highly (although not perfectly) 
egalitarian gender relations, and are generally (although not 
perfectly) peaceful (ibid: 279-81; 288). The Yanomami, who live on 
the border of Brazil and Venezuela, are by contrast both sexist and 
violent, both amongst themselves and in their relations with their 
neighbours (ibid: 290-1)1. 
In this chapter I focus on one non-state social form, that of the 
Nuer in the southern Sudan, in order to exemplify some of the 
capacities and tactics humans have for living together and resolving 
conflict, without states or other institutionalised inequalities of power. 
I consider an acephalous social form because, first, it both provides a 
comparison with other ways of living and managing conflict, and 
exemplifies the wide range of human sociability and the possibility of 
alternatives to our current arrangements. Second, because stateless 
people have been an enduring subject of interest for anarchists: I 
have already noted Kropotkin's interest in 'savages' (chapters 3& 4); 
further examples of this anarchist concern, in various styles and as 
part of various projects, include Barclay (1982), Clastres (1977), 
Taylor (1982) and Ward (1973: chapter 4). In general, anarchists 
have "Stressed the non-hierarchic and egalitarian nature of many 
traditional societies, for instance the Nuer in Africa" (Heywood 1992: 
187). My use of this example is thus an extension of that tradition, 
although distinct from it in the two ways I noted in 1.6: 1 use the 
theoretical apparatus developed in the Toolkit section to describe the 
Nuer social form, and do not romanticise it. 
I focus on the Nuer in particular for two further reasons. First, 
the classic studies of EE Evans-Pritchard (1940,1940a, 1951 & 1956) 
both stand as a paradigm of anthropological investigation and 
instigated a prolonged engagement with the Nuer: 
1 There may, as Harris argues, be general causal relations between 
these different features, such that, for instance, groups of people 
making their living by plough-based agriculture tend to be both more 
sexist and more violent than those who rely on rice-paddies (ibid: 
328-31). 1 do not need to consider this debate for my purposes. 
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The enduring disciplinary fame of "the Nuer" of southern Sudan 
derives directly from the intellectual virtuosity of their original 
ethnographer, Sir Edward E Evans-Pritchard (1902-73)... Nearly 
all the great disciplinary debates that have emerged in recent 
decades have drawn at one time or another on the Nuer 
ethnographic corpus of Evans- Pritchard. Indeed, with the 
possible exception of the "Trobriand Islanders" made famous by 
Malinowski, "the Nuer" have been more widely cited, discussed, 
analyzed, and theorised about than any other "imagined 
community" within the anthropological discourse. (Hutchinson 
1996: 21) 
That there is therefore a great deal of material on the Nuer does not 
unambiguously mean that we know a great deal about them: 
Hutchinson goes on to argue that ""The cumulative effect of decades of 
secondary reanalyses of Evans- Pritchard's materials" (ibid) has been 
both to foster an illusion that the Nuer are "Somehow above history 
and beyond change" (ibid), and to perpetuate several false images of 
their social forM2 . However that there is such a mass of material at 
least means that we are likely to have correctives to one-sided and 
ideologically motivated accounts, which we might lack in the case of 
less studied people and social forms. 
Second: as I describe them in 11.1, the Nuer are not especially 
far towards the peaceful end of the variation I have noted in non- 
state social forms. Individual Nuer are fairly quick to use and to 
retaliate with violence. My argument is not just that some people are 
wonderfully peaceful, and that we would do well to emulate them. It 
is that even where people are not much given to being peaceable, the 
non-state tactics for conflict resolution I discover are still effective. 
The relatively violent Nuer life is therefore a good exemplary social 
form to use to make the argument. I do not want to give the 
impression that non-state conflict resolution depends on the unusual 
mildness of the people involved in it: even among fairly violent people 
like the Nuer, non-state conflict resolution works. This is a further 
distinction of my use from other anarchist uses of this example: 
2 For brief consideration of and references for the multiple 
reinterpretations of Eva ns- Pritchard's material, see Hutchinson (1996: 
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where they have typically used an account of the Nuer social form to 
display the possibility of peace in the absense of the state, I use one 
to display the possibility of conflict resolution in the face of ongoing 
violence. 
11.1 The Nuer: a sketch 
When EE Evans-Pritchard lived with and studied them in the 1930s, ' 
the Nuer were a group of perhaps two or three hundred thousand 
people 3 living around the Nile, in what was then the Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan, in East Africa. At that time, they were having to deal rapidly 
with invasion by British military forces and the consequent imposition 
of new administrative and political institutions, including for instance a 
colonial governor who argued that the Nuer: 
Are slow to appreciate the blessings of European civilization and 
the benefits arising from an ordered administration of their 
country. Although this outspoken self-consciousness was bound 
to lead to conflicts, it must be admitted that the personal 
qualities of the people that caused these conflicts are of a kind 
that ought to be cultivated and guided rather than blamed and 
suppressed. (Westermann 1970: v; first published 1931) 
Although Evans-Pritchard "Was profoundly aware of 'the colonial 
encounter' and was, in fact, part of it" (Hutchinson 1996: 30), he 
pays little attention to this aspect of contemporary Nuer life. Since 
then, the Nuer's way of life has been transformed and partly 
destroyed by government interference, trade, disease, and two 
Sudanese civil wars (ibid: Prologue). I do not attempt to give 
anything like a full account of the complexities of Nuer life here, but 
consider only enough of the material about them to provide an 
empirical example of effective conflict-resolution without the use of 
unequal power distributions. 
31-2); for some examples of that reinterpretation, the studies in 
Beidelman (1971). 
3 Although see Huffman 1970 for a higher estimate, and Hutchinson 
1996: 26 for argument that Evans- Pritchard's estimate may be too 
low. 
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The Nuer live(d) on savannah, which is parched and dry from 
December to June, and flooded from June to December. They 
husband cattle, fish, hunt, collect wild fruit and roots, and cultivate 
millet and maize. During the wet season, they live in villages of 
between fifty and several hundred people, on high ground, separated 
from other villages by between five and twenty miles of flooded 
grassland; during the dry season, in camps concentrated around 
permanent water-sources. Camps and villages involve partly but not 
entirely the same individuals living together: ""People who form 
separate village communities in the rains may unite in a common 
camp in the drought. Likewise, people from the same village may join 
different camps" (Evans- Pritchard 1940a: 275). The Nuer live in a 
general situation of scarcity. Famine is not uncommon, and there are 
few natural resources - no iron or good stone and very few trees - for 
toolmaking. 
Cattle and their husbandry have been particularly important to 
the Nuer. "According to Evans-Pritchard... the Nuer of the early 1930s 
were almost totally absorbed in the care, exchange, and sacrifice of 
their beloved cattle" (Hutchinson 1996: 59). Humans and cattle were 
involved in an "Intimate symbiosis of survival" (ibid). Cattle were not 
only the central metaphor for value, but were both "The principle 
means by which people created and affirmed enduring bonds amongst 
themselves as well as between themselves and divinity" (ibid) through 
a symbolic equation of cattle with people, and "An incessant topic of 
conversation among Nuer men and women" (ibid: 33). On her first 
field trip to the Sudan in 1979, Hutchinson found that this topic had 
largely been replaced in conversation by "National political issues, 
cabinet shake-ups, regional troop movements, and the Jonglei Canal 
scheme" (ibid). 
The significance of cattle has been transformed since the 1930s 
by Nuer involvement in state politics and especially monetary 
exchange, but not wholly lost. Hutchinson argues that, throughout the 
1980s and early 90s, Nuer were "'Actively grappling" with the 
relationship between cattle and money, and developing a "Unique 
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system of hybrid wealth categories... in order to facilitate movements 
of cattle and money between 'market' and "non-market' spheres of 
exchange while simultaneously affirming the existence of an 
axiological boundary between these spheres" (ibid: 50). Money has 
not passed the Nuer by, but neither has it effaced their earlier modes 
of exchange and understandings of value (see further ibid: chapter 2). 
The Nuer in the 1930s had no government, no long-standing 
inequalities of power, no police or tax collectors, and no leaders. 
The ordered anarchy in which they live accords well with their 
character, for it is impossible to live among Nuer and conceive of 
rulers ruling over them. The Nuer is a product of a hard and 
egalitarian upbringing, is deeply democratic,, and is easily roused 
to violence. His turbulent spirit finds any restraint irksome and 
no man recognizes a superior. Wealth makes no difference. A 
man with many cattle is envied, but not treated differently from 
a man with few cattle. Birth makes no difference. A man may not 
be a member of the dominant clan of his tribe, he may even be 
of Dinka descent, but were another to allude to the fact he would 
run a grave risk of being clubbed. That every Nuer considers 
himself as good as his neighbour is evident in their every 
movement. They strut about like lords of the earth, which, 
indeed, they consider themselves to be. There is no master and 
no servant in their society, but only equals who regard 
themselves as God's noblest creation... Among themselves even 
the suspicion of an order riles a man and he either does not 
carry it out or he carries it out in a casual and dilatory manner 
that is more insulting than a refusal. When a Nuer wants his 
fellows to do something he asks it as a favour to a kinsman, 
saying, 'Son of my mother, do so-and-so', or he includes himself 
in the command and says: "Let us depart', "Let the people return 
home', and so forth. In his daily relations to his fellows a man 
shows respect to his elders, to his 'fathers', and to certain 
persons of ritual status, within the circuit of his reference, so 
long as they do not infringe on his independence, but he will not 
submit to any authority which clashes with his own interests and 
he does not consider himself bound to obey any one. I was once 
discussing the [neighbouring] Shilluk with a Nuer who had 
visited their country, and he remarked, 'They have one big chief, 
but we have not. This chief can send for a man and demand a 
cow or he can cut a man's throat. Whoever saw a Nuer do such a 
thing? What Nuer ever came when some one sent for him or paid 
any one a cow? ' (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 181-2) 
Evans-Pritchard Is repeated use of 'man',, 'he" and 'his' in this passage 
is not accidental: he mostly spent his time with male, and in his terms 
A aristocratic', Nuer, and his account may therefore be distortedly 
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viricentric. Sharon Hutchinson makes it clear that being female 
allowed her access to interactions and social spaces which were closed 
to Evans-Pritchard; she is also very funny about the difficulties raised 
by her being ""An awkward cross between a woman and a girlff 
(Hutchinson 1996: 46) since she was married, but had no children. I 
briefly consider Nuer gender relations in a moment, but before that, I 
want to note two points. 
First: at least for some Nuer, sociability was egalitarian, anti- 
authoritarian, and potentially violent. Second: the Nuer's way of 
distributing power is not the result of the absence of other, 
inegalitarian tactics. In general, there is no simple state of nature on 
which more complex systems can be built (see 8.1.3). In particular, 
the Nuer's 'turbulent spirit' is a distinctive way of maintaining a 
(relatively) equal power distribution, further to the ways of 
distributing power I distinguished in 6.6. The Nuer are well aware of 
the possibility and danger of chiefs, and have tactics to resist such 
redistributions of power, including their attitudes to authority and 
especially to orders. Such tactics are widespread. Marvin Harris 
records a parallel example in the experience of Richard Lee: 
To please the ! Kung, [Lee] decided to buy a large ox and have it 
slaughtered as a present. After several days searching Bantu 
agricultural villages looking for the largest and fattest ox in the 
region, he acquired what appeared to be a perfect specimen. But 
his friends took him aside and assured him that he had been 
duped into buying an absolutely worthless animal. "Of course, 
we will eat it, " they said, "'but it won't fill us up - we will eat and 
go home to bed with stomachs rumbling. " But when Lee's ox was 
slaughtered, it turned out to be covered with a thick layer of fat. 
Later, his friends explained why they had said his gift was 
valueless, even though they knew better than he what lay under 
the animal's skin: "Yes, when a young man kills much meat he 
comes to think of himself as a chief or a big man, and he thinks 
of the rest of us as his servants or inferiors. We can't accept this, 
we refuse one who boasts, for someday his pride will make him 
kill somebody. So we always speak of his meat as worthless. 
This way we cool his heart and make him gentle. " (Harris 1989: 
345-6) 
I am not making the obviously false claim that such egalitarian tactics 
are always successful. My point is twofold: 1) egalitarian people are 
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typically aware of the possibility of other arrangements of power; and 
2) have tactics of distribution explicitly intended to maintain their 
situation of equal power. Now, back to gender equality. 
Nuer distinguish between men and women, especially as 
fathers and mothers; descent is reckoned on the male line; and males 
hold positions of responsibility and ritual status which are not usually 
open to women - although it is open to a woman who is unable to 
conceive children ""To become a social man, gather cattle, and marry 
a wife to produce children for her" (Hutchinson 1996: 61). Men and 
women have different roles in relation to husbandry and cultivation, 
to food preparation, to children, and to violence. However it is not 
clear to me to what extent these differences in roles translate into 
gender differences in power. Hutchinson traces the changing roles, 
metaphorical understandings, and reciprocal autonomies of Nuer men 
and women since the 1930s with considerable subtlety (ibid: chapter 
4). Her account cannot be taken as unambiguously supporting either 
the claim that women were or are systematically oppressed in Nuer 
social forms, or that they were or are not. Rather, she argues that the 
metaphors of blood, cattle and food, and the culturally legitimated 
demands and spheres of autonomy of men and women, of husbands 
and wives, and of fathers and mothers, have changed in complex and 
inter-related ways. I therefore leave the issue of gender equality as 
an admitted gap in my sketch of the Nuer. We certainly have no 
reason to claim that the Nuer's otherwise egalitarian social form 
requires or gives rise to gender inequality. 
Across these differences and complexities, Nuer social and 
political life significantly involves two interlinked but distinct forms of 
interaction: tribes and their subsections on the one hand, and kinship 
networks on the other. "There is no common political organisation or 
central administration" (Evans-Pritchard 1940a: 279), but Nuer 
nontheless relate to one another as members of various sorts of 
group, as well as individuals. 
Tribes are the largest groups in which "There is machinery for 
settling disputes and a moral obligation to conclude them sooner or 
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later" (ibid: 278), but their boundaries are not the limits of social and 
political interaction: 
People move freely all over Nuer-land and are unmolested if they 
have not incurred blood-guilt. They marry and, to a small extent, 
trade across tribal boundaries, and pay visits to kinsmen living 
outside their own tribe. Many social relations, which are not 
specifically political, link members of different tribes. (ibid: 279) 
Further, members of different tribes encounter one another in dry- 
season camps concentrated around scarce sources of water. 
Tribes are subdivided into what Evans-Pritchard calls primary, 
secondary and tertiary segments. These segments are concentric, so 
an individual might be a member, for instance, of the Cuak tertiary 
segment of the Nyapir secondary segement of the Jenyang primary 
segment of the Lak tribe (see the diagram in Evans-Pritchard 1940: 
141). An important characteristic of segmentary organisation is that 
how an individual characterises her membership is relative to the level 
of segment from which she is excluded in a particular context: 
A member of Z2 tertiary division of tribe B sees himself as a 
member of Z2 community is relation to Z', but he regards 
himself as a member of y2 and not of Z2 in relation to Y'. 
Likewise, he regards himself as a member of Y, and not of y2f in 
relation to X. He regards himself as a member of tribe B, and not 
of its primary section Y, in relation to tribe A. (Evans-Pritchard 
1940a: 281) 
So, again, my Cuak is a Cuak in relation to the Kar and Thiang 
tertiary sections, a Nyapir in relation to the Kudwop secondary 
section,, a Jenyang in relation to the Kwacbur primary section, and a 
Lak in relation to the Gawaar, Gaajak and other tribes. In situations of 
violent conflict, and of blood-feud after a murder in particular, this 
Cuak will join with other Cuaks against the Kar, when a Kar has killed 
a Cuak, but will join with other Nyapir, including the Kar, against the 
Kudwop when a Kudwop has killed a Nyapir. 
Thus, on a structural plane, there is always a contradiction in the 
definition of a political group, for a man is a member of it in 
virtue of his non-membership of other groups of the same type 
which he stands outside of, and he is likewise not a member of 
the same community in virtue of his membership of a segment 
of it which stands in opposition to its other segments... The 
outstanding structural characteristic of Nuer political groups is 
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their relativity. A tribal segment is a political group in relation to 
other segments of the same kind, and they jointly form a tribe 
only in relation to other Nuer tribes and to adjacent foreign 
tribes which form part of their political system, and without 
these relations very little meaning can be attached to the 
concepts of 'tribe' and 'tribal segment'. (ibid: 281-2) 
Tribal and segmentary groups "Are always changing in one direction 
or another" (ibid: 284). That is, the Nuer social form has tendencies 
both towards fission and towards fusion: "Although any group tends 
to split into opposed parts, these parts tend to fuse in relation to 
other groups... fission and fusion are two aspects of the same 
segmentary principle and the Nuer tribe and its divisions are to be 
understood as a relation between these two contradictory, yet 
complementary, tendencies" (ibid). 
The Nuer's other, interlinked but distinct form of interaction is 
the kinship system, which cuts across tribes and tribal segments. A 
clan is a segmented set of lineages comprising everyone descended, 
through the male line, from the founder of that line. It is worth noting 
that 'the male line' is not constituted by physical fatherhood, but by 
heirs legitimated by the payment of bride-cattle: ""Without access to 
cattle, a man could not legally acquire heirs - no matter how many 
children he sired" (Hutchinson 1996: 61); further, "'If a man died 
without heirs, his relatives were able - indeed obliged - to collect 
cattle and marry a 'ghost wife... in the name of the deceased to bear 
children for him" (ibid). As with tribal structure, lineage membership 
is relative: ""Two lineages which are equal and opposite are composite 
in relation to a third, so that a man is a member of a lineage in 
relation to a certain group and not a member of it in relation to a 
different group" (Evans-Pritchard 1940a: 285-6). 
Kinship is extremely important to the Nuer. They have a variety 
of obligations to their kin, especially the duty to avenge a death, and 
a complex system of prohibitions of incest, even between kin we 
would not regard as close. Kinship crosscuts tribal membership - "The 
same clans are found in different tribes" (ibid: 279) - but lineage and 
clan relations also provide a general idiom for social obligations and 
interaction, as well as a rich source of gossip. Kin and tribal affiliations 
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can clash, in particular by giving rise to conflicting duties. For 
instance, after a murder, "It is not clear what would happen if close 
agnates of the slayer were living in the village of the slain, in which 
case they would have loyalties to both sides" (Gough 1971: 86). 
Kinship can be fictional: Evans-Pritchard records that, ill and 
leaving the Nuer, he asked the people he had been living with to help 
carry his belongings to the river. They refused. When asked why, a 
young Nuer boy replied: 
You told them to carry your belongings to the river. That is why 
they refused. If you had asked them, saying, 'My mother's sons, 
assist me, they would not have refused. (Evans-Pritchard 1940: 
182). 
Nobody of course supposed that Evans-Pritchard was actually close 
kin, but kinship was still the right idiom for a request for help as for 
other interactions. 
Rights, privileges, and obligations are determined by kinship. 
Either a man is a kinsman, actually or by fiction, or he is a 
person to whom you have no reciprocal obligations. (ibid: 183) 
Like other features of Nuer sociability, kinship and the social idiom it 
provides have been changed, but like others, not wholly effaced, by 
involvement with states, money and war. 
The Nuer that Evans-Pritchard encountered were quick to use 
violence, both individually and collectively: "A Nuer will at once fight if 
he considers that he has been insulted, and they are very sensitive 
and easily take offence... From their earliest years children are 
encouraged by their elders to settle all disputes by fighting" (ibid: 
151); "Feuds frequently break out between sections of the same tribe 
and they are often of long duration" (Evans-Pritchard 1940a: 283); 
and "From the earliest times", but not continuously, ""The Nuer have 
been fighting [their neighbours] the Dinka and have been generally 
on the offensive"' (ibid: 280) in raids for cattle or captives. Hutchinson 
to some extent confirms this impression, recording for instance that 
many Nuer mothers "Consciously sought to inculcate the virtues of 
courage, self-assertion, and independence in their children" 
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(Hutchinson 1996: 168) and praised them for asserting themselves 
violently and for knowing how to fight. 
However despite this general, culturally approved tendency to 
initiate violence and to use it in revenge, the Nuer have (or had) 
systems of conflict-resolution which do not involve unequal power or 
hierarchy, and which relatively successfully prevent or limit violence. 
In the first place, although once a fight has begun between people of 
the same village, neither party can with honour give way, what 
generally happens is that ""People pull them away from each other, 
loudly protesting, and then stand between them" (Evans- Pritchard 
1940: 151). In the second place, kinship obligations and tribe or 
segment membership provide a system both of deterrence, because it 
is generally known that the kin or tribal associates of a murder victim 
will seek vengeance, and of limitation of involvement, because "The 
scope of direct vengeance is limited to small kinship groups and their 
efforts to exact it are not incessant" (ibid: 159). The duty of vengence 
is felt and acted on only by a limited number of people. 
In the third place, and most importantly here, there is a system 
of arbitration and arrangement of compensation. I now sketch it. 
11.2 Leopard-skin chiefs 
The term 'chief' is misleading about this system of arbitration, 
because leopard-skin chiefs do not have any general authority. The 
Nuer regard them as: 
Agents through which disputes of a certain kind can be settled 
and defilement of a certain kind can be effaced, and I have often 
heard remarks such as this: ""We took hold of them and gave 
them leopard skins and made them our chiefs to do the talking 
at sacrifices for homicide". (ibid: 170) 
Chiefs are ritual and social functionaries with specific roles, and those 
roles do not translate into any more general authority or to being the 
beneficiary of unequally distributed power: "The chiefs I have seen 
were treated in everyday life like other men and there is no means of 
telling that a man is a chief by observing people's behaviour to him" 
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(ibid: 176). Nor is a chief representative of any political grouping: "He 
in no way represents or symbolizes the unity and exclusiveness of 
political groups" (ibid). Nor does he gain material benefits from his 
position. Indeed being a chief is often costly, since their ritual 
activities involve giving or sacrificing cattle. Chiefs perform a 
mediative role in disputes: they pursuade parties in conflict to talk 
rather than fight; they offer but are unable to enforce a resolution; 
they build coalitions to support a return to peace; and they arrange 
and preside over compensation, usually in the form of a traditionally- 
specified number of cattle. A chief: 
Is simply a mediator in a specific social situation and his 
mediation is only successful because community ties are 
acknowledged by both parties and because they wish to avoid, 
for the time being at any rate, further hostilities... He is the 
machinery which enables groups to bring about a normal state of 
affairs when they desire to achieve this end. (ibid: 174-5) 
Mediation is not always successful, and is in general less so the more 
distant the parties to the dispute are in kinship or tribal relations. At 
the limit, no possibility of compensation, or therefore of mediation,, is 
recognised in disputes between tribes (although this statement may 
be less informative than it appears, since Evans-Pritchard partly 
defines tribal boundaries as the limit of the possibility of mediation). 
(Evans-Pritchard 1940: chapter 4; Evans-Pritchard 1940a: section V; 
Greuel 1971. ) 
11.3 Primitivism, again 
In 11.1 & 11.2 1 have sketched some of the features of Nuer 
sociability over the period from the 1930s, when EE Evans-Pritchard 
lived with them, to the 1980s and "90s, when Sharon Hutchinson did. 
I have not covered anything like the full complexity of Nuer life: I 
have not, for instance, said much about gender relations, except to 
leave their equality or lack of it as an admitted absence in my 
account. I have gestured towards, but said little about, the changes 
that the Nuer's encounter with state power, money and warfare have 
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brought about. And I have said nothing about Nuer religious practices, 
or about the repeated phenomenon of religious revivals led by 
prophets (on which see Beidelman 1971a; Evans-Pritchard 1956; 
Hutchinson 1996: chapter 7). 
However even what little I have said should be enough to show 
that the Nuer are not 'primitive' in one of the senses of that term: 
they live complex lives in a complex and fluid social form. In the case 
of the Nuer, and I suggest in general, Ernest Gellner's claim that 
"What defines a segmentary society is not that [segmentary 
organisation] occurs, but that this is very nearly all that occurs"' 
(Gellner 1969: 42) is manifestly false. 
Whether or not the Nuer are "primitives" (ignoring for the 
moment my argument in 8.1 that there are no "primitive' societies), 
my argument here is not primitivism. 
I have not used the Nuer to display some uncorrupted human 
nature (in the primitivist mode defined in chapter 3). They are, as 
sketched in 11.1 & 11.2, as richly and distinctively aculturated as 
anyone else. And even if they did display fundamental human nature, 
we could not regard it as wholly good: as I have emphasised, the 
Nuer are fairly violent. 
I have not presented the Nuer social form as a relic of some 
past golden age: according to my sketch, the Nuer, like the rest of us, 
are a group of people making a living and pursuing their other 
interests in a historically and environmentally conditioned but not 
determined way. And, for as long as western anthropologists have 
known anything about them, the Nuer have been greatly affected by 
their encounter with capitalist nation-states. 
I am not recommending return to a Nuer-like social form, for at 
least two reasons. First, it has some fairly unappealing features: I am 
not recommending abandoning the complex and industrially based 
technology we enjoy, and which the Nuer used to lack (at least in part 
because they also lacked the the raw materials to make or support 
it); nor am I praising the Nuer's propensities for violence. Second, the 
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idea of a 'return' to this way of living is obscure: for whom would it be 
a return? Certainly not me. 
As with Kropotkin and Godwin (chapter 3), the question is, 
What am I doing argumentatively with this material?, and the answer 
is that I am not performing a primitivist argument. I am using the 
example of the Nuer to display some human capacities for living 
together and especially for conflict-resolution. The range of human 
social possibility includes systems of equal or fairly equal power 
networks, without institutionalised inequalities of power, in which 
violence is limited and conflict is often resolved. 
11.4 Morals 
I have given one example of humans living together and resolving 
conflict, without (institutionalised) inequalities of power, and despite 
culturally sanctioned tendencies towards individual and collective 
violence. The Nuer create sufficient power to satisfy their interests., 
which they share with most other humans, in food, shelter,, company, 
continued life,, the respect of peers, and the absence, or at least the 
limitation and resolution, of violent conflict. They further create 
capacities for complex social interaction, ritual performance, 
storytelling, and investigation of the world around them. But they do 
not distribute power in the radically unequal, institutionalised way 
that some other humans, including us, have done. They mutually 
organise conflict-resolution by assigning the task of mediation to ritual 
and coalition-forming specialists known as leopard-skin chiefs, and 
thereby succeed for the most part in living in "ordered anarchy. They 
have also been socially creative and plastic in their responses to, and 
appropriation of some elements of, other social forms. 
The Nuer are not the only example of successful life in the 
absence of inequalities of power and of institutions benefitting from 
that inequality, and using their power to limit and resolve, or to create 
and direct, violent conflict. Other examples of the effectiveness of 
similar strategies of mediation can be found in Barclay (1982) and 
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Middleton & Tate (1958). In general, mediation without unequal 
power is a common way of resolving conflict. Mediation: 
Is a kind of non -govern menta I system of dispute settlement 
which one finds widely dispersed throughout the world... That it 
is so common and widespread may indicate that it has proven a 
most successful mechanism for maintaining peace. (Barclay 
1982: 47-8) 
Other tactics are also available: see, for instance, Ernest Gellner's 
description of trial by collective oath among Berber tribes (Gellner 
1974). 
Humans can live together and create and distribute power in a 
wide variety of ways. The range of human social possibility includes 
(pristine or modern) states and slavery, but it also includes situations 
of (much more) equally distributed power, in which peace is relatively 
successfully maintained by tactics including mediation. It is often 
thought that if we do not distribute power in favour of institutions to 
maintain peace or stability, we will be unable to live in any way 
except a chaotic war of each against all. But this claim is empirically 
false: humans are capable of creating, maintaining and living in 
ordered, egalitarian and relatively peaceful social forms. 
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12 * Spanish Civil War Anarchism 
Anarchism in the Spanish civil war is a classic anarchist example and 
locus of debate: no anarchist or historian of anarchism since has been 
able to ignore it, or the problems and arguments it raises. Examples 
of this engagement include Bookchin (1998), Guerin (1970: chapter 
3), Harper (1987: chapters 6& 8), Joll (1979: chapter 9), Marshall 
(1993: chapter 29), Richards (1983), Skirda (2002: chapter 17) and 
Woodcock (1963: chapter 12). As with my discussion of the Nuer in 
chapter 11, my engagement with this example is thus an extension of 
the anarchist tradition; however, as with that discussion,, it is 
distinctive in making use of my theoretical apparatus, and in avoiding 
the tendency to romanticise the case (see 1.6). 
I do not intend to intervene in, still less resolve, all of the 
disagreements among anarchists or others about the civil war. I do 
not, for instance,, consider the ongoing debate about the propriety of 
the involvement of anarchist trade-unionists in the Spanish republican 
government (on which see, for instance, Guerin 1970: 128-30). Nor 
do I involve myself in the bitter argument about atrocities committed 
by both sides (see,, for instance, Preston 1996: 88-91). In line with 
my general minimalist strategy, I invoke only enough information and 
make only as much argument as is necessary for my particular 
purposes. But before sketching the civil war and the anarchist social 
experiments it provoked or allowed, I need to refute one influential 
false image of Spanish anarchism. 
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12.1 Primitive rebels? 
There is an image of specifically Spanish anarchism, sometimes 
illegitimately extended to other anarchisms, which pictures it as a 
%primitive' social movement. This is potentially another kind of 
accusation of primitivism (see chapter 3): if Spanish anarchists were 
'primitive', and other anarchists admire and seek to emulate them, 
then anarchists are primitivists. I now consider this accusation in 
detail, and argue that it falls at the first hurdle: Spanish anarchism 
was not a "primitive' social movement. 
Spanish anarchists have often been compared to medieval 
millennialists. Hugh Thomas, for instance, describes the "Regime" in 
Castro del Rio, in the early part of the Spanish civil war, as 
"Comparable to that of the anabaptists of MOnster of 1530,, all private 
exchange of goods being banned, the village bar closed, the 
inhabitants realising the long-desired abolition of coffee" (Thomas 
1990: 306)'. Similar analogies are made by James loll (1979), by 
Gerald Brenan (2000; first published 1943), and,, most importantly 
here, by Eric Hobsbawm (1971). For a careful history of the millennial 
analogy, as applied to nineteenth-century Andalusian anarchists in 
particular, see Kaplan (1977: chapter 8). 
Where the analogy between anarchists and millennialists is 
made as a descriptive conceit or as an attempt at illumination by 
comparison, it is unproblematic. It is of obvious historical and human 
interest to note the similarities in activity and aspiration between such 
widely-sepa rated phenomena. Ascetic ideals of purification exercised 
both fifteenth -ce ntu ry peasant chiliasts and twentieth-century peasant 
anarchists, and both expected radical change, even reversal, of the 
order of the world. They are not alone: many radicals have hoped or 
expected that the world would be turned upside down (see for 
' It is perhaps worth noting that Thomas' book has long been "'The 
standard work on the Spanish Civil War"" (Carr 1971: 257), but that 
he, and it, have been attacked by anarchists on both historical and 
political grounds (see for instance Richards 1975). 1 do not involve 
myself in this debate. 
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instance Hill 1975). That said,, we need also to recognise the striking 
differences between anarchists and millennialists. The latter 
characteristically expect that the transformation of the world is to be 
"Miraculous, in the sense that it is to be accomplished by, or with the 
help of, supernatural agencies" (Cohn 1970: 13), and regard the role 
of the righteous group as being: 
To gather together, to prepare itself, to watch the signs of the 
coming doom,, to listen to the prophets who predict the coming 
of the great day, and perhaps to undertake certain ritual 
measures against the moment of decision and change, or to 
purify themselves, shedding the dross of the bad world of the 
present so as to be able to enter the new world in shining purity. 
(Hobsbawm 1971: 58) 
The Spanish anarchists, in contrast and like other revolutionary 
groups, regarded their role as being to bring about the great 
transformation themselves, particularly through egalitarian 
organisation, struggle, and often the tactic of the general strike. 
Further, while we can compare the social and economic 
circumstances of the southern Spanish peasantry and the medieval 
peasants who were often the core of millennial movements, we need 
to recognise that Spanish anarchism was also an urban phenomenon, 
especially in (comparatively) wealthy, industrialised Barcelona. Daniel 
Guerin is particularly concerned, indeed, to show Spanish anarchism 
as a tense "Symbiosis" (Guerin 1970: 119) between two tendencies: 
one rural, southern, Kropotkinite and nostalgic for a mythologised 
traditional "Free commune" (ibid); the other industrial, northern, 
syndicalist, Bakuninite and "'More realistic,, more concerned with the 
present than with the golden age" (ibid: 120). 
The analogy between millennialism and Spanish anarchism is 
often intended not just to be descriptive, but to form the basis of a 
genealogy. If the ideologies and activities of the two are similar, it 
might be that millennialism is an ancestor of anarchism. This historical 
hypothesis, and the research intended to test it, are also 
unproblematic. But clearly, more than an analogy will be needed to 
support any such genealogical claim. Specific evidence of the 
transformation of millennial into anarchist groups, activity and 
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ideology is required. We will need to recognise that, although 
anarchism may have roots in millennial movements, it has other roots 
too. Spanish anarchism began most obviously in, first, the 
Proudhonian political theory of Fransisco Pi y Margall, and second, the 
arrival of Giuseppe Fanelli, a disciple of Bakunin,, in Madrid in 1868 
(Bookchin 1998: chapter 1). Before the civil war, it has a sixty-year 
history of debate, polemic, and often -cla ndesti ne organisation (on 
which see Nettlau 1996: chapter 13). The history of Spanish 
anarchism is a part of the history of nineteenth-century European 
socialism and Spanish politics as much as it is part of the suggested 
transformation of millennialism. 
The detail of these specifically historical debates is outside the 
scope of this section; for a recent review, see Esenwein (1989). My 
points are: 1) that while there are analogies to be made between 
millennial and Spanish anarchist movements, and while it is possible 
that anarchism is partly descended from millennialism, this is far from 
being the whole story; and 2) that neither of these historical claims, 
even if true, in themselves support the characterisation of Spanish 
anarchism as "primitive, nor therefore of anarchists enthused by it as 
primitivists. 
More than analogy or genealogy will be needed characterise 
Spanish anarchism as "primitive". The argument requires some 
structure in which millennial and revolutionary movements can be 
placed on a progressive scale from simple, undeveloped, 'primitive' or 
embryonic, to complex, developed, modern or fully grown. Gerald 
Brenan (2000) implies such a stucture in his influential suggestion 
that Spanish anarchism was a millennial heresy of the kind which took 
place in the rest of Europe in the late middle ages, but which was 
delayed in Spain by the power of the Church and especially the 
Inquisition. For this claim to be meaningful, we need to assume that 
millennia[ heresy is somehow a necessary stage in the 'growth' of a 
discrete society. This biological metaphor - speaking of societies as if 
they were distinct creatures, and needed to endure millennialism as 
humans need to endure puberty - allows Brenan to present Spanish 
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society between the late middle ages and the nineteenth century as 
neotenous, and Spanish anarchism as a phase that Spain had to 
endure to gain adulthood or modernity. 
Brenan's progressive scale is largely implicit, and his picture of 
Spanish anarchism as delayed heresy is more metaphor than 
metaphysics. But he directly inspired Eric Hobsbawm's 'primitive 
rebels' thesis (Hobsbawm 1971), in which the historical metaphysic is 
explicit and polemical (for Hobsbawm's debt to Brenan,, see ibid: 74). 
I now consider this account of Spanish anarchism as 'primitive' in 
detail. 
Primitive Rebels is a series of studies rather than a continuous 
narrative. But these studies of mafia in Sicily, Lazzarettists in Spain, 
and others, are contextualised and linked by a metaphysic of 
progression. The three major types of 'primitive rebellion' which 
Hobsbawm recognises - social banditry, mafias, and millenarian 
movements - are part of what he calls "'A chain of historical evolution" 
(ibid: 4). All three are "Archaic" or ""Primitive" (ibid: 1 and passim), 
but unlike "What are normally thought of as "primitive' societies", they 
"All have considerable historical evolution behind them, for they 
belong to a world which has long known the State... class 
differentiation and exploitation... and even cities" (ibid: 3). 
Hobsbawm's historical metaphysic has three stages: true 
primitiveness, where society is governed by "Kinship or tribal 
solidarity... whether or not combined with territorial links" (ibid); 
modern society; and, between them, the transitional stage which is 
his subject. The people involved in this last pre-modern stage are 
""Pre-political people who have not yet found, or only begun to find, a 
specific language in which to express their aspirations about the 
world", and "'Their movements are thus in many respects blind and 
groping, by the standards of modern ones" (ibid). In asserting this 
metaphysic, Hobsbawm makes frequent use of the same biological 
metaphors as Brenan: mafla, for instance, are "A sort of embryo"' of 
"More highly developed movements" (ibid: 30). 
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So, Hobsbawm's account of Spanish anarchists and other 
primitive' movements is a cultural evolutionary story of the kind I 
described and criticised in 8.1.2. There, I characterised such stories 
as involving the association of five ideas or research plans: an 
ambition to describe and explain human social change at a high level 
of generality; a typology of human social forms; a linear scale of 
height, civilisation, evolution or complexity; unilinealism; and 
metaphors of organic growth. Although Hobsbawm's story is confined 
to revolutionary movements in western and southern Europe, rather 
than encompassing the whole of human social life, it displays: an 
ambition to describe and explain their development at a fairly high 
level of generality; a typology of revolutionary forms; a linear scale of 
of evolution from simple to complex; and metaphors of organic 
growth. It is unclear to what extent Hobsbawm is a unilinealist. It 
appears, then, that my reasons for not adopting such stories or plans 
could apply to Hobsbawm's account. I consider this possibility further 
in a moment, but first, I say something about how Hobsbawm places 
Spanish anarchism on his scale. 
The Spanish anarchists find their place on Hobsbawm's scale as 
millennialists. For Hobsbawm, millennialism, ""Of all the primitive 
social movements... is the one least handicapped by its primitiveness. 111 
(ibid: 57), because it is on the cusp of "modernity. Millennialists share 
with modern revolutionary movements the desire, not merely to 
correct particular injustices, but to overthrow and replace the whole 
present world. The differences are only that: 1) unlike millennialists, 
modern movements ""Have - implicitly or explicitly - certain fairly 
definite ideas on how the old society is to be replaced by the new, the 
most crucial of which concerns what we may call the 'transfer of 
power"' (ibid: 58); and 2) millennialists lack a precise language in 
which to express their claims and grievances. The Spanish anarchists 
""Show millenarianism wholly divorced from traditional religious forms" 
(ibid: 65), but still lack such definite ideas and precise expression, 
which are to be provided by modern and especially socialist 
revolutionary movements, and are therefore, only just, 'primitive. 
218 
In order for anarchists to be given their place on this scale, at 
least one of 1 and 2 must be true: the Spanish anarchists lacked 
definite ideas about the transfer of power, or appropriate language in 
which to express their aspirations. But,, first, it is not true that the 
Spanish anarchists lacked definite ideas about the transfer of power. 
They were involved in a lively debate, through publication and 
conference, throughout the sixty years before the civil war, precisely 
about revolutionary tactics. These debates have been exhaustively 
recorded by Max Nettlau (1996), and many of the pamphlets and 
periodicals in which they were carried out are still extant. The 
eventual consensus about tactics was such that, as I discuss in 12.3, 
the transfer of power was accomplished in similar ways all over the 
Republican sector of Spain in the early part of the civil war. The first 
argument for characterising Spanish anarchists as 'primitive' fails. 
Hobsbawm's second argument is that the anarchists lacked the 
proper vocabulary to express their aspirations. The claim is that 
millennial Spanish anarchists shared the aspirations of modern 
socialist revolutionary movements, but, lacking the proper mode of 
expression, cloaked themselves in mystical and pseudo- religious 
language instead. Millennialists can "Readily exchange the primitive 
costume in which they dress their aspirations for the modern costume 
of socialist and communist politics" (Hobsbawm 1971: 64), but the 
Spanish anarchists failed to find the right wardrobe. Hobsbawm is not 
the only commentator to make such claims about costume. Josef 
Macek, for instance, writes of the Hussite heresy that "The dim vision 
of a classless society, disguised in biblical vestments, which arose 
before the eyes of the Taborite brothers and sisters in 1420, reflected 
the yearnings of the serfs and the poor" (Macek 1965: 34). Some 
Spanish anarchists did use religious language, although with more 
self-consciousness than Hobsbawm implies: 
Anarchist writers and orators... were not averse to using religious 
imagery and developing a prophetic rhetorical style, often 
employing the apostolic message as a guide or a point of 
contrast. At times in conversation the name of God might be 
invoked, but only to symbolise a common though 
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incomprehensible creation and a shared heritage that calls for 
unity and equality among men. (Mintz 1982: 4) 
This does not show that they wanted to say something else, still less 
that they would have said what a 'modern socialist' would say, had 
they possessed the vocabulary. Indeed it is difficult to imagine what 
kind of evidence could be provided to support a claim that any 
historical actor was trying, and failing, to say something other than 
what she actually said. The second argument for characterising 
Spanish anarchism as 'primitive' is at best unsupported. 
Hobsbawm's account of Spanish anarchism misrepresents it, 
and should therefore be rejected. But, to return to the issue of 
cultural evolutionary stories, do we also have reason to reject the 
progressive scale as a whole? Recall that in 8.1.2,1 asserted only the 
fairly weak claim that we should not use such stories for my anarchist 
and comparative purposes. So, since Hobsbawm's purposes are 
different, I cannot reject his scale for the reasons given there. This 
point implies the question, What are Hobsbawm's purposes?, and I 
now consider it. 
Hobsbawm's purposes in asserting his historical metaphysic 
may simply be to do with the fact that Primitive Rebels introduced a 
new topic into historical conversation. As Hobsbawm characterises it, 
historical work on revolutionary movements before Primitive Rebels 
had concentrated, first, on ""Ancient and medieval" revolutionaries, 
and, second, on modern "Labour and socialist" ones (Hobsbawm 
1971: 1; 2). His subjects had been regarded by "Older historians" as 
""Marginal or unimportant phenomena" (ibid: 2). So, the metaphysic 
may be intended to contextualise those subjects in relation to more 
well-known and 'respectable' issues. It may further be a way of 
justifying taking an interest in such apparently marginal figures, 
analogously to James Joll's justification of his interest in anarchism on 
the grounds that "The study of failure can often be as instructive and 
rewarding as the study of success" (Joll 1979: viii). 
However,, I suggest that there is a further implicit purpose in 
Hobsbawm's characterisation of anarchism as 'primitive'. Hobsbawm 
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ends his consideration of Spanish anarchism with the claim that "The 
history of anarchism, almost alone among modern social movements, 
is one of unrelieved failure; and unless some unforseen historical 
changes occur, it is likely to go down in the books with the 
Anabaptists and the rest of the prophets who, though not unarmed, 
did not know what to do with their arms, and were defeated for ever" 
(Hobsbawm 1971: 92). He uses the same analysis to support his later 
judgement that ""The revival of interest in anarchism today seems... 
unexpected, surprising, and - if I am to speak frankly - unjustified" 
(Hobsbawm 1999b: 100). In both cases, Hobsbawm feels free to 
extend (dubious) conclusions about Spanish peasant anarchism to 
anarchism in general. Marx and Engels used their idea of utopian 
socialism to legitimate their, and their theories', hegemony in socialist 
politics (see further 13.1.2); Josef Macek's claims about the Hussites 
were an appropriation of a Czech cultural myth as support for 
communist power in mid -twentieth -century Czechoslovakia. 
Hobsbawm similarly makes a political move: by characterising 
anarchism as blind, groping, misclothed and 'primitive', and by 
presenting modern parliamentary and Marxist socialism as the 
culmination of earlier, obsolete movements, he polemically supports 
his own politics. We therefore have good reason to reject, or at least 
to be suspicious of, the whole metaphysical structure. 
Hobsbawm perhaps misrepresents the complexity and historical 
fragmentation of revolutions and revolutionary movements (on which 
see, for instance, Parker 1999) for political reasons; he certainly 
misrepresents Spanish anarchism and therefore anarchism in general. 
The labels "primitive' and 'millennialist' ""Stamp anarchist goals as 
unrealistic and unattainable" (Mintz 1982: 5), but they are inaccurate. 
The primitive rebels thesis should be rejected. 
Now that I have removed this influential image of Spanish 
anarchism, I can go on to sketch the Spanish civil war in general. 
221 
12.2 The Spanish civil war: a sketch 
The background of Spain"s civil war is the long struggle and vacillation 
between "The forces of reform and reaction which had dominated 
Spanish history since 1808" (Preston 1996: 10) in the persons of 
republicans, liberals, communists, monarchists, the army, and pro- 
and anti-clericals. It is grounded in this instability and in the culture of 
political violence which went with it. The specifically anarchist 
background partakes of this culture and history, and further fuses 
several other influences, from both within and outside Spain. First, 
the Spanish tradition and myth of village democracy and collective 
self-management in the patria chica. Second,, in many regions and 
especially in Catalonia, a tradition of localist resistance to the 
centralising tendencies of Castille. Third, a tradition of peasant anti- 
clericalism. Fourth, from outside Spain, the influences of Proudhon, 
Kropotkin, and especially Bakunin, whose doctrines were spread by 
apostolic anarchists travelling rural Spain from the late 1860s 
onwards, leaving behind them groups of vegetarians,, teetotallers, and 
anarchist revolutionaries. Fifth, a sixty-year history of trade-union and 
conspiratorial organisation and polemical publication. Sixth, after 
1917, the glorious inspiration of the Russian revolution, even if the 
image of it was unrealistic. 
In February 1936, the latest of many vacillations of power 
produced a left-wing 'Popular Front' government supported by 
anarchists, socialists and communists. In July, an attempted right- 
wing military coup under General Franco and others sparked popular 
resistance. That resistance was organised not by the republican 
government, but by anarchist and communist organisations (the CNT, 
FAI,, UGT, pSUC, pOUM2 and others). Spain was divided into 
2 CNT: ConfederaciOn Nacional del Trabajo; anarcho-syndicalist. FAI: 
FederaciOn Anarquista Iberica; militant anarchist. UGT: Union General 
de Trabajadores; socialist. PSUC: Partit Socialista Unificat de 
Catalunya; Comintern-affiliated communist; POUM: Partido Obrero de 
Unificacion Marxista; dissident or Trotskyite communist. See Fraser 
(1981: 11-12). 
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republican or loyalist or socialist or revolutionary against nationalist or 
Christian or fascist sectors (in each case, the description depends on 
who is asked). The first was concentrated in the east,, around 
Catalonia, and in the south, around Andalusia. The second, in the 
west and north. The civil war was initially fought at their boundaries, 
for instance at the front moving back and forth near Saragossa in 
Aragon, before the nationalists won in the east and then the south. 
(Bookchin 1998; Preston 1996; Thomas 1990. Maps can be found in 
Fraser 1981: 16-23. ) 
The war can usefully be divided, following George Woodcock, 
into two general periods. First,, from 1936 to early 1937, a "Dynamic 
period" (Woodcock 1963: 365). During this period the CNT and FAI 
were among the most active and influential organisations in Spain. 
They thought and organised in terms of general strikes, insurrection 
and street-fighting, workers' self- management, and collectivisation of 
land and industry. In alliance with other socialist unions and parties, 
they resisted the Generals' uprising in many areas, and their 
successes gave rise to a brief flourishing of free communal 
organisation. Factories and services were collectivised. The eye- 
witnesses George Orwell and Franz Borkenau both testify, for 
instance, to the success of worker-managed industry in Barcelona 
(Orwell 2001; Borkenau 1986). Farming land was taken over by 
village communes. I consider these organisational successes further in 
12.3. 
The second phase of the war was inaugurated or at least 
signalled by the street-fighting between Republican government 
troops and CNT and POUM militias in Barcelona, in May 1937. The 
CNT and other libertarian movements thereafter "Declined both in 
influence and drive as centralization in military and administrative 
affairs successfully brought the loyalist regions of Spain under the 
control of the republican government" (Woodcock 1963: 365). The 
situation changed from popular resistance to a military attempt to 
seize power, to a modern total war, and the anarchists were ill-fitted 
for it. The republican government, under the influence of the 
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Comintern-affiliated PSUC and with the material support of Stalin's 
USSR, centralised and militarised the anti-nationalist effort. Militia and 
radical leaders were arrested and in some cases, for instance that of 
Andres Nin, murdered. The 'People's Army, regularised with a 
hierarchy of officers and differential rates of pay, and armed by the 
USSR, took over the conduct of the war from the rag-tag egalitarian 
militias (Alexander 1999: chapter 9). And lost. "1936: the 'People in 
Arms' won the revolution. 1939: the 'People's Army' lost the war" 
(Richards 1983: back cover). 
The nationalists,, in the mean time, were getting military 
support from Italy and from Nazi Germany, particularly in the form of 
the 'Condor Legion': some 16,000 men over the course of the war, 
with tanks, anti-aircraft guns and fighter-bomber aircraft (Thomas 
1990: appendix 7). 
The anarchists in the Spanish civil war achieved more than any 
other anarchist movement, certainly in the twentieth century, perhaps 
ever. Nonetheless, they failed. The civil war killed perhaps 500,000 
people, and Spain ended it with a reactionary or fascist dictatorship 
which lasted until Franco's death in 1975. Perhaps that outcome can 
be blamed on the republican government and its Soviet allies, but the 
anarchists did not prevent it, and their social innovations and 
successes were short-lived (for further consideration of how far the 
communists were to blame for the nationalist victory, see for instance 
Alexander 1999; Bolloten 1968; Goldman 1983: section 5). The 
Spanish anarchists, in the judgement of both Woodcock (1963) and 
Guerin (1970), were failures at war; their success, even if a fleeting 
one, was in their creative egalitarian organisation. I now consider that 
success. 
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12.3 Anarchic organisation 
"The military insurrection of July 1936 not only destroyed the political 
edifice of the Second Republic but also, in most of the areas where it 
proved possible to maintain opposition to the rebellion, led to the re- 
ordering of an entire society" (Kelsey 1986: 60). Anarchic and other 
egalitarian organisation in Spain was improvised, socially eclectic and 
various: each one of these experiments "Would deserve a book to 
itself" (Skirda 2002: 161). 1 artificially divide this range into three 
types: military (12.3.1), urban (12.3.2) and rural (12.3.3) 
organisation. I make this division for convenience, and do not intend 
to suggest that any of the three categories was monolithic. 
The anarchic and social-revolutionary currents of Spain's civil 
war have been downplayed, and in some cases completely ignored, by 
non-anarchist historians and commentators. The reasons for this 
absence are various, but include at least that several of the major 
players in the conflict had their own reasons for not presenting the 
social experiments in the republican zone as anarchic or 
revolutionary. The republican government hoped for help from 
western powers, and did not want to frighten them off with the ideas 
of anarchy or revolution. Stalin, and therefore the Comintern-affiliated 
communists in the government, wanted to draw those western powers 
into Spain and into conflict with Nazi Germany, and thereby shift 
Hitler's attention away from the east. They therefore shared the 
republicans' desire to present the civil war as a liberal regime 
threatened by a military coup, not a revolution. Much of the local and 
international support for Franco's rebels was Catholic, and they 
therefore had reason to present themselves as crusaders against 
Godless Soviet communism, in line with the contemporary church's 
attacks on ""Russia and Moscow and Communism with all their 
blasphemous and anti-democratic tyranny" (Edward Lodge Curran, 
quoted in Alexander 1999: xxiv). Robert Alexander further suggests 
that ""Had the Rebels drawn an accurate picture of the taking over of 
factories and other enterprises by their workers, and of the land by 
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the peasants, this would certainly have had the effect of sowing 
discontent behind their own lines" (Alexander 1999: xxiv). After their 
victory, the rebels continued to present themselves as crusaders 
against communism, and went to great lengths to manipulate and 
control the historical record, to maintain that presentation (Preston 
1994). 
It may further be the case, as Noam Chomsky (1988) argues, 
that liberal and Bolshevik-communist intellectuals share an elitist 
ideology which leads to a characteristic ""Antagonism to mass 
movements and to social change that escapes the control of privileged 
elites" (Chomsky 1988: 84-5), and therefore to a tendency to 
marginalise such movements. 
12.3.1 Military organisation 
The egalitarian militias were not successful in war. But this does not 
mean that we know why, nor that we can attribute that lack of 
success to their organisational form, nor therefore that we can 
dismiss them. It was, after all, a regular, hierarchical army that 
eventually lost to Franco's nationalists. 
Anarchist involvement in the actual fighting of the civil war is 
perhaps the element of Spanish anarchism most downplayed by 
historians. Nonetheless, and thanks in particular to the work of Robert 
Alexander (1999), we can say something about it. 
After the initial, improvised and partly successful response to 
the Generals' uprising, militias were rapidly organised, not by the 
government but by the General Council of Anti-fascist Militia, '"In 
which the anarchists were the overwhelmingly dominant element" 
(Alexander 1999: 158), and by various left-wing parties and trade- 
unions including the CNT, UGT, PSUC and POUM. The first of them 
was the famous Durrutti column, raised in Barcelona on July 24 th 
1936. 
Organised by different groups as they were,, the militias varied 
considerably in their constitution, organisation, size, and amount and 
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quality of equipment. However we can make some genera lisations. 
First, the vast majority of the recruits were militarily inexperienced. 
Second, militia columns often took one of two forms: anarchist and 
communist. 
According to Burnett Bolloten (who was no fan of anarchism), 
the anarchist militias were egalitarian, non-hierarchical, and 
democratic. They had: 
No military titles, badges, or distinctions in the way of food, 
clothing, and quarters... The basic unit was the group, composed 
generally of ten men; each group elected a delegate, whose 
functions were somewhat akin to those of a non-com missioned 
officer of the lowest rank, but without the equivalent authority. 
Ten groups formed a century which also elected its own 
delegate, and any number of centuries made up a columna, or 
"column, " at whose head stood a committee of war. This 
committee was likewise elective and was divided into various 
sections in accordance with the needs of the column. The 
gradation into group and century delegates and a committee of 
war did not imply the existence of any permanent staff with 
special privileges since all delegates could be removed as soon 
as they failed to reflect the wishes of the men who had elected 
them. "'The first impression one gets, " ran a CNT-FAI account, "is 
the total absence of hierarchy... There is no one giving orders by 
authority. " Nevertheless, duties had to be assigned, and in such 
a way as to avoid friction. In the Anarchist Iron Column, for 
example, lots were drawn by the militiamen to decide on who 
should stand guard at night and who in the early morning. 
(Bolloten 1968: 216-7; Orwell 2001 largely confirms this 
description) 
That is, the anarchist militias were equal-power social networks. The 
communist militias, in contrast, adopted a semi-military, hierarchical 
organisation based on party discipline and Bolshevik tactics. As a 
result, they "Attracted many of the regular [army] officers who 
remained loyal to the Republic, many of whom were appalled at what 
they conceived (by no means entirely correctly) as indiscipline 
bordering on chaos in many of the militia units" (Alexander 1999: 
152). 
Accounts of anarchist militias have tended to emphasise their 
'indiscipline'. It is true that the apparent need for military discipline, if 
they were effectively to fight the nationalist army, raised a problem 
for and tensions within the anarchist movement: 
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If this problem beset all the militia units, whatever their 
ideology, it was only in those formed by the Libertarian 
movement that its solution encountered a philosophical 
impediment, for the liberty of the individual is the very core of 
Anarchism and nothing is so antipodal to its nature as 
submission to authority. "'Discipline is obedience to authority; 
Anarchism recognizes no authority., " said La Revista Blanca, the 
leading anarchist journal, in an issue published before the civil 
war [22 nd June 1934]. (Bolloten 1968: 216) 
But it is not true, as has sometimes been claimed, that this problem 
was insoluble in anarchist terms. In the first place, many anarchists 
decided that the compromise acceptance of some military discipline 
and hierarchy was a necessary sacrifice, and rapidly put it into 
practice, although they often retained general assemblies of soldiers 
existing in parallel to the orthodox military hierarchy, at least for a 
time (Alexander 1999: 150-1; 169). 
In the second place, and more importantly here, anarchist 
militias solved the problem by re-understanding 'discipline: "'The 
anarchists had a different concept of discipline than that of the 
Communists or professional military officers" (ibid: 167-8). If by 
discipline is meant military courtesy and rigid hierarchy - saluting, 
uniforms, deep divisions between officers and ordinary soldiers, 
differential rates of pay, orders obeyed without question - then the 
anarchists certainly lacked it. But "'If by discipline is meant a 
willingness to go into battle when told to do so, or when volunteers 
were asked for, the anarchist troops had discipline as good as or 
better than that of any other elements in the Republican army" (ibid: 
169, paraphrasing Ricardo Sanz, commander of the Durrutti column 
after Durutti's death). If by discipline is meant the ability to 
coordinate military actions, the anarchist and other egalitarian militias 
were disciplined. According to George Orwell: 
A newly raised draft of militia was an undisciplined mob not 
because the officers called the privates "Comrade' but because 
raw troops are always an undisciplined mob. In practice the 
democratic 'revolutionary' type of discipline is more reliable than 
might be expected. In a workers' army discipline is theoretically 
voluntary. It is based on class-loyalty, whereas the discipline of a 
bourgeois conscript army is based ultimately on fear... In the 
militias the bullying and abuse that go on in an ordinary army 
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would never have been tolerated for a moment. The normal 
military punishments existed, but they were only invoked for 
very serious offences. When a man refused to obey an order you 
did not immediately get him punished; you first appealed to him 
in the name of comradeship. Cynical people with no experience 
of handling men will say instantly that this would never 'work, 
but as a matter of fact it does 'work' in the long run. The 
discipline of even the worst drafts of militia visibly improved as 
time went on... 'Revolutionary' discipline depends on political 
consciousness - on an understanding of why orders must be 
obeyed; it takes time to diffuse this, but it also takes time to drill 
a man into an automaton on the barrack-square. (Orwell 2001: 
50-1) 
'Discipline' might name either of two modes of organising military 
cooperation: the orthodox military or the anarchist mode. The second 
proved itself sufficiently effective in the practice of war that the 
charge of 'indiscipline' is either false, or an irrelevant comment on the 
anarchist militias' lack of military courtesy. 
The second major problem for the anarchists, which they failed 
to solve, was their rivalry with the communists, who increasingly and 
with the backing of the USSR took over the republican military effort 
and government. 
Despite this failure, the anarchist militias were effective fighting 
forces, especially in the early part of the war: 
It is clear that on all of the fronts of the Spanish Civil War, 
anarchist troops made up a substantial proportion of those 
fighting in the Republican forces. On the Catalan-Aragonese, 
Levante-Teruel, and Asturias areas they constituted the majority 
of the soldiers fighting against the Rebels; elsewhere they were 
not numerically as significant but nonetheless constituted an 
important part of the Republican forces. As a general rule, they 
fought tenaciously and well and, on some fronts, held out when 
most other elements were ready to give up. In some areas, CNT 
leaders such as Ricardo Sanz, Cipriano Mera, and Jos6 Gonzalez 
Malo played key roles in organizing and leading important 
elements of the Republican army. (Alexander 1999: 248) 
There is no evidence that anarchist militias were in general less 
effective than others in prosecuting the war; there is evidence that 
they were highly effective in some cases. Nonetheless, we must judge 
that the anarchists were failures at war, for exactly the same reason 
that we must judge the communists and the other republican forces 
229 
as failures: their side lost. But this does not mean that we can ignore 
the success and effectiveness, even though in this case temporary, of 
egalitarian fighting forces. 
12.3.2 Urban organisation 
In the very early part of the civil war, many owners of industrial and 
commercial enterprises in Barcelona and the rest of Catalonia 
abandoned them, either out of sympathy for Franco's side, or out of 
fear of the revolutionary workers. The administrative gap this left was 
rapidly filled by improvised egalitarian arrangements of the workers 
themselves, drawing on trade-union organisation. Because they were 
mostly organised spontaneously and locally by the workers in 
particular factories and shops, which varied greatly in size and form 
(Dolgoff 1974: 85), these arrangements were various. But we can 
make some general isations. 
Typically, a general assembly of the workers in a particular 
enterprise elected a Comite de Control or Comite de Empressa, 
consisting of five to ten people, and theoretically including 
representatives of both the UGT and CNT (but in practice, especially 
in the early stages of the war, often CNT-dominated). This Comite 
contained delegates for different departments of the firm, and elected 
a managing director (who in some cases was the returned or 
sympathetic former owner). The director and Comite ran the 
enterprise day to day, but major decisions were brought before the 
general assembly. (Alexander 1999: 467-9. ) 
Collectives of this general kind successfully ran enterprises 
including municipal transport, telephone services, railways, gas, 
water, electricity, textile factories, the munitions industry, even 
hairdressing (Borkenau 1986: chapter 2; Souchy 1974). In Barcelona, 
workers' collectives distributed food supplies, set up communal dining 
halls, and organised themselves into a Food Workers' Industrial Union 
including bakers, butchers and dairy workers (Souchy 1974a). "Every 
shop and caf6 had an inscription saying that it had been collectivised; 
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even the bootblacks had been collectivised and their boxes painted 
red and black" (Orwell 2001: 32). In Catalonia, health services were 
collectivised and made available free to all (Leval 1974a). In general, 
urban workers' collectives successfully provided food, clothing, 
shelter, public services and war materials. 
The collectives faced problems caused by the economic 
situation in Spain, by the civil war, by their own organisational 
failings, and by their supposed allies. 1) Like much of the west, Spain 
was still feeling the effects of the great depression, and had high 
unemployment and inflation, which made the organisation of a war 
economy difficult. 2) As the war went on, the nationalist blockade 
made raw materials increasingly hard to source; physical plant was 
damaged or destroyed by bombing; and workers went to the front, 
leaving many enterprises under-staffed. 3) Because of their 
spontaneous and improvised nature, and the unpreparedness of the 
CNT's organisation, it was often difficult for individual enterprises to 
federalise and coordinate their activities. Many contemporary writers 
complain of the problem of "Factory patriotism'. Victor Alba, for 
instance, noted that "We have occasion to see how in some workers' 
sectors, to collectivize a factory or an industry consists only of 
appropriating it without consideration of the needs of the war and of 
the general organization of production, nor of whether the raw 
materials they possess are needed by other branches of production" 
(quoted in Alexander 1999: 474). 4) Both the Republican government 
and the increasingly influential Comintern-affiliated communists were 
strongly opposed to local, ground-up anarchic reorganisation of 
enterprises by their workers, and attempted ""To undermine and 
destroy the collectives" (Alexander 1999: 484). 
Despite these problems, individual collectivised enterprises 
were often highly successful, and anarchic organisation was in general 
effective: 
There is little question about the fact thatf as a result of the 
seizure of most of the manufacturing, public utilities, and many 
commercial enterprises by the workers, the economy of 
Republican Spain began functioning as normally as wartime 
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conditions permitted a few days after the suppression of the 
Rebellion there. It is also clear that the workers' collectives 
quickly created a war industry where none had existed before, 
an industry which was able to provide a substantial part of the 
weapons, vehicles and other military equipment which was used 
throughout the War by the Loyalist armed forces. At the same 
time, essential consumer goods such as textiles continued to be 
available from the factories run by the collectives. In these 
senses, the collectives were an economic success. (ibid: 487) 
We can at minimum say that, despite difficulties and failures, and in 
the face of civil war, the economy of republican Spain did not collapse 
under collective organisation. We do not know whether or not these 
organisations were sustainable in the long term, but cannot ignore 
their temporary success. 
12.3.3 Rural organisation 
Village and agricultural organisation was rapidly transformed in the 
space opened by initial victories against the military coup. The forms 
this transformation and its results took varied considerably, according 
to local opportunities, decisions, and individual peculiarities, and 
especially across three major ranges of difference. Anarchist and 
other egalitarian rural organisations varied: 1) in the precise details of 
their administrative and social organisation. 2) In the relative wealth 
of different villages. Hugh Thomas argues that the economic situation 
of a village ""Depended over-greatly on the situation before" (Thomas 
1971: 254): that is, that redistribution between poor and wealthy 
villages was ineffective. And, 3) in the balance of and relations 
between colectivistas (who collectivised their land and managed it by 
direct local democracy) and individualistas (mostly small peasant 
proprietors who remained outside the collectives, either for ideological 
reasons, or to wait and see how successful they were before joining). 
This division was exploited and widened by the republican 
government, and especially its communist members, for political 
purposes, but was often handled peaceably and reasonably on a local 
level (see for instance Goldman 1983: 64-6; Leval 1975: 209). For 
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examples of particular and various village organisations, see Dolgoff 
(1974: chapters 8-10), Goldman (1983: 64-72), and Leval (1975: 
part 2). 
Despite this variation, we can make a number of 
generalisations about agricultural and village organisation in the 
republican sector of Spain during the civil war. First, they were to 
some extent actuated by the same spirit: 
We wanted a terrestrial paradise, but not in the biblical sense: to 
live here - organized here. One man wouldn't be able to live off 
the work of another. It was the wish that each man work and not 
desire to live in luxury. One wouldn't be able to suck another's 
produce, and we would all eat. The world is work - intellectual 
and manual. (anonymous anarchist of Casas Viejas, quoted in 
Mintz 1982: 5) 
That is, a spirit of levelling and activism (and not of millennial 
religious mania). 
Second, the rapid transformation of class-bound and 
inegalitarian social forms was a bottom-up reorganisation: 
"Collectivization was not (as in the Soviet Union or Cuba) imposed 
from above by decree, but achieved from below by the initiative of the 
peasants themselves" (Dolgoff 1974: 111). 
Third,, some administrative tactics were generally adopted by 
colectivistas and accepted by individualistas. A consejo de 
administraciOn (council of administration), consisting typically of "A 
president, secretary, vice-secretary and treasurer, together with a 
number of other vocales or delegados responsible for specific 
questions such as statistics, cattle, food, the olive crop and so on" 
(Thomas 1971: 243), reported to and was recallable by a general 
assembly of the whole village (that is, not usually excluding women, 
local individualistas, or non-agricultural workers). This assembly 
heard, debated and voted on all major issues for the collective and its 
locality. Gaston Leval (1975: 207-13) gives a detailed eye-witness 
account of one such assembly in Tamarite de Litera. 
Fourth, the assemblies and councils often abolished the use of 
state-issued currency, replacing it with common stores of goods, 
ration-books, work-vouchers, and entitlements based particularly on 
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how many non-working dependents (the young, old, and ill) someone 
had to support (Dolgoff 1974a). Typically, villages organised complex 
systems of payments to individuals and families, based on formulas of 
need and work-contribution (Thomas 1971: 250-1). 
Fifth, the village collectives were probably economic successes. 
Although the figures for production by collectivised villages, and 
therefore the possibility of comparison with the system they replaced, 
are limited, we can say at minimum that the collectives were not 
economic failures. They did succeed in continuing to produce enough 
food not only for themselves but for the militias at the front. 
According to Thomas, "The most complete general account of a 
collective's finances is that of the 300-family collective of Almagro" 
(ibid: 247). Thomas has some doubts about the accuracy of these 
figures, but it appears that despite war and rapid social 
reorganisation, the Almagro collective had "75 per cent more barley... 
500 per cent more wine,, 200 per cent more olive oil., 80 per cent 
more rye, 400 per cent more peas, 300 per cent more chick-peas, 
[and] about 90 per cent more beans of varying sorts" (ibid: 248) in 
store in 1937 than the village had been able to produce before 
collectivisation. "The total value of the products possessed by the 
collective was about 50 per cent higher than in 1936" (ibid). Almagro 
may have been unusual: but we can at least say that the production 
of this village, and of many others, did not collapse under collective 
organisation. 
Sixth, the social success of the collective villages is clear. In a 
short time, they removed or effaced considerable social and economic 
inequality; instituted social support of widows, orphans and invalids; 
organised schools; and considerably extended medical care. 
Seventh, and finally, collectives to some extent fecleralised, 
coordinating their production, sharing tactics and expertise, and 
exchanging or sometimes giving food and other goods (Leval 1974; 
Thomas 1971: 244). As already noted, the redistribution towards 
equality implied by this was not entirely effective: perhaps it did not 
have time to be. 
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In general, the rural revolution was startlingly successful: 
Although these collectives varied much in their organisational 
structure, and their degree of 'utopianism', most of them 
provided their members with levels of living and a feeling of self- 
respect which they had never before enjoyed. Many of them 
considerably increased the output of the land under their control. 
(Alexander 1999: 1087) 
Although they were short-lived, had problems, and were having 
rapidly to improvise solutions in difficult circumstances, the collectives 
were succesful in creating a situation of (much more) equal power 
and making a living in it. 
In summary: in the republican sector of Spain, the opportunities and 
demands created by the coup, partially successful resistance, and 
then civil war, gave rise to rapidly improvised local organisation. 
Equal-power networks took over the organisation of military action, 
urban industry, commerce and public services, and rural and 
agricultural life. The tactics for creating and distributing power they 
used were various, but typically included the direct democratic 
creation of administrative committees, responsible to and recallable 
by general assemblies. They also included improvisations in the face 
of present problems. Ronald Fraser, for instance, records how Luis 
Santacana, an administrator in one of Catalonia's largest textile 
plants, dealt with the problem of pilfering: 
[Santacana: ] "Inevitably, collectivization could not resolve all 
problems; there were people who lacked self-discipline, a 
consciousness of what was demanded of them. There was a 
mechanic who stole a spanner. I told him he was no longer 
stealing from the capitalists, he was robbing himself and his 
fellow-workers. Under the old regime, he would have been 
sacked on the spot. 'Please, please, don't steal again... "'. Within 
a fortnight the man was back and Santacana had to take 
disciplinary action. The collective, he said, would not sack him 
because he had children and needed his weekly wage. Instead, 
they were going to move him to a new section, the cleaning 
department. But that would require public notification. - ""You 
will write your full name on the blackboard, underneath it that 
you have stolen two spanners and that is the reason for your 
move to a section where you will have no chance of further 
theft. ' "No, no, ' he cried, 'not the blackboard. ' 'Yes, ' I said, 'It 
can't hurt you to write the truth up there. ' There were no more 
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cases of indiscipline; the threat of the blackboard was 
sufficient... " (Fraser 1981: 218-9) 
The final and most important point about these various egalitarian 
organisations is that they were in general successful. In the middle of 
a crisis, and despite having to fight a war without a pre-existing 
military infrastructure, anarchist and other federated, minimally 
institutional ised, equal-power networks managed to organise food 
production and distribution, munitions manufacture, fighting forces, 
public services, and much else. "All these creative activities, these 
ventures, these changes to human relationships amounted to a 
'miraculous blossoming" (Skirda 2002: 161). 
12.4 Spanish anarchists and the Nuer: a comparison 
Spanish anarchists and the Nuer differ in many ways, the most 
obvious being their different technologies and ways of making a 
living. However they are also importantly similar, in three major 
ways. First, neither exist in a social vacuum. They are examples of the 
political condition of "Siba", that is ""Anarchy opposed to something"' 
(Gellner 1969: 1; 2). Both are bundles of minimally institutionalised 
equal-power networks existing in a complex relationship with, 
challenged by, and aware of the dangers of, much more 
institutionalised, hierarchical, unequal-power networks. So, the 
common belief that such anarchic social forms can only exist in 
unusual situations of isolation is empirically false. Second, neither 
social form can be characterised as the mere absence of tactics and 
organisations for the unequal distribution of power. Rather, both the 
Nuer and the Spanish anarchists used a complex and various set of 
tactics for creating power and for distributing it equally (or, at least, 
much more equally than many alternatives available to them). Third, 
and most generally: both Nuer and Spanish anarchists succeeded in 
creating enough power to satisfy their interests, which they share 
with most other humans, in food, shelter, company, continued life, 
and the respect of peers. The Nuer succeeded in limiting and often 
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resolving conflict; the Spanish anarchists were capable of organising 
themselves against hierarchical military aggression, with temporary 
success. 
12.5 Morals 
In chapter 11,, 1 showed that humans are capable of organising 
themselves to limit and resolve conflict in situations of equal power. 
But it might be argued that the Nuer's lack of (western, industrial) 
technology explains their success, and that our arrangements are 
sufficiently different that unequal power distributions are necessary. 
Here, however, I have shown that anarchic tactics for the creation 
and equal distribution of power have also been effective in modern 
industrial circumstances. Anarchic organisations can successfully 
organise factories and urban public services, as well as tribal conflict- 
resolution. In general, we have empirical examples of humans' ability 
to organise ourselves so as to satisfy our many interests while 
distributing power equally. 
The Spanish anarchist experiment failed, but that does not 
mean that it had to, nor that its successes can be disregarded. We 
have the capacities and tactics available to organise ourselves in this 
way. I am not making the obviously false claim that anarchic social 
forms are always stable, or will always win in a contest against 
alternative social forms. There seems no reason to suppose that this 
is true of any social form, anarchic or not. Rather, I am displaying this 
human social possibility as one amongst many others. 
12.6 Summary and conclusion 
After clearing the ground by removing the false image of Spanish 
anarchism as a 'primitive' social movement (12.1), 1 sketched the civil 
war (12.2). 1 then described the forms and successes of anarchic 
organisation during it (12.3), dividing them for convenience into three 
general types: military (12.3-1), urban (12.3.2) and rural (12.3.3) 
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organisation. I compared the Spanish civil war anarchist and Nuer 
social forms (12.4), emphasising the similarities that both are 'siba, 
that both exemplify complex tactics for distributing power equally 
(and not merely the absence of hierarchical tactics), and that both 
succeed in satisfying typical human interests, while distributing power 
equally. I drew the morals (12.5) that anarchic tactics have been 
successful in modern industrial circumstances, and that the empirical 
range of human social possibility includes successful anarchic social 
forms. 
In this and my previous chapter, I have displayed examples of 
successful anarchic organisation: fragments of hope to put up against 
the undeniable possibility of enslavement and violence which I 
displayed in chapters 9& 10. In chapter 13,1 put these fragments 
together to show the possibility of my anarchist utopia. 
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13 * Utopia 
In this chapter, I draw together the fragments of hope I discovered in 
chapters 11 & 12 to describe and prove possible my anarchist utopia. 
But because the terms 'utopia' and 'utopianism' have such polemical 
heft, I first defend (my) utopianism against some expected attacks 
and misrepresentations. 
13.1 A defence of utopianism 
A defence of utopianism implies a direct clash between arguments for 
and against utopianism. I wish it were so: but attacks on utopianism 
commonly talk past it, failing to take notice of what actual utopian 
texts are like and what actual utopists use them to do'. The contest 
between utopists and anti-utopists is less like a duel than like ships 
passing in the night. So, here, I describe utopianism and utopias in 
general (13.1.1) and show how common attacks fail to engage with 
them (13.1.2), before displaying and analysing two major purposes of 
utopists in writing and publishing utopias (13.1.3 & 13.1.4) and a 
major rhetorical feature of utopias (13.1.5) in relation to my 
purposes. I argue that utopianism understood in this way, and in 
particular my version of it, is one of a range of reasonable tactics for 
performing what I call a political intervention. 
The title of this section alludes to a series of articles by GK 
Chesterton, published under the by-line 'The Defendant' and including 
for instance "A Defence of Rash Vows" (Chesterton 1935). 
Chesterton's defensive strategy is often to show that a widespread 
belief that his subject has long ago been refuted, shown to be 
' In order to avoid confusion, I use 'utopia' to mean an example of the 
genre, or the imaginary place described in it; 'utopist' to mean the 
author of a utopia; "utopian' to mean something to do with the genre 
or place; "Utopia' (note initial capital) to mean the imaginary place 
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ridiculous, or rendered obsolete - that nobody who is anybody could 
now believe, worry about or do that - is false. I intend something 
similar here: despite a widespread belief to the contrary, no one has 
shown that utopianism is a bad idea. Its opponents are still drifting in 
fog, and have never fired on a real target. Once we understand what 
utopists do with utopias, we can see utopianism as one reasonable 
form of political action. 
13.1.1 Utopianism and utopias 
What is utopianism? Creating and making use of utopias. So, What is 
a utopia? For my purposes, it is a text which makes use of a 
historically developed and developing vocabulary of tropes, story- 
fragments and rhetorical tactics. That is, I exclude real experimental 
communities from consideration here (on such communities see, for 
instance, the studies in Pitzer 1997). The utopian vocabulary includes, 
but is not limited to: an unknown land; a framing story of a traveller 
who has visited it; an imaginary community; a story within the story 
of that community's foundation; a built environment in which the 
community's members are fully at home; a travelogue which reveals 
the lineaments of the utopia; peace, harmony and human flourishing; 
and an often satirical comparison with our own land and living 
arrangements. Example utopias include More's Utopia, Bacon's A New 
Atlantis, Morris' News from Nowhere, Wells'A Modem Utopia, and Le 
Guin's The Dispossessed and Always Coming Home (More 1992; 
Bacon 1889; Morris 1993; Wells no date; Le Guin 1975 & 1986). For 
many more examples, see for instance Berneri (1982); Claeys (1994 
& 1997); Manuel & Manuel (1979). 
One major utopian trope is a description of an ideal way of life, 
and it is worth considering the meaning of 'ideal'. It might mean a 
perfect way of life: one with nothing at all wrong with it. But more 
often, utopias describe something less than perfection in this sense. 
described by Thomas More; "Utopian' to mean one of its inhabitants; 
and "Utopia'to mean More's book. 
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Utopias typically describe either a life which is better than ours,, 
without the implication that nothing even better than that is 
imaginable, or an ideal in the weaker sense of something which is as 
good as is possible for us. That is, as good as is possible for flawed 
humans in a not entirely friendly world. 
That one can write a utopia just by making use of, modifying, 
or even alluding to or satirising the utopian vocabulary, has three 
consequences. First, the boundaries of the genre are extremely fuzzy. 
Do we want to include, for example, Samuel Butler's Erewhon, or Iain 
M Banks" 'culture' novels (Butler 1968; e. g. Banks 1988)? This 
problem is made worse by anachronistic, but sometimes useful, 
extension of the genre back into the period before its explicit 
foundation: do we want to include Republic? Second, the utopian 
vocabulary can productively be combined with other vocabularies and 
tactics. Science-fiction, in particular, provides a rich resource for 
combination with utopian tactics (see, for instance, the work by Wells, 
Le Guin and Banks I have already mentioned; on the general 
relationship between utopian and science-fictional writing, see 
Hardesty 1987). 
Third, because one can write a utopia just by making use of the 
vocabulary, we cannot completely specify in advance for what 
particular purposes, by whom, nor to express what particular ideal, 
the vocabulary might be used. It can be and has been used for 
purposes of satire,, criticism, experimental community design, moral 
polemic, and sheer creative game-playing, by Christians, 
behaviourists, anarchists, socialists, libertarians and others. The 
ideals it has been used to express include monastic communism, 
enlightened technocracy, arts-and-crafts federalism, and shamanic 
anarchy, amongst many others. 
However, one limitation we can make to the range of purposes 
for which utopias have been used is that typically, they have been 
political interventions. By calling utopias interventions, I mean that 
they are attempts to act in public - to do something to and with 
others, whether it is to debate, to motivate, to shock,, to delight - by 
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writing and publishing. I mean political in a wide sense, as covering 
not only, for instance, parliamentary activity, but all human sociability 
and interaction. Whatever particular purpose and ideal it is intended 
to serve and present, we can expect that a utopia will be a political 
intervention in this sense. I will argue in 13.1.3 and 13.1.4 that we 
can make two further specifications of the purposes of many utopias. 
Given the variation of utopias, if by a defence of utopianism we 
mean a defence of all of the particular purposes and ideals elaborated 
in examples of the genre, then the project is probably impossible and 
certainly unwise. It would end in trying to defend both Thomas More 
and L Neil Smith: both communism and libertarianism; both deism 
and secularism; both regimentation and laissez faire (More 1992; e. g. 
Smith 1980). It would also require, for me specifically, defending 
things I have no wish to defend. I find BF Skinner's ideal 
unappealing, but cannot deny, without implausible stipulation, that 
Walden Two is a utopia: Skinner explicitly says so, uses many 
elements of the utopian vocabulary, and has discussed the strand of 
the utopian genre with which he identifies himself (Skinner 1968 & 
1976). So, rather than make the mistake of trying to defend all 
utopias, I specify and defend two major purposes of many utopias, 
before considering a major rhetorical feature. The purposes are 
criticism and imagination., and the rhetorical feature is the story form. 
I intend to defend utopian tactics, not every particular utopia. But 
before displaying those tactics, I will deal with three common attacks 
on utopianism. 
13.1.2 Common attacks 
Perhaps the most common attack on utopias and utopianism is the 
simple use of the adjective 'utopian'. Used to describe a utopia, or any 
radical proposal, it means unrealistic, impractical, weird, lunatic, or 
unlikely to come true. The critic often then acts as though a telling 
point has been made, but it has not, for two reasons. First, not all 
utopias are intended to describe realistic possibilities or practical 
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manoeuvres. Some are intended to describe an unreachable goal, on 
the basis that even half way there would be better than here. Others, 
a regulative ideal against which current arrangements can be judged. 
The claim or fact that these utopias are unrealistic is irrelevant. 
Second, even when a utopia is intended to describe a real (even if 
distant or difficult) possibility, the criticism that it fails to do so 
requires evidence to be telling. Calling something 'utopian' in this 
sense, without showing that and why it is unrealistic, is not an 
argument but an example of what Martin Buber calls "'Annihilation by 
labels"' (Buber 1958: 6). 
"Utopian' is also an attack made by Marxists, and there are two 
distinct senses of the term in this usage. In the first, respectful sense, 
a utopian socialist is one of a group of pre-Marxian socialists including 
Owen, Saint-Simon and Fourier. While Marx and Engels to an extent 
shared their ideals, and gave credit for expressing them, they argued 
that the utopians were hamstrung by their historical position. Lacking 
both Marxian science and a developed proletariat, the utopians could 
not avoid becoming "Lost in pure fantasy, " (Engels 1993: 64), and 
could not be politically effective. In the second, contemptuous sense, 
a utopian is a socialist who does not share the Marxian theory of 
history, or whom Marx and Engels wanted to discredit in the eyes of 
socialist and communist movements. The first are "Utopians as 
forerunners"; the second, "Utopians as obscurantists" (Buber 1958: 
6). 
In both cases, as Buber argues, the claim is a political tactic 
internal to socialism. Marx and Engels used the epithet in the first 
sense in The Communist Manifesto, to claim Owen and the rest as 
their forerunners, and thereby to present themselves as early 
socialism's true heirs (Marx & Engels 1977: 243-5). They used or 
alluded to it in the second sense against many rivals for influence, 
including, for instance, Proudhon and Weitling. Their disciples have 
often done the same. In general, the Marxist use of the charge of 
utopianism is significant for two groups. First, for non-Marxian 
socialists in movements with strong Marxist wings, who must find 
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ways to avoid or to transform it. Second, for the rest of us, who are 
subject to the polemical force partly given to it by Marx's genius for 
contemptuous rhetoric. But the charge itself is only a matter of deep 
argumentative concern for those who accept Marx's theory of history. 
The third common attack is the use of 'utopian' to characterise 
a political intervention which presents an ideal without suggesting any 
means for reaching it. 'That sounds wonderful', says the critic, "but 
what are we to do now, or at any time,, to get there? ". As with the first 
attack, the critic often then acts as though a telling point has been 
made, but as with the first attack, it has not. It may be that this 
attack is simply an appropriation of 'utopian' as a technical term 
unrelated to the utopian genre, and I will deal with that possibility in a 
moment. But first we should note that if the critic supposes that 
utopias typically sketch ideals without any means to reach them, then 
she is wrong. More's Utopia, Morris' News from Nowhere, L Neil 
Smith's libertarian utopia in the sequence of novels beginning with 
The Probability Broach, and many others, all provide detailed accounts 
of how we might realise their ideals. Whether or not these means 
would actually work is another question: the point is that "utopian', if 
it is to have anything to do with actual utopian writing, cannot be 
used to mean an ideal without means. 
Suppose, however, that the criticism signalled by this third use 
of 'utopian' is just that some ideal, whether expressed in the utopian 
vocabulary or not, can be disregarded because it lacks an account of 
the means for achieving it. This is an odd criticism: why does the fact 
that some political intervention is incomplete mean that we can 
disregard it? An ideal without means is not a complete system, but 
why are only complete systems worth reading? "All ideal, no means' 
might be a telling criticism of an individual political actor, but it is no 
criticism at all of a political text. John Rawls provides no account of 
how to get to the ideal just society he describes in A Theory of 
Justice, because that is not the task he has set himself, and to attack 
Rawls as a 'utopian' would be to miss the point. I do not provide an 
account of how to get to my ideal either, because, again, that is not 
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the task I have set myself. My argument is that the anarchist utopia is 
a possible social form for humans. To attack that argument as 
'utopian' would, again, be to miss the point (although I do give some 
consideration, below, to the idea that expanding the assumed bounds 
of possibility might in itself be one means for starting the journey 
from here to there). There is nothing as such wrong with essays, as 
opposed to systems; and this is lucky, because if there were, most of 
us who write would be subject to the same criticism. 
These three kinds of attack, and especially the first and third, 
are likely to come up whenever utopias or utopianism are mentioned. 
I have argued that none of them is telling, but in order to defend 
utopianism,, more is needed. Having shown what utopias are not, I 
need to show what they (historically and typically) are, and I 
therefore now sketch and discuss three typical features of utopian 
political interventions. 
13.1.3 Criticism 
In 4.4.2,1 characterised the critical purpose of the anarchist rhetorical 
trope I discovered there, by comparison with utopias. As I noted 
there,, this utopian form of criticism - broad external criticism by 
comparison - is not the only way of criticising something. But what, 
exactly, is wrong with it? We can argue of particular utopias that we 
do not in fact prefer that specific ideal to our own life: More's and 
other utopias can seem stagnant, regimented tyrannies, as is 
dramatised by Aldous Huxley in Brave New World (Huxley 1955; 
before characterising Huxley as an anti-utopian, we should note that 
he also wrote a utopia, Island - Huxley 1994). But even if we do not 
adopt the ideal, the criticism can stand. That there is something badly 
wrong with here and now can be pointed out even by comparison with 
something which, we decide, is also wrong, and that some particular 
utopia fails to convince does not prove the tactic a bad one. I do not 
mean to suggest that this form of criticism is the only reasonable or 
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workable one, which would be ridiculous, but only that there is no 
obvious reason why it should not be one such form. 
Utopias are typically and amongst other things broad external- 
critical political interventions. The comparison this involves is extreme 
in covering all or almost all of our here and now, and in suggesting 
that very deep changes are necessary. Utopianism, the creation and 
use of utopias, is one but not the only way of making criticisms, and 
is particularly suited to radical criticism. I can find no argument to 
show that this is a bad or unreasonable form of political intervention, 
and therefore conclude that I have succeeded in defending utopianism 
as criticism to the extent required by my purposes. The onus is on 
critics of utopianism to show that criticism either cannot or should not 
be performed in this way. 
As I stated in 1.3, my focus in this thesis is on the factual 
rather than the normative element of anarchism. So, although I do 
intend to compare our current arrangements with my ideal, I am 
more interested in the second typical purpose of utopias. 
13.1.4 Imagination and social possibility 
The second major feature of utopias and utopianism which I want to 
emphasise is imagination. Clearly, utopists exercise imagination in 
inventing and picturing their ideals, but what I want to point out is 
that one typical purpose of utopias is to expand the political 
imaginations of their readers. That is, first, to attack our acceptance 
of here and now as inevitable, inescapable, and as good as we can 
expect. 'Things in the past could not have worked out any differently; 
having got here, we cannot get away; and this is as good as things 
have been or will get'. In this explicit form, it is clear how strong and 
strange this assumption is, but it is nonetheless widespread. Not all 
utopias are intended to describe real possibilities: but some are, and 
one of their purposes is, second, to assert and defend the possibility 
of better alternatives to what we now have. "Political philosophy is 
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realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought of as 
the limits of practical political possibility" (Rawls 1999a: 6). 
We can now see a further analogy between utopianism and the 
anarchist trope I discovered in chapter 4: both are intended to assert, 
first, the wide variety of human social possibility, and second, the 
possibility within that range of better (or even ideal) alternatives. The 
imaginative purpose typical of utopias is very much like the 
exemplification of human social variety and possibility made by the 
anarchist trope. 
We are contained in and to some extent constructed by our 
local circumstances and ways of thinking, and it is therefore easy to 
believe that nothing could be much different. This belief is further 
supported by our tendency to interpret other ways of life in terms 
derived from our own, and so falsely to minimise their differences. 
There are several ways in which we might attack it. One, for instance, 
is to show that what we have here and now has a history: that things 
were not always like this, and that our arrangements were preceded 
by other social forms. I used this tactic in discussing states in chapter 
9. Utopias use another tactic: utopists attempt to expand the political 
imaginations of their readers by giving an account of a better life 
somewhere else (in place or time), and by defending its possibility. 
False assumptions about the limited possibilities of human 
sociability can stand in the way of movement towards a better way of 
life: Kropotkin believed that the claim that human limitations prevent 
the realisation of communism did so, for instance (see chapter 3). So, 
the expansion of political imagination which is one frequent function 
of utopias may have a revolutionary potential of its own. It has been 
argued by Miguel Abensour, amongst others,, that part of the point of 
William Morris' utopianism, and by extension part of the point of (non- 
classical, non-juridico-political) utopianism in general,, is the 
""Education of desire"' (Thompson 1976: 793, translating Abensour). A 
utopia can transform or crack open the imaginations of its readers, 
and thereby not only show that what was thought impossible is 
possible, but also be a first step towards its realisation. However, as 
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already noted (1.4 & 13.1.2), 1 have not intended to write about 
revolutionary tactics or about the means by which we might achieve 
utopia: my concern is a particular utopia's possibility. 
Whatever the revolutionary potential of the expansion of 
imagination, the possibility of utopia can be defended in a wide 
variety of ways. For example: More initially asserts the possibility of 
the Utopians' social form by having Hythloday say that they are no 
more intelligent than we are. "As a matter of fact, I believe we 
surpass them in natural intelligence, but they leave us far behind in 
their dilligence and zeal to learn" (More 1992: 29-30). The suggestion 
is that, since the Utopians have no special advantage over us, and 
started,, as it were, in the same place as we did, we could have done 
and still could do what they did with the endowments we share. The 
difference between us and the Utopians is not that they are of a 
different natural kind from us, but that they have invented better 
ways of living together, and "What ingenuity has discovered or chance 
hit upon could have turned up just as well in one place as the other" 
(ibid: 29). Utopians are humans, not angels; Utopia is a place on 
Earth, not in heaven; we can do as well as the Utopians. 
This way of defending the possibility of utopia for us, by 
grounding it on a shared human nature 2, is common to many utopias. 
They need not be set literally on Earth. Wells' utopia is set on a planet 
"Out beyond Sirius, far in the deeps of space, beyond the flight of a 
cannon-ball flying for a billion years", but that planet is completely 
Earth-like: ""The same continents, the same islands, the same oceans 
and seas, another Fuji-Yama is beautiful there dominating another 
Yokohama" (Wells no date: 318), and its inhabitants are just humans 
who have done better than us at creating a social life for themselves. 
Again, the implication is that if these familiar people, in this familiar 
place, can do so well, then so can we. Utopias are typically far away 
in terms of distance, but close in terms of who lives there. This does 
2 That is, a human character to which, at minimum, claim 1 (that it is 
real or permanent or transhistorically present in humans) and claim 2 
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not preclude,, and indeed often implies, that their inhabitants have 
built better selves for themselves than we have: but they built out of 
the same materials. 
The defence of these possibilities is rarely explicit in utopias. 
But utopists often describe people like us, in a place like our place, 
succeeding in creating an ideal social form, at least in the sense of 
one better than ours. The intended implication of this display is the 
real possibility of that ideal society, grounded on a human nature 
which we share with its inhabitants. Showing other people acting in 
ways which are not completely alien to our endowments, but which 
are involved in and give rise to a better life than ours, implicitly 
defends the possibility of that life. 
Although this way of defending the possibility of some utopian 
ideal is common,, I do not think it particularly convincing. As I argued 
in 4.4,, the Kropotkinite version of the anarchist trope, which uses real 
exemplary social forms, is a better tactic for defending the possibility 
of ideal alternatives to our current arrangements than is the 
Godwinite version,, which uses imaginary social forms. Accounts of 
human nature are in general highly controversial and difficult to 
prove, and are especially so when they are designed to allow human 
social forms which, for whatever reason, appear unrealistic. I have 
stipulated and appealed to a minimalist and non-normative account of 
human nature (see 5.5). But I do not use it directly to defend the 
possibility of my utopia. Instead, and in line with the Kropotkinite 
version of the trope, I defend my utopia by discovering real fragments 
of the utopian social form in human history and social life. One 
common and unconvincing utopian argument for defending the 
possibility of an ideal is: 1) humans are like this; 2) this nature allows 
my ideal social form; and therefore 3) my utopia is possible. My 
argument, on the other hand, is: 1) humans have as a matter of fact 
lived in various ways, including these; 2) so these ways of life are 
(that it is shared by all humans), from my definition of an idea of 
human nature in 3.1, both apply. 
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possible for humans; and therefore 3) my utopia,, which is made up of 
these fragments, is possible. 
We can now say of utopias that they are typically political 
interventions intended not only to criticise here and now, but to assert 
and defend the possibility of better alternatives to here and now. The 
expected response to a utopia is not just to say 'that sounds 
wonderful'. but to change one"s beliefs about what is really possible 
for us: that is, to expand one"s political imagination. 
Particular utopias may fail to convince us of their possibility, or 
defend what is really impossible, or both. I have suggested that the 
common (although not universal) defensive tactic of asserting or 
implying, and relying on, a rich account of shared human nature, is 
unconvincing. But as with the critical side of utopianism,, I can find no 
argument to attack the assertion and defence of the possibility of a 
better life, just as such. What is unreasonable about this kind of 
political intervention? Lacking an argument to show that one should 
never write utopias (or, perhaps, never read them), I conclude that I 
have defended this second typical purpose of utopias, to the extent 
required by my purposes. Again, the onus is on critics of utopianism 
to show that there is something wrong with this utopian tactic. 
13.1.5 Stories 
I have so far defended and described two major purposes of utopias 
and utopianism: criticism and imagination, both of particular kinds. 
My argument has been that these are reasonable modes of political 
intervention, not that they are the only such modes. The third feature 
I want to consider is the usual rhetorical form of utopias. Unlike many 
other kinds of political intervention - manifestos, works in political 
theory, speeches - utopias are typically stories. That is, they are both 
narrative and (openly) fictional. By calling utopias narrative, I mean 
that they are structured by a plot (even if it is rudimentary: a 
character finds herself in a strange place, meets friendly natives, is 
shown around, and comes home to tell us) and around characters 
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(even if they are also rudimentary), as opposed to being structured, 
for instance, by an analytic division of the subject matter. By calling 
them fictional, I mean that their narratives are literally false, known 
to be false by their authors, and paracligmatically intended to be 
known to be false by their audienceS3. 
Often, utopian stories are structured by the visit of a traveller 
(or travellers) from the author's world to the utopia. In More, 
Campanella and Bacon, this traveller is an explorer and sailor; in 
Morris and Wells, someone who finds himself transported, without 
explanation, to the utopia. This form is in the first place a useful plot 
device for describing the utopia, since the traveller, a stranger, can be 
shown things and have things explained which a local would find 
obvious or uninteresting. The stranger is the reader's representative 
in utopia, and as "one of us", is used to focus on what we find 
interesting. In the second place, this device is a further dramatisation 
of criticism. By juxtaposing the utopia with someone strange to it but 
familiar to us, the author emphasises the comparison between us and 
them and between here and there, and thereby emphasises the 
criticism which that comparison is intended to make. The comparison 
and criticism is further emphasised by the return of the traveller to 
tell us what she has seen. Her travel and return typically frame 
utopian stories: she is our representative there, and then the 
representative of the ideal alternative which there represents, when 
she comes home. 
31 say only paradigmatically intended to be known to be false, 
because there is room for play in, and utopists often have played 
with, presenting fiction as fact. More scattered Utopia with coded 
indications that his story is not true - the river running through the 
main Utopian city, for instance, is called 'Anyder', which means "no 
water' - but convinced many of his contemporaries, and probably 
enjoyed the joke. Utopists are not alone in playing with fiction-as- 
fact: the Coen brothers, for instance, prefaced their film Fargo (Coen 
& Coen 1996) with the statement "'This is a true story". It is not, the 
Coens later said that the truth-claim was part of the fiction, and it 
appears in the screenplay (http: //bigloosecannon. com/downloadsflles 
/scripts/fargo. pdf, accessed 1/11/02). 
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Not all utopias use this device. In Le Guin's Always Coming 
Home, for instance, the main characters live in the utopia, and the 
narrative which structures our discovery of it is not a travelogue but a 
web of biographies, fables, and stories for children. In these cases, we 
take on the role of the traveller: the reader is the stranger. But in 
both cases, the utopist invites us to compare here with there, and to 
find here wanting. 
The device of the stranger's visit also relates to the imaginative 
purpose of utopias. Psychologically at least, the suggestion that one 
can get from here to there and back again emphasises the point I 
made in discussing the imaginative purpose of utopias: they may be 
physically far away, but they are also close to us. Utopia is in this 
universe, not heaven. Where the traveller device is not used, and we 
are the strangers, we are typically encouraged to the same 
psychological conclusion by identification with the viewpoint character 
or characters. Le Guin's Stone Telling, Pandora, and others, are 
strange people, but ones who can become friends. 
Whatever its particular plot, the fact that a utopia is introduced 
to us in a story, not an analysis, is rhetorically useful. A story requires 
concrete and small elements as well as the general ones on which a 
political theory, for instance, would focus. The traveller or viewpoint 
character is shown living day to day in utopia, and so encounters not 
only justice but the judge; not only economics, but the sights and 
smells of a market; not only the necessity of producing clothes, but, 
for instance, a Thames waterman who wears a costume "Of dark blue 
cloth, simple enough, but without a stain on it" and "'A brown leather 
belt around his waist, and I noticed that its clasp was of damascened 
steel beautifully wrought" (Morris 1993: 47). The concreteness which 
is required and encouraged by the story form can be persuasive in 
furthering both the critical and the imaginative purposes of utopias. 
Despite its rhetorical advantages, I do not emulate this feature 
of many utopias, for four reasons. First, this is a work of political 
philosophy, and explicitly intended, as stated in 1.2, to promote 
conversation between anarchists and academics. I suspect that telling 
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a story about a stranger's round trip to utopia would not further this 
purpose. Second, I am a philosopher, not a novelist, and any attempt 
I made at writing a narrative utopia would be likely to be poor. I do in 
fact think that it is worth writing anarchist narrative utopias, and that 
Ursula Le Guin's The Dispossessed and Always Coming Home (Le Giun 
1975 & 1986) are good examples. But I do not think that this is the 
place, nor that I am the person, to produce another one. Third, I use 
the Kropotkinite mode of defending the possibility of my utopia: I rely 
on accounts of real human social forms. Telling a narrative fiction 
would therefore work against my defensive strategy. Fourth, I have 
argued in 8.1.1 that there are no social totalities, and telling a story 
about a trip to some geographically or temporally distinct place might 
wrongly suggest that I intended to describe utopia as (metaphorically) 
an island, rather than as a mode of social organisation. 
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In this section I have characterised utopianism as one kind of political 
intervention, carried out by writing and publishing utopias, which are 
pieces of writing making use of a historically developed vocabulary of 
tropes and tactics, and which are therefore not characterisable by 
some one particular purpose or ideal. I then distinguished and 
defended two typical, although not universal, purposes of utopias: 
criticism by extreme external comparison, and expansion of political 
imagination by asserting and defending alternative social possibilities. 
I showed that these purposes were analogous to the purposes of the 
anarchist trope I identified in chapter 4. Finally, I considered and 
chose not to use the narrative and fictional form common to many 
utopias. 
Of course, there are other ways than utopianism of criticising 
here and now, other ways of expanding political imagination, and 
other forms for political interventions. I have emphasised that I am 
not arguing for the use of this particular way of doing these things to 
the exclusion of other ways. I am not arguing that we should replace 
political theory, or speeches, or manifestos, or arguments in pubs, 
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with utopias. I am arguing for accepting and using utopias as part of a 
wide repertoire of ways of intervening politically. 
My utopia, like many others, has two purposes: criticism of our 
current arrangements by external comparison, and the 
exemplification of the possibility of better alternatives. In line with my 
intention, stated in 1.3, to concentrate on the factual over the 
normative elements of anarchism, the second of these purposes is the 
more important here. I have suggested that one common way of 
defending the possibility of alternatives, by appeal to a rich idea of 
shared human nature,, is unconvincing, and indicated my alternative 
defensive tactic. In the next section, I describe my utopia and show, 
by recalling the fragments of anarchic social possibility which I 
discovered in chapters 11 & 12, that it is possible. 
13.2 Some features of my anarchist utopia 
In 1.9 1 sketched my utopia as follows: my anarchist utopia consists 
of multiple interwoven networks of social humans pursuing their huge 
variety of interests, from the most basic in making a living,, to the 
most subtle in art, science and communication. Power is equally 
distributed in these networks. Coordination between individuals and 
their networks is achieved, not by an attempt to unify them into a 
single territorial hierarchy, but by federalisation and agreement. 
Conflict is not absent, but is limited and resolved by mediation and 
negotiation. Individuals' activity is various and varying, not limited to 
particular tasks by the division of labour. I now show by empirical 
example that the central elements of this ideal are possible for social 
humans. 
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13.2.1 Equal-power networks 
Networks of social humans can distribute power equally amongst 
themselves. Humans can create and maintain a wide variety of power 
distributions, using a huge range of tactics (including but not limited 
to the tactics I have described in 6.5,6.6,, 9.21 10.3 & 11.1). Some of 
these distributions, including those exemplified by states and slavery, 
are extremely unequal. Others, including those exemplified by the 
Nuer and the Spanish civil war anarchists, are much more equal, and 
tend towards actual equality. These distributions are not merely 
consequences of the (lucky) absence of anti-egalitarian tactics,, but of 
the conscious use of tactics for the creation and preservation of 
equality. So,, equal-power networks are one among a wide range of 
human social possibilities. 
13.2.2 Production and distribution 
Production and distribution to satisfy human interests can be carried 
out by federated, minimally institutionalised., equal-power networks of 
humans, rather than, for instance, by slaves working for the benefit of 
masters who hold extreme power over them, or by hierarchies of 
owners, managers and workers who are differentially rewarded 
according to the dictates of property and authority discourses. In the 
social experiments made by anarchists and others during the Spanish 
civil war, we have an empirical example of the possibility of this 
arrangement, and its success in satisfying a wide variety of interests: 
food production and distribution; public services including transport, 
fire-brigades, education and health services; even munitions 
manufacture and military organisation for self-defence. Humans in 
equal-power networks are capable of creating the power to satisfy 
their interests. 
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13.2.3 Federal coordination 
Relations between networks can be managed by federalisation and 
negotiation rather than by, for instance,, attempting to organise all of 
the inhabitants of some territory into a discrete hierarchical 
organisation controlled from an administrative centre. As I have 
admitted, federal coordination between collectives in the Spanish civil 
war was not fully effective. But even in the short time available, and 
in difficult circumstances, it was partly so. Humans have been and 
therefore are, to some extent, capable of managing their relations 
with other groups by organised negotiation, by assigning the tasks of 
communication and coordination to representatives, and by oversight 
of those representatives by local general assemblies. Hierarchy is one 
way, but not the only way, to coordinate networks of humans. We do 
not know how successful Spanish anarchic federalisation would have 
been in the long term. In general, we do not know how far federal 
coordination could spread among equal-power networks, and to what 
extent network organisation would remain local. We do know that 
federalisation is a possible tactic. 
13.2.4 Conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution can be managed by mediation, rather than by 
distributing (coercive) power to some institution or elite. The Nuer 
provide us with an empirical demonstration that, even where people 
have cultural ly-sanctioned tendencies towards violence, conflict 
resolution can be managed in and by equal-power networks. We can 
mutually organise conflict-resolution by assigning the task of 
mediation to ritual and coalition-forming specialists, and thereby 
satisfy the typical human interest in the absence or limitation of 
violence. 
one possible response to this argument is to suggest that 
conflict resolution by mediation may be possible in times of (relative) 
peace, but would collapse in war. This may be so. But as I showed in 
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chapter 9, war is characteristically a practice of states. Few humans 
are perfectly peaceful, but humans living in and with states have 
historically been far less peaceful than humans living without them. 
13.2.5 The division of labour 
Cooperative labour does not have to involve the permanent division of 
a project into sub-tasks assigned to individuals who perform only that 
task. Dividing up some large project into smaller sub-tasks is an 
available and useful tactic for cooperation: but as I argued in 9.2, 
humans have not always made such divisions permanent. Humans 
have been able to, and therefore can, organise cooperation without 
limiting and simplifying individuals' lives to some one, ever-smaller 
task. Although we have reason to believe that condemning someone 
to spend the rest of her life working only with a cash-register is 
profitable for some, we have no reason to believe that it is a 
necessary feature of human social life. Other modes of cooperation 
are available and can, as in the case of the Nuer, produce enough 
power to satisfy our interests. 
13.2.6 Networking 
In my utopia, humans do an enormous amount of networking: they 
organise and maintain multiple, interacting social networks for the 
satisfaction of a huge variety of interests. We may worry that few 
would bother. Why not retreat into solitary life and let someone else 
do all the talking and organising? It is undeniable that this might 
happen in some utopian anarchic social form, and leave it either 
culturally and materially impoverished, or easy prey for the empire 
next door. However all of my descriptions of landmarks in chapters 9- 
12 exemplify the fact that humans are highly social creatures. Most 
humans spend an enormous amount of time and effort on creating, 
maintaining, transforming and destroying social networks, using a 
vast variety of tactics for the creation of power, its distribution, and 
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for thereby satisfying their many interests. Some of our tactics are 
violent; some of the networks and institutions we form are disastrous; 
but social interaction is what we typically do. This fragment of my 
utopia is exemplified by all human history and social activity. 
13.2.7 Siba 
It might be supposed that, even if the anarchic social form I have 
described is possible,, its realisation would require a lucky isolation 
from the challenge of non-anarchic forms and especially states and 
slavery. But as I pointed out in 12.4,, we have empirical examples of 
'siba', of anarchic social forms existing in complex and difficult 
relationships with non-anarchic forms. As the egalitarian militias in 
Spain show (see 12.3.1), anarchic equal-power networks are capable 
of organising military self-defence. Further, and as I emphasised in 
chapter 10,, resistance is a permanent feature even of the most 
extreme power-inequalities. So, it is not the case either that the 
realisation of my anarchist utopia would require colonising a new 
planet,, or that such a utopia would be easy prey for the first 
conqueror to come along. 
0 
In this section I have set out the main features of my utopia, in 
structural rather than narrative form. I have shown that these 
features are humanly possible ways of living and organising, by 
displaying the empirical examples of these fragments of utopia which 
I discovered in my Landmark chapters. 
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13.3 What shall we do with utopia? 
Given that utopia is possible, how are we to regard it? As a motivation 
for longing, for personal emulation, for immediate action, or what? I 
do not have a pat answer to this question, but several responses to it 
are available in the anarchist tradition. 
One of the many possible taxonomies of anarchism divides it 
into separatist and immanentist forms. Representatives of both regard 
utopia as possible and desirable, but their attitudes to it differ. For 
separatists,, utopia is on the other side of a radical break with current 
arrangements, whether spacial, brought about by setting up new 
communities and colonies, or temporal,, brought about by destroying 
those current arrangements and starting again from scratch. For both 
colonising and destroying-and-building separatists, utopia is a new 
design, freed from the irrationalities of tradition,, historical 
entitlements to authority and property, and the whole paraphernalia 
of the old life. For immanentists, utopia is present in seed form in, 
and can or will grow out from,, our current arrangements. For them, 
utopia is buried in the here and now. 
As with many taxonomies, the division between separatist and 
immanentist is not sharp: there is a continuum of views between the 
extremes. Some anarchists believe, like Marxists, that utopia is on the 
other side of a revolution which is immanent in our current social 
form. Kropotkin, for instance, regards the revolution as growing out of 
current arrangements, and is in that sense an immanentist. But he 
distinguishes between "The dramatic side of revolution" (Kropotkin 
1995: 26) as a necessary destructive episode, and the real revolution, 
which he envisions on separatist lines as the conscious organisation of 
utopia, by the people, in the absence of states and capitalism: 
A revolution in Europe means... the unavoidable stoppage of at 
least half the factories and workshops. It means millions of 
workers and their families thrown on the streets... Society itself 
will be forced to take production in hand, in its entirety, and to 
reorganise it to meet the needs of the whole people. But this 
cannot be accomplished in a day, or even in a month; it must take 
a certain time to reorganise the system of production, and during 
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this time millions of men will be deprived of the means of 
subsistence... There is only one really practical solution of the 
problem - boldly to face the great task which awaits us, and 
instead of trying to patch up a situation which we ourselves have 
made untenable, to proceed to reorganize production on a new 
basis. (ibid: 56-7) 
Kropotkin is an immanentist about the revolution which will usher 
utopia in, but a separatist in how he conceives its creation. 
Colonising separatists have included the founders, like Josiah 
Warren, of American utopian communities, like New Harmony. These 
utopian experiments, influenced by Robert Owen and by Charles 
Fourier, were an important strand of nineteenth-century American 
radicalism; they have been a source of inspiration for anarchists, 
communitarians,, romantics, religious nonconformists, and others, 
ever since (see for instance Pitzer 1997). However, their separatist 
ideal of self-sufficient communities, organised on rational and moral 
grounds, operates in parallel with an immanentist ideal most clearly 
expressed in the experiments in community banking carried out by 
Warren, Benjamin Tucker and others. 
Bakunin's very different separatism regards utopia as 
unachievable in a colony separated from mass society. Freedom 
cannot be achieved piecemeal: 
Man is really free to the extent that his freedom, fully 
acknowledged and mirrored by the free consent of his 
fellowmen, finds confirmation and expansion in their liberty. Man 
is truly free only among equally free men; the slavery of even 
one human being violates humanity and negates the freedom of 
all. (Bakunin 1980: 76) 
The freedom of individuals, and their proper authority over 
themselves, are of vital importance to Bakunin, but they can be 
achieved only by everyone, not individually. The separation he 
believes necessary is therefore the complete destruction of current 
arrangements: the abolition of organised religions, monarchy, 
"Classes, ranks, and privileges", 
Abolition, dissolution, and moral, political, and economic 
dismantling of the all-pervasive,, regimented, centralized State, the 
alter ego of the Church... Abolition of all state universities... 
Abolition of the state judiciary... Abolition of all criminal, civil, and 
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legal codes now administered in Europe... Abolition of banks and 
all other institutions of state credit. Abolition of all centralized 
administration, of the bureaucracy, of all permanent armies and 
state police. (ibid: 78) 
Bakunin is the most radical, or at least the most vocal,, of separatists. 
Nothing will do for him but a complete break with the current social 
order: 
We must overthrow from top to bottom this effete social world 
which has become impotent and sterile... We must first purify our 
atmosphere and transform completely the milieu in which we 
live... The social question takes the form primarily of the 
overthrow of society. (quoted in Carr 1975: 173) 
Bakunin's thought is often unoriginal: according to Peter Marshall, it 
"Consists largely of Proudhonian politics and Marxian economics" 
(Marshall 1993: 270). His legacy to anarchists, apart from his example 
as a revolutionary activist, has been his universal separatism. He 
probably inspired Buenaventura Durutti: 
We have always lived in slums and holes in the wall. We will know 
how to accommodate ourselves for a time. For, you must not 
forget, we can also build. It is we the workers who built these 
palaces and cities here in Spain and in America and everywhere. 
We, the workers, can build others to take their place. And better 
ones! We are not in the least afraid of ruins. We are going to 
inherit the earth; there is not the slightest doubt about that. The 
bourgeoisie might blast and ruin its own world before it leaves 
the stage of history. We carry a new world here, in our hearts. 
(interview with Pierre van Paasen, Toronto Star,, September 
1936 4) 
Other anarchists have also been optimistic about ruins, and about the 
utopia which will or could be built on them. 
In contrast, William Godwin believes that the exercise and 
education of free individual judgement will lead to the gradual 
improvement of society from within. He rejects violent revolution and 
secession as means for reaching utopia, and argues instead for the 
steady progress of the whole through cautious deliberation: 
The true instruments for changing the opinions of men are 
argument and persuasion. The best security for an advantageous 
4 http: //fl a g. bIa ckened. net/revolt/spai n/d urruti_interview. htm If 
accessed 8/9/03. 
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issue is free and unrestricted discussion. In that field truth must 
always prove the successful champion. If then we would improve 
the social institutions of mankind,, we must write, we must argue, 
we must converse... There are two principles therefore which the 
man who desires the regeneration of his species ought ever to 
bear in mind, to regard the improvement of every hour as 
essential in the discovery and dissemination of truth, and willingly 
to suffer the lapse of years before he urges the reducing his theory 
[sic] into actual execution. (Godwin 1985: 115-6) 
Rational discussion and choice will lead, gradually, to utopia. 
Not all immanentists have had Godwin's faith in the progressive 
perfection of humanity. Many have instead relied on the readoption of 
power by already-existing equal-power groups, or on the voluntary 
creation of alternative anarchic organisations in the interstices of our 
current arrangements, to replace them from within. Proudhon came to 
reject revolutionary separatist action in favour of gradual 
transformation, led by (his) economic theory, towards utopia. Hakim 
Bey recommends face-to-face interaction - dinner parties, quilting bees, 
art projects, tongs - to overcome the mediation and loneliness which he 
sees as the main expressions of the current distortion of human life 
(Bey 1994). Colin Ward argues that: 
An anarchist society, a society which organises itself without 
authority, is always in existence, like a seed beneath the snow, 
buried under the weight of the state and its bureaucracy, 
capitalism and its waste, privilege and its injustices, nationalism 
and its suicidal loyalties, religious differences and their 
superstitious separatism. (Ward 1973: 18) 
Anarcho-syndicalists are immanentists in the sense that they regard 
one and the same thing, the industrial workforce organised into 
voluntary and federalised syndicates, as being both the instrument of 
revolution and the form of utopia, already present within current 
arrangements. Despite their differences, Proudhon, Bey, Ward and the 
syndicalists all regard utopia as immanent in and growing out of what 
we have now, rather than as separated from it by destruction or 
colonisation, by radical fractures in time or distance. 
These are merely some examples of the many possible 
attitudes to utopia. I do not intend to arbitrate between them. So far 
as I can see, all of these attitudes could be appropriate in particular 
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circumstances, individuals and moods. I am sympathetic to, and 
vacillate between, several of them, and have no basis for legislating 
to others. But this is not a problem: that there are so many possible 
attitudes to utopia is part of its strength. Believing in the possibility of 
the anarchist utopia does not require one to sign anything, to join any 
political party, or to carry an identity card. It might motivate any of a 
wide range of attitudes and actions. 
13.4 Conclusion 
In 13.1,1 gave a general account of utopias and utopianism, and 
defended them against some common but misguided attacks. 
Utopianism is one among many reasonable ways of performing a 
political intervention. At the same time, I specified my political 
intervention here as utopian, by showing the analogies between the 
purposes of the anarchist comparative trope and of many utopias. 
Those purposes are, first, criticism by external comparison, and 
second, assertion of the wide variety of human sociability and of the 
specific possibility within it of an ideal social form. Given my project 
as I have specified it, the second is the more important for me here. I 
argued that the tactic used in many utopias to support the possibility 
of the ideal alternative, appeal to a rich idea of shared human nature, 
is unconvincing, and described my own, different tactic. In 13.2,1 
deployed that tactic: I constructed a utopia by pulling together the 
real fragments of anarchic sociability I discovered in previous 
chapters. The argument is that,, since humans really have lived in 
these ways, we could. My anarchic utopia is possible for creatures like 
us. In 13.3,1 considered, but did not decide between, some of the 
possible motivational consequences of expanding our political 
imaginations to include this utopia. 
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14 * Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I summarise my project, argument and 
conclusions, and consider their significance. 
14.1 Reasons not to marginalise anarchism 
In 1.11 1 suggested that there were five reasons for the 
marginalisation of anarchism. I dealt quickly with the first two: 
anarchists are not typically, first, terrorist bomb-makers, nor second, 
pathetic nihilists. The third accusation was that anarchism is a kind of 
skepticism. I dealt with it in chapter 2, by showing that the analogy 
between anarchism and skepticism is only that both have been 
systematically misrepresented in some academic discourses. The 
fourth was that anarchists are primitivists, and I dealt with it in 
chapter 3, by showing that two important anarchists do not hold the 
required beliefs about human nature or history, and therefore that the 
generalisation 'anarchists are primitivists' cannot stand. In chapter 4, 
I explained the mistaken accusation of primitivism and discovered a 
common anarchist trope. In the rest of the thesis, I developed and 
used a form of argument based on that trope to refute the fifth and 
most interesting reason for marginalisation, the beliefs that 
utopianism is unreasonable and that the anarchist utopia is 
impossible. 
My argument was as follows: in chapters 5-8 1 solved a major 
problem with my proposed argument-form by developing a conceptual 
toolkit for analysing and comparing human sociability. In chapters 9- 
12,1 used it to describe, and place within the range of human social 
possibility, both some familiar and disastrous social forms, and some 
(perhaps) less familiar fragments of hope. In chapter 13,1 argued 
that utopianism was one reasonable form of political intervention, and 
then constructed a utopia from those fragments. I argued that 1) 
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humans have as a matter of fact lived in the ways discovered in these 
fragments; so 2) these ways of life are possible for humans; and 
therefore 3) my utopia, which is made up of these fragments, is a 
possible way of life for humans. The anarchist utopia is available to 
US. 
One possible objection to this conclusion is that, despite the 
fact that my fragments are individually possible,. there might be 
relationships between each of them and their wider social 
environments which sustain them, and which make them incompatible 
with each other. So, these fragments could not co-exist in a single 
way of life. However, this response has no teeth, for two reasons. 
First, it is less a criticism than a gesture in the direction of a 
possible form of criticism. It might be the case that, for instance, the 
form of conflict-resolution by mediation I discovered in the Nuer social 
form (chapter 11) and the form of industrial production without 
hierarchy I discovered in the practice of Spanish civil war anarchists 
(chapter 12) are incompatible, because of some features of the wider 
social systems in which they were embedded and on which they 
depended. It might be the case: but without evidence to show that it 
is, as a matter of fact, the case, this is not a real objection. It is akin 
to the use of the term "utopian, without further argument, to label 
something as impossible (see 13.1.2). 
Second, and more importantly, the (gesture in the direction of) 
criticism misunderstands my project and its results. I have not 
advocated a utopian colonisation project in which we would emigrate 
to some isolated island and attempt to play out all of the fragments of 
utopia I have discovered (worse problems than the possible 
incompatibility of mediation and non-hierarchical factories would be 
facing us if we tried that, not least the impossibility of suddenly 
becoming quite differently socialised people). Rather, I have 
attempted an expansion of political imagination, by rediscovering the 
possibility of some features of a utopia (that is, an ideal way of life) in 
the joint social experience of humanity. My purpose has been to show 
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that the anarchist utopia is available to us, not to solve all of the 
problems we might face in making it our own way of life. 
14.2 Anarchists and academics,, again 
In 1.2,1 stated my subsidiary ambition to promote conversation 
between anarchists and academics. I have satisfied that ambition in 
two ways. First: by using academic literature to develop my 
conceptual toolkit, which allows me to prove an anarchist utopia 
possible, I have shown that anarchists can benefit by taking notice of 
academic work. Second: by displaying and arguing for an anarchist 
way of looking at human sociability and the possibility of an anarchist 
utopia, in academic and specifically philosophical style, I have brought 
anarchism into academic discourse. Whether or not an academic is 
pursuaded by my argument, she can at least recognise it as within the 
academic pale. 
14.3 Utopianism and political philosophy 
Political philosophy is a tradition (or perhaps a cluster of interlinked 
and nested traditions), and, as such, is probably subject to the same 
kinds of ambiguity about its unity as are other traditions. So, we are 
unlikely to be able to say what the single, unchanging task of political 
philosophy is. Different political philosophers have had different 
projects and interests, and future ones might have different ones 
again. However,, we can identify and distinguish two common kinds of 
project in which political philosophers have often been interested. 
First, there are projects which approach the question, What is to be 
done? That is: What tactics should we use to transform our world, or 
to preserve it, in line with justice or morality? This is a reasonable 
question, and answering it is a reasonable project, but it has not been 
my project. Second, there are utopian projects, which attempt to 
expand political imagination by displaying the availability to us of 
alternative ways of life. My project is an example of this second type: 
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I have argued that the joint experience of humanity, mapped by my 
conceptual toolkit, proves the availability to us of an anarchic utopian 
social form, amongst many other possibilities. I have not given any 
account of what means we might use, now or at any time, to realise 
my utopia. That was not the task I set myself, and as I argued in 
13.1.2, there is nothing wrong with essays as opposed to systems. 
14.4 Some roads not taken 
I have argued for anarchism, most importantly on the grounds that 
the anarchist utopia is possible. I now want to note some arguments 
and claims I have not made. 1) 1 have not proved the typical 
anarchist moral claims that domination,, violence, inequality and 
slavery are bad things, and that equality, freedom, self-determination 
and peace are good things (see 1.3). My interest has been in the 
factual rather than the normative side of anarchism, and I have 
therefore concentrated on showing that the utopian life anarchists 
demand is possible, not that it is morally ideal. 2) 1 have not said 
anything about how probable it is that the anarchist utopia will be 
realised, now, soon, or at any time. As I stated in 1.4,1 do not know 
how to answer the probability question for this (or any other) possible 
social form, and I doubt that anyone else does, either. I have argued 
that my utopia is possible, not that we should expect the revolution 
tomorrow. Most importantly, 3) 1 have not argued either that my 
utopia is inevitable, or that once achieved it would last forever. I 
doubt that these claims are true of any social form, whether utopian, 
adequate or disastrous. I have argued only that the anarchic utopia is 
one among the vast range of human social possibilities, which also 
includes slavery and states. To paraphrase Gustav Landauer: anarchy 
need not come, but anarchy can come and should come, when we 
wish it (cf Berman & Luke 1978: 3). 
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14.5 The negotiated settlement 
In 1.8,1 emphasised that I did not intend to present my theory as the 
one true heir of the anarchist tradition, but rather wanted to come to 
a negotiated settlement with, and thereby sympathetically to extend, 
that tradition. I have done so by drawing on some of its threads: in 
particular,, on the common rhetorical habit of critical and exemplary 
comparison which I discovered in chapter 4, on anarchist concerns 
and ideas about power, and on anarchist accounts of a utopian social 
form. My theory is an extension of the tradition, and therefore 
anarchist, because I have made this use of some of its elements. 
Further, it is specifically Kropotkinite in making use of and extending 
his version of the anarchist trope and his vision of anarchy. 
I have not picked out several other threads, not because they 
are not "real' anarchism, but because they were not useful for my 
purposes. For instance: I have not made much use of Kropotkin's 
post-Darwinian evolutionary vocabulary (which he shares with many 
other nineteenth and early twentieth-century socialists - see Stack 
2003). This is not because I think that evolution-talk is a mistake, but 
because I did not need to make more use of it than my claim that 
humans are evolved creatures and therefore share a range of general 
capacities and interests (see 5.5). For another instance: I have not 
taken on Godwin's perfectionism. I do in fact think it false, but have 
not argued for that claim here. 
My theory is anarchist and to some extent specifically 
Kropotkinite in extending the tradition in these ways. It is not, and 
does not need to be, 'true' anarchism. "Interpretations... are neither 
good nor bad for being notionally 'authentic; they are convincing 
developments of the tradition, or they are not" (Clark 1972: 269). 
Anarchism is various, and mine is just one anarchism amongst many. 
I do, however, believe that many anarchists will find my conclusions 
sympathetic. 
I have not, then, solved the problem of the unity of the 
anarchist tradition (see 1.5). Nor have I specified conditions for what 
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counts as an extension of, as opposed to a break with, this or any 
other tradition. I doubt that these problems have general solutions, 
and do not need to solve them in order to carry out my project. If 
Bakunin can be an anarchist on the grounds of calling himself one,, 
being influenced by (as well as sometimes disagreeing with) 
Proudhon, and writing texts which have family resemblances to those 
which other anarchists write, then I can be an anarchist by calling 
myself one, by being influenced by (as well as sometimes disagreeing 
with) Kropotkin, and by writing things which have such family 
resemblances. This is what I have done here, and all I require. 
14.6 Our general situation 
Humans are evolved creatures who share some general capacities, 
which can be expressed in a variety of ways, and typical interests, 
which are strong but can be trumped by others. The ways in which 
humans have expressed their capacities, pursued their interests, and 
lived together, have varied widely. But in general: human social 
activity can be mapped as consisting of multiple networks of humans 
interacting in various ways, creating power and distributing it equally 
or unequally, using a variety of tactics. These networks overlap and 
interpenetrate one another, and change in response to a variety of 
projects and stimuli. Humans have not historically organised 
themselves into unified and discrete social totalities, but have lived in 
confederal social situations. Human history is not best understood by 
cultural evolutionary stories, and there is no single, simple 
groundstate of human social life. All social networks display opposing 
tendencies to institutionalisation on the one hand and to resistance 
and interstitial emergence on the other; all are functionally 
promiscuous. Human sociability is typically changing and changeable, 
and humans are typically socially creative and plastic. 
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14.7 Our current arrangements 
Almost all humans currently live in a social situation importantly 
shaped by states (and by Atlantic slavery, amongst other influences). 
We are involved in institutions, which create and distribute power 
using several techniques, and in which hierarchical elites have and 
exercise considerable unequally distributed power of various kinds. 
We all help to create this power and its distribution, but many of us 
are at the sharp end of its inequalities: we are not free. This situation 
is historically unusual. Pristine states appear only rarely; modern 
states are a recent innovation; for most of the time there have been 
humans, there have not been states. 
14.8 Our possibilities 
States are only one amongst the vast range of human social 
possibilities. That range also includes my anarchic utopia, in which: 
power is equally distributed in our social networks; those equal-power 
networks produce and distribute goods to satisfy our interests; they 
are coordinated federally and by negotiation; conflict is resolved by 
mediation; labour is not permanently divided; humans expend a great 
deal of their time and effort on networking; and we succeed in living, 
if we must, alongside and amongst hierarchical and unequal-power 
social forms. Utopia is one of the ways in which we really can live 
together. 
14.9 Our predicament 
There are many problems which humans must face in living together, 
whatever social form we create for ourselves. Our interests can clash, 
either because they differ, or because of the scarcity of goods in 
which we share an interest. We have propensities for violence, self- 
aggrandisement, dividing the world into 'we' and "they', enslavement, 
weakness of will, and sheer stupidity. I have not argued that my 
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anarchist utopia will magically solve these problems: they are general 
human predicaments. I have argued that one of the ways in which we 
can approach living together, without being destroyed by these 
predicaments, is an anarchic utopia. No social form has ever fully 
solved these problems. States, in particular, have not been 
particularly good at doing so, and have especially failed to prevent 
violence: they have, in fact, promoted it more than any other human 
social form. But humans can live together, in a variety of ways, and 
my utopia is one of those ways. 
14.10 Human anarchy 
An anarchic utopia is possible. We can organise ourselves and live 
together in this way, amongst many other ways, and our recognition 
that this is the case is a widening of political imagination, with many 
possible motivational consequences. "'There is no final struggle" (Ward 
1973: 29) for utopia,, because it is as subject to impermanence as any 
other human social form, but it is one of our real options. The human 
potential for violence and enslavement is undeniable: but we also 
have reasons for hope. 
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